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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates to what extent Turkey’s mediation differs from Western modes of 
mediation. It poses an example for understanding the ability of peripheral countries to 
challenge the prevalent modes of mediation and emerge as problem solving agents in the 
international system. The study examines Turkey’s mediation in the interstate conflict 
between Syria and Israel between 2007 and 2008; and in the intrastate conflict in Somalia 
between 2012 and 2014. It suggests that Turkey’s search for a new identity since 2002, in 
the context of domestic, regional and international changes, paved the way for the 
emergence of its mediator role by creating a sense of confidence leading Turkey to adopt a 
more proactive stance vis-à-vis the conflicts pertaining in its region. Turkey uses mediation 
as one element in its wider foreign policy which bears resemblance to Western mediators. 
Mediation enables Turkey to exert its interest in areas in which it has historical, 
geopolitical and relational ties. Turkey gains legitimacy as a mediator from its dual identity 
by presenting itself as both Western and non-Western. Its ability to present its insiderness, 
inclusiveness and cultural ties as assets come to the fore as ways in which Turkey mediates 
differently. While cultural ties are advantages in gaining entry into conflicts; demonstrating 
commitment and dealing with the technicalities of mediation played a greater role in 
securing Turkey’s credibility as a mediator. The Turkish model entails a broader 
understanding of mediation that includes aid as complementary to diplomatic talks, 
particularly in intrastate conflicts. There is also considerable room for civil society 
involvement. The thesis suggests that Turkey’s mediator role has been too dependent upon 
more intangible aspects of cultural affinity and identity. As a result, its sustainability 
depends on the willingness of policy makers to improve the condition of Turkish mediation 
by investing in institutionalization, capacity building and expertise.  
Keywords: Mediation, International Mediation, Turkish Foreign Policy, Syrian-Israeli 
Peace Talks, Somalia Conflict  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
1.1 Research Question and Rationale 
The historical setting and the current state of the international system, to a considerable 
extent, specifies Western states and institutions as exclusive mediators and the rest as the 
subject of the mediation processes.
1
 The rest are at most subordinate allies in the attempts 
at mediation in which Western imagery occupies a central place, just as “peace” is 
regarded as an international norm produced by the West. In this view, the West as the 
“centre” is a symbol of peace-bringing while the East as the “periphery” is generally 
regarded as the “realm of survival.”2 Similarly, the possibility of an alternative mediator on 
the periphery is generally not perceived as a welcome development in the international 
system, since it challenges the prevalent modes of mediation. Actors associated with the 
periphery have long been characterized by instability, underdevelopment and disorder 
rather than as problem solving agents.  
Until recent years, there had been limited involvement from the periphery in the resolution 
of major international conflicts that have the potential to destabilize international order. 
The general assumption had been that an ideal mediator should have an image of strong 
power based on military and economic capabilities and capacity for conflict resolution. In 
this view, only the powerful countries such as the United States (US), Britain, the Soviet 
Union or international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) could play peacemaking roles. This perception has begun to 
                                                     
1
 Saadia Touval, “The Superpowers as Mediators,” in Jacob Bercovitch and J. Z. Rubin (eds.), Mediation in 
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, New York: St. Martin’s, 1992, 232-
247; Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-Building in the Periphery,” Journal of 
Balkans and Near East Studies 11, no.1, 2009: 29-41.  
2
 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?: An 
Introduction,” in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds.), Non-Western International Relations Theory: 
Perspectives on and Beyond Asia, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2010, 1; See also, James M. Goldgeier and 
Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era,” International 
Organization 46, no.2, 1992: 467–491. 
2 
 
change with the emergence of European small-states, mainly Scandinavian, as legitimate 
peacemakers in international conflicts.  
In recent years, peripheral countries such as Turkey, Brazil, India, Qatar, China, among 
others, have played important roles in peace attempts. These roles come to the fore mostly 
depending on the context of the dispute. Little research has been conducted so far 
regarding the mediation practices of these countries yet their mediation attempts signal the 
rise of alternative methods and practices to mainstream mediation mainly practised by the 
core countries.
3
  
The end of the Cold War brought with it a change in the international order, bringing an 
end to the bipolar world system and triggering the emergence of peripheral states as 
influential actors in global politics. As indicated by Haas, “21st-century international 
relations will be characterized by nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one, two or even 
several states but rather by dozens of states and other actors possessing and exercising 
military, economic, diplomatic and cultural power.”4  
According to Williamson and Gates, “the post-World War II global architecture created by 
Western allies to contain communism and promote peace and prosperity” is changing as a 
result of new geopolitical realities and shift of global power dynamics.
5
 They add that the 
international institutions fail to conform to the new realities and tend to cope with 
challenges by utilizing “ad hoc and regional arrangements instead of established 
institutions.”6 Coupled by the global economic crisis, it may be argued that the power 
vacuum created by the reluctance and inadequacy of these institutions in dealing with the 
                                                     
3
 Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal 65, no.4, 2011: 539-556. 
4
 Richard N. Haass, “The Restoration Doctrine,” The American Interest, December 9, 2011. 
5
 Richard S. Williamson and Jana Chapman Gates, “Rising Powers and a New Emerging Order,” The 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 2012, 1. 
6
 Ibid, 5. 
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conflicts on the periphery of the international system created a need and opportunity for 
emerging powers to take on mediator roles.  
These peripheral states usually come onto the stage when the resolution of a given conflict 
does not directly interest or benefit the core countries or they fail to resolve the conflict. 
Following the September 11 events, the countries at the core of the international system, 
most of whom may be considered established mediators, failed to resolve many of the 
subsequent crises of military aggressions, violent attacks, human security and human rights 
violations. 
As Williamson and Gates note, “a growing number of influential states offer capabilities 
important to conflict and cooperation and could be more creatively engaged in order to 
create the conditions for a new era of peace and stability.”7 As the demand for alternative 
mediators increased, emerging powers began to play larger roles in conflict resolution. 
These roles vary from providing platforms for negotiations to actively mediating between 
the parties or offering broader peacebuilding or humanitarian facilities. Their roles have 
raised both curiosity and suspicions.
8
  
Although there have been some mediation attempts by peripheral states in the past, such as 
Algeria’s mediation between Iran and the US during the hostage crisis in 1980, India’s 
mediation in Sri Lanka in 1987, or Egypt’s mediation in the Middle East, all these cases 
were ad-hoc and focused specifically on the immediate problem. The issue at stake in this 
                                                     
7
 Ibid, 2. 
8
 E. Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak, “Turkey as a ‘Humanitarian State’,” Project on the Middle East and the 
Arab Spring (POMEAS) Policy Paper, no.2, July 2014; Oliver P. Richmond and Ioannis Tellidis, “Emerging 
Actors in International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: Status Quo or Critical States?,” Global Governance 
20, no.4, 2014: 563–584; Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and 
Prospects,” The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 41, no.6, 2013: 865-870; Pınar Akpınar, “Turkey’s 
Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy,” Turkish Studies 14, no.4, 2013: 735-
757; Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 539-556; Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle 
East,” 29-41. 
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study is less about small-scale, technical mediations to resolve certain problems, and more 
about how some emerging states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, Brazil, or 
Turkey now regard mediation as part of their foreign policies. 
This study explores the possibility for alternative mediation approaches of emerging 
mediators on the periphery of the international system. It aims to explore whether and how 
emerging powers are able to mediate differently from traditional or established mediators. 
As underlined by Roselle and Spray, “The ability to place a narrowly defined study that 
answers a specific question within a broader context of international relations (IR) 
scholarship is a distinguishing feature of research.”9 As such, this study seeks to 
understand how emerging powers position themselves in the changing international system 
by using mediation as one element in their wider foreign policies. In order to answer this 
question, the study focuses on Turkey’s experience as an emerging mediator in the 
international system. This thesis defines an “emerging mediator” as an actor outside the 
centre of the international system and is associated with the periphery. The question of 
whether emerging mediators offer anything novel and different or simply continue 
mainstream mediation practices constitute the core of this thesis.  
This study is limited to tracing the difference of Turkey’s mediation as an emerging 
mediator. It does not aim to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Turkish foreign policy in 
its entirety. It rather aims to make a humble contribution to deepen the understanding of 
the motives behind Turkey’s mediation, its approach to and style of mediation, how 
mediation is situated in its broader foreign policy and whether or not it offers anything 
novel and different to international mediation practices, particularly in terms of mediation 
                                                     
9
 Laura Roselle and Sharon Spray, Research and Writing in International Relations, London: Pearson; 
Longman, 2008, 2.  
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as foreign policy. Although the study draws comparisons with other mediators in order to 
sharpen the analysis of what is particular to Turkey, its central focus is Turkey.  
The main research question of this thesis is, “To what extent does Turkey’s mediation 
differ from Western modes of mediation?” with sub questions such as: 
How can difference in international mediation be identified? 
What role does mediation play in the broader Turkish foreign policy? 
Why and how does Turkey mediate? 
What role does Turkey’s discourse on difference play in its foreign policy making? 
What are the main determinants of Turkey’s role as a mediator on the periphery?  
Is this a sustainable role or a temporary one based on certain internal or/and external 
factors?  
 
In order to comprehend Turkey’s new mediator role, the study analyses the parameters of 
Turkey’s new foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government 
which have been determined by various international, regional, and domestic 
developments. The study highlights the principles, mechanisms and vision of the new 
Turkish foreign policy in order to understand whether they have really paved the way for 
the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role as argued by Turkish foreign policy makers.10  
Foreign policy makers in Turkey posit that Turkey’s mediator role is a consequence of an 
ethical concern based on taking responsibility to bring peace and order to its region; the 
“central country” role it has adopted; and an understanding that a stable and peaceful 
region will also bring stability and peace at home.
11
 They have even identified Turkey as 
                                                     
10
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey 10, no.1, 
2008: 77-96; Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East,” 29-41. 
11
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010. 
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an “order bringing country,” especially in the post-September 11 era, by highlighting its 
mediator role as an apparent indication and tool of this role.
12
  
This study takes this discourse and its implementation in the field as a departure point to 
analyse the limits and potentials of Turkey’s mediator role. Turkey’s mediation is a current 
issue that is continuously evolving. The scope of this thesis mainly covers the period 
beginning with the AKP’s ascendance to power in 2002 until 2015 although the Arab 
Spring had obvious and challenging consequences for Turkey’s mediation role in the 
region. This period is particularly important since mediation has become an important 
policy tool after the AKP’s rise to power.  
1.2 Literature Review 
This section aims to locate the subject matter of this thesis within the existing literature. 
The thesis builds on three main sources of literature which include literature on 
international mediation, literature on change in Turkish foreign policy and literature on 
Turkish mediation. This study aims to contribute to the literature on mediation and on 
Turkish foreign policy by trying to uncover why and how Turkey mediates, and the role 
this plays in Turkey’s foreign policy. Despite the fact that Turkey’s new foreign policy has 
been discussed to a considerable extent in the literature there is still a significant gap with 
respect to its mediation particularly in terms of building a connection with the existing 
mediation literature.  
1.2.1 Literature on International Mediation 
 
Mediation is a method of alternative dispute resolution that is often studied within the field 
of Peace and Conflict Studies.
13
 It is used in various areas such as, “international relations, 
                                                     
12
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, interview by Scott MacLeod, Cairo Review of Global Affairs, March 12, 2012, 
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=143 (accessed May 21, 2014). 
7 
 
labour-management negotiations, community disputes, school conflicts, and legal 
disputes.”14 Despite the fact that it is generally studied under IR, international mediation 
crosses the borders of a range of disciplines including management, psychology, law, 
anthropology and sociology.  
Bercovitch and Gartner list different methods of conflict management as the use of force 
and coercive measures such as military interventions; judicial and legal processes such as 
arbitration and trials; formal and informal bilateral methods and various forms of non-
coercive, third-party interventions such as mediation.
15
 As such mediation is a “form,”16 a 
“mechanism,”17 an apparatus, a method, an instrument, of conflict resolution practised by a 
third party.  
There are various definitions in the literature stressing different aspects of mediation. 
According to the UN, mediation is “a process whereby a third party assists two or more 
parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to 
develop mutually acceptable agreements.”18 While some scholars emphasize the 
importance of voluntary presence and mutual consent of the parties during mediation,
19
 
                                                                                                                                                                
13
 Parts of this section have been published by the author in Pınar Akpınar “Mediation as a Foreign Policy 
Tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14, no.7, 
2015, 10.1080/19448953.2015.1063270. 
14
 James A. Wall, Jr., John B. Stark and Rhetta L. Standifer, "Mediation: A Current Review and Theory 
Development, " The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3, 2001: 371. 
15
 Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, “New Approaches, Methods and Findings in the Study of 
Mediation,” in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds.), International Conflict Mediation: New 
Approaches and Findings, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2009, 4-5. 
16
 Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution  40, no.2, 1996, 360-389. 
17
 Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette L. Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical 
Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” Journal of Peace Research 28, no.1, 
1991: 8. 
18
 United Nations, United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, September 2012, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28engli
sh%29_0.pdf (accessed September 15, 2014). 
19
 Josephine M. Zubek, Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy and Helena Syna, “Disputant 
and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short-Term Success in Mediation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, 
no.3, 1992: 546; Jacques Faget , “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” in Jacques Faget (ed.), Mediation in 
Political Conflicts: Soft Power or Counter Culture?, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, 3. 
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others focus on the nonbinding nature of the process indicating the lack of force and 
authority of the third party
20
 unlike, for instance, arbitration which is legally binding.
21
  
For instance Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, and Syna define mediation as, “attempts 
by a third party to facilitate voluntary agreement between parties in conflict.”22 Faget 
offers a more comprehensive definition by referring to mediation as, “a consensual process 
of conflict regulation in which an impartial, independent third party without any decision-
making power helps people or institutions to improve or set up relations through exchanges 
and, as far as possible, to solve their conflicts.”23 Kleiboer underlines the non-coercive 
nature of mediation by defining it as “a form of conflict management in which a third party 
assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force.”24  
A similar definition is suggested by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille who define it as “a 
process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer 
of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve 
their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”25 
Wall, Stark and Standifer refer to mediation as “assistance to two or more interacting 
parties by third parties who (usually) have no authority to impose an outcome.”26 Moore as 
well emphasizes the non-coerciveness of mediation by noting that mediation is “the 
intervention in a negotiation or a conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no 
                                                     
20
 Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of 
Successful Mediation in International Relations,” 8; Faget , “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 3; 
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authoritative decision-making power, who assists the involved parties to voluntarily reach 
a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute.”27  
As the above definitions suggest, most of the definitions in the literature highlight common 
aspects such as voluntariness, consent, neutrality, impartiality and non-coerciveness of an 
ideal mediation. However, as Jones also posits, all these concepts are subject to discussion 
since “international mediation is conceived to be a complex phenomenon.”28 As such, 
mediation is a political process, and as discussed throughout this thesis, when the mediator 
is a state, it may be biased, partial, coercive and the parties may be forced into the 
mediation process through political, economic and military pressure.  
This study defines mediation as a process in which a third party assists the parties towards 
the resolution of a conflict through several measures including persuasion or coercion. In 
addition, the study refers to mediation in a broader sense; not only as official diplomatic 
talks but also as a long-term process that often needs to be supported by emergency 
assistance, development aid and overall peacebuilding to ensure sustainability, particularly 
in intrastate conflicts when people are deprived from long-lasting, devastating, protracted 
disputes. In intrastate conflicts, especially those that have resulted in a humanitarian 
catastrophe, mediation and peacebuilding often go hand in hand. As Papagianni contends, 
a peace process does not end on the table. It is indeed the implementation process 
following the talks that is crucial in sustaining peace.
29
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While the use of mediation goes back to the times of early civilizations, studies on 
mediation are only about six decades old beginning with Kerr
30
 and Meyer,
31
 Schelling,
32
 
Stevens,
33
 Barkun,
34
 Podell and Knapp,
35
 Simkin,
36
 and Kressel
37
 who focused mainly on 
mediation in industrial or labour disputes. During this period studies on mediation also 
found their ways into anthropology with the works of scholars such as Gluckman,
38
 
Gibbs
39
 or Bohannan
40
 on Africa. 
Studies on international mediation per se emerged during 1960s with the works of 
pioneering scholars such as Young
41
 who delivered one of the first accounts on the use of 
mediation in international crises and Burton
42
 who underlined the importance of 
communication in resolving international conflicts. The following years witnessed an 
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increasing interest in international mediation with the works of Doob,
43
 Ott,
44
 and 
Stenelo.
45
  
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a rise of interest in the field of international 
mediation.
46
 Other systematic studies ensued in the following years with the works of 
seminal scholars such as Bercovitch,
47
 Zartman,
48
 and Wall
49
 with their footprints on a 
number of topics in the field that have been particularly helpful in this study in terms of 
understanding the general tenets of international mediation. 
The literature that discusses mediation as a tool of foreign policy was particularly helpful 
in building the foundation of this thesis. As also criticized by Touval, the literature tends to 
refer to international mediation as a solitary and rather technical activity in isolation from 
the surrounding political context. He argues that, when the mediator is a state, mediation is 
often part of foreign policy and utilized to pursue foreign interests.
50
 Scholars such as 
Zartman,
51
 Bercovitch and Jackson,
52
 Grieg and Dhiel,
53
 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and 
Miall
54
 argue in a similar vein that mediation can be a tool of exerting a state’s interests as 
part of its foreign policy. This thesis builds on the works of these scholars by arguing that 
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mediation cannot be understood in isolation from the overall foreign policy of the mediator 
state. 
In addition to the above, more specific literature on mediator states were also investigated 
during the thesis to be able to understand Turkey’s difference more systematically. For 
instance, the works of Touval,
55
 Quandt,
56
 and Inbar,
57
 were analysed to understand what 
role mediation plays in the foreign policy of the US as a great power. Among these, 
Quandt’s work on US mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflicts was particularly insightful in 
understanding Turkey’s difference in the Syrian-Israeli talks.58 Similarly, the literature on 
small-state mediators was also consulted during the thesis. Among these, the works of 
Foster,
59
 Skånland,60 Waage,61 and Moolakkattu62 were focused upon to analyse what role 
mediation plays in Norwegian foreign policy. 
In addition to the literature mentioned above, the literature that examines the role of culture 
in mediation was also insightful since scholars such as Avruch who has extensive work on 
the role of culture in conflict resolution often uses “culture” as an important indication of 
“difference” in mediation.63 As such, analysing whether Turkey utilized culture in its 
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mediation helped in understanding to what extent this creates a difference from Western 
mediators.  
While some scholars such as Zartman;
64
 Fisher and Ury
65
 neglect culture as an important 
element in mediation, others such as Avruch see it as an indispensable element of 
mediation.
66
 In this respect, Avruch’s extensive work on culture in mediation was 
particularly consulted during the thesis. Some of the scholars, who underpin the 
importance of culture in mediation, or conflict resolution as a whole, criticize Western 
“liberal peace” for failing to give enough emphasis on culture.  
For instance Richmond argues that, “prevailing liberal approaches to peacebuilding are 
based upon an assumption that governance, development, and indeed conflict resolution 
are ‘before’ culture.”67 Scholars also maintain that culture is a significant determinant for 
the process and outcome of mediation.
68
 For instance, Bleiker and Brigg criticize Western 
approaches for failing to address conflicts effectively, “particularly when cultural 
difference is at play.”69 Drawing on the conflict resolution practices between the state and 
the indigenous peoples in Australia, they suggest that Western mediation approaches 
regard cultural difference as a threat rather than “valuable resource for helping to manage 
conflicts.”70  
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Other scholars also draw attention to the importance of culture in the conflicts taking place 
between the state and the aboriginals in Australia.
71
 Among them, Rose criticizes the 
Australian state’s approach to aboriginal claims over land and other rights by arguing that 
it lacks comprehensive solutions due to its neglect of local customs, cultures, and 
understandings that emphasise concepts such as “attentiveness to place, relatedness, 
violence, emotions, and the inclusion of ancestral and non-human others” in the process of 
conflict resolution.
72
 Similarly, scholars such as Connolly
73
 and Harrison
74
 condemn 
homogeneity as the actual source of conflicts and posit that the subordination of different 
communities into a unified culture, belief, or way of life would eventually stem conflicts. 
In addition to the scholars who are critical of the lack of enough emphasis given on culture 
in mediation, some scholars criticize mediation studies, and to an extent mediation as a 
practice, for being dominated by Western approaches which are related to, and perhaps 
derive from, a universal conception of peace. Critics also draw attention to the dominance 
of ideas of “liberal peace” on the field of conflict resolution.75 Some also agree that the 
Western approaches to mediation fails to cope with the needs and realities of peripheral 
settings.
76
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In contrast, and perhaps in reaction to some of the early studies in the literature that 
presented peripheral ways of conflict resolution as immature and underdeveloped,
77
 some 
recent thinkers underline the importance of understanding peripheral ways of thinking and 
practising.
78
 Among these, while some scholars such as Abu-Nimer,
79
 Irani,
80
 Pely,
81
 and 
Al-Krenawi and Graham
82
 focus on the conflict resolution and mediation practices of the 
Bedouin Arabs, others draw attention to the Melanesian approaches,
83
 as well as the East 
Asian,
84
 the Indonesian,
85
 the Japanese,
86
 the Chinese,
87
 the Malaysian,
88
 and the Korean.
89
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As such, this literature which is somewhat critical of the mainstream studies and practices 
of mediation was also consulted during the thesis to be able to draw out certain inferences 
to analyse how one can identify “difference” in mediation. These discussions have been 
made more extensively in Chapter 2 in order to lay out a conceptual framework for the two 
case studies in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
Drawing on the above discussion, this thesis seeks to contribute to the field of international 
mediation as it sheds light on the roles of different states as mediators. The fact that it 
brings out the role of Turkey as an emerging mediator contributes to the field since the 
literature on mediation is still preoccupied with mediation by established mediators.    
1.2.2 Literature on the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy  
This section will illuminate the literature on the new Turkish foreign policy by covering 
the period from the AKP’s ascendency to power in 2002 until the current day. It will 
discuss the literature on the new Turkish foreign policy, from the AKP’s ascendancy to 
power in 2002 until the present day. It is in this period that Turkey emerged as a mediator; 
and hence, it is apparent that mediation was very much connected to a more assertive and 
exploratory Turkish foreign policy advocated by AKP. As Yalvaç posits, a great deal of 
work in the literature on Turkish foreign policy have “been dominated by state-centric, 
decision-making approaches adopting a positivist ontology and epistemology.”90 Although 
this trend was more apparent during the Cold War period when scholars were largely 
influenced by “security-oriented” and “actor specific”91 approaches, one may still feel the 
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weight of realist and liberal approaches in the literature. A majority of scholars agree that 
there has been a change in Turkish foreign policy in which the long military tutelage and 
the Kemalist ideology lost their weight and Turkey has become a more active in its region. 
As such, the section aims to understand how scholars explain this change. For the sake of 
clarity this section classifies the literature into three approaches as realists, liberals and 
constructivists.  
A common trend among realist and liberal scholars is to explain the change in Turkey’s 
foreign policy as a pragmatic and rational choice rather than one driven by ideology.
92
 For 
instance, realist scholars such as Meral and Paris note that, “What drives the AKP is not an 
ideological realignment but a rational and pragmatic attempt to maximize Turkish national 
interests.”93 By drawing on former Turkish Foreign Minister and current Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s doctrine of “strategic depth” Yalvaç argues in a critical realist vein 
that, “the concept of strategic depth is not only a ‘discursive practice’ utilized by 
‘intellectuals of statecraft’, but is deeply embedded in different relations of hegemonic 
power both within Turkey and in the international domain.”94 He further contends that the 
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concept “is based on traditional realist geopolitical ideas of frontiers, territory, strategic 
belts, basins and conflict belts.”95  
Liberals also draw attention to the pragmatic impulse in Turkey’s new foreign policy. 
Among them, Oğuzlu contends that Turkey’s rapprochement with the Middle East is a 
“pragmatic/rational” choice rather than an “emotional/romantic” one.96 By referring to the 
debates regarding whether there is a “shift of axis” in Turkish foreign policy he adds that, 
“Middle Easternization does not suggest a break with the West but rather the growing 
salience of the Middle East in Turkey’s relations with the West.”97 Taşpınar follows the 
trend of defining the new Turkish foreign policy as pragmatic and regards Turkey’s soft 
power in the region as a diplomatic asset in its relations with the US.
98
 Danforth also posits 
that Turkey’s activism in the Middle East is a pragmatic choice rather than an ideological 
one.
99
  
Scholars such as Keyman, who may be defined as a liberal, argue that although Turkey’s 
new foreign policy, and particularly proactivism, is based on pragmatism and rational 
choice and is independent from ideological concerns, it is still not clear whether this is a 
“realistic” and “sustainable” approach.100 Keyman notes that, “it is only if proactive and 
multidimensional foreign policy is sustained by realistic choices and effective domestic 
support that success can be achieved.”101 As a realist scholar, Kardaş argues similarly that 
Turkey’s proactivism is “zero-sum” and eventually “Turkish foreign policy will be forced 
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to set more realistic agendas and prioritize the country’s strategic relationships.”102 Öniş 
suggests in a similar vein that, “Over-assertiveness and over-confidence in international 
affairs can have significant pay-offs in the short term but can also be detrimental to 
national interest and to lead to isolation in the long term.”103 Zarakol contends similarly 
that despite its high goals, there is a mismatch between Turkey’s capacity and ambitions.104 
Likewise, Sözen contends that, the “AKP’s Islamist reflexes in domestic politics and 
Turkey’s relative lack of financial resources are the potential factors that can limit the 
success of the new Turkish foreign policy vision and strategy in the future.”105  
A considerable number of scholars on Turkish foreign policy also draw attention to the 
role of the European Union (EU) as a catalyst for change many of whom may be 
considered liberals.
106
 EU studies have grown significantly in Turkey particularly as a 
result of the acceleration of the process during the early phase of AKP period.
107
 The EU is 
often underlined as a promoter of domestic reforms and democratization in Turkey. For 
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instance, Aydın suggests that the process of democratization “has been in part a by-product 
of Turkey’s desire to join the EU.”108 Aras and Polat pinpoint that “the EU membership 
process enabled civil society organizations’ entry into politics, which in turn contributed to 
the widening of normal politics.”109 They also outline that Turkey’s activism in the Middle 
East is a consequence of its EU accession process by arguing that Turkey’s journey 
towards the EU helped it gain confidence in its foreign affairs, making it more active in its 
region.
110
 
Several scholars are informed by other approaches particularly by constructivism. 
Constructivist accounts of Turkish foreign policy mainly focus on how ideas, identities and 
interests of actors influence processes of foreign policy making. In the literature on 
Turkish foreign policy, constructivism finds its way into studies on the construction of 
identity,
111
 processes of securitization,
112
 desecuritization,
113
 foreign policy discourses
114
 
and the identities and ideas of foreign policy actors.
115
  
Among these, a considerable number of studies underline the role of the leaders 
particularly Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu as the main actors of Turkey’s 
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new foreign policy. While scholars such as Moubayed;
116
 Altunışık and Tür;117 and 
Sasley
118
 draw attention to the role of the leadership of Erdoğan in the development of 
Turkey’s new vision towards the region, others point directly at Ahmet Davutoğlu as the 
main designer of Turkish foreign policy in line with his Strategic Depth doctrine.
119
 They 
agree that the ideational structure of Turkey’s foreign policy is mainly built on the ideas of 
Davutoğlu and he, therefore, deserves the main credit. Most of these scholars regard 
Turkey’s “zero-problems policy” as the main tenet of this doctrine.120 For instance, 
Grigoriadis suggests that, “The implementation of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy doctrine has 
contributed to a transformation of Turkish foreign policy and the rising importance of 
Turkey’s diplomatic role, especially in the Middle East.”121 By emphasising the proactive 
nature of the new foreign policy Aras suggests that, “Davutoğlu’s attempts have aimed to 
open up new areas, to extend influence in neighbouring regions and to play a leading role 
in selective global issues.”122  
Some scholars emphasize the role of domestic change on Turkey’s new foreign policy.123 
Referring to the theory of societal constructivism, Aras draws attention to the importance 
of social norms and common historical experiences in the construction of Turkey’s foreign 
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policy.
124
 Similarly, Aras and Polat emphasize domestic factors, significantly the process 
of “desecuritization” at home and its impact on foreign policy perceptions, especially 
towards Turkey’s neighbours.125 In this view, owing to the desecuritization process, issues 
such as the Kurdish conflict or political Islam, which had previously been considered 
within the limits of national security, have been desecuritized and entered the spheres of 
normal political discussions.
126
  
Scholars such as Sadık underline the role of religion in the formation of foreign policy “by 
examining the competing theoretical explanations on the role of Islam in the 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy.”127 Sadık contends that, “the transforming 
identity of Turkish foreign policy has paved the way for the construction of an identity-
based foreign policy.”128 As highlighted by Keyman, some scholars express scepticism 
about the AKP’s political agenda and contend that its foreign policy priorities are 
influenced by ideological concerns.
129
 Other scholars suggest there has been a change in 
Turkey’s orientation by moving away from the West towards the East (mainly the Middle 
East). These scholars emphasize that Turkey’s foreign policy is based on “neo-
Ottomanism” built on a historical- geopolitical imagination of its Ottoman inheritance 
embedded in cultural and religious ties.
130
 Bilgin notes in a different vein that, 
“Ideologically, there might be Islamist considerations, but once in power, political interests 
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apparently supersede religious values” and suggests that the AKP is rather pragmatic in its 
foreign policy calculations.
131
 
1.2.3 Literature on Turkish Mediation 
Studies on mediation are rather scarce in Turkish scholarship since mediation is relatively 
new to Turkey’s foreign policy. As such, despite its long use in domestic settings, studies 
on the field of mediation are rather new in Turkey. Only a handful of studies have been 
conducted so far which mainly focus on the role of managerial mediation in organizational 
conflicts,
132
 mediation in industrial conflicts,
133
 peer-mediation in high schools,
134
 
mediation in environmental
135
 conflicts, and Islamic mediation in local settings.
136
 
Similarly, only a small number of writings are dedicated to Turkey’s mediation in 
international conflicts per se.
137
 Among them, only the works by Gürkaynak;138 Altunışık 
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and Çuhadar;139 and Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu140 are embedded in the mediation 
literature. Others mainly consider mediation within the broader scope of Turkish foreign 
policy often as part of Turkey’s regional policy, its proactive foreign policy or soft power 
without any references to the theory of mediation.
141
 Studies mainly focus on its mediation 
in the Middle East despite the fact that Turkey has played active mediator roles in the 
Balkans, the Caucasus, Africa, Asia and even played a minor role in the Philippines.  
The existing literature on Turkey’s mediation mainly looks into why and how Turkey 
mediates, the regional and global implications of its mediation, what role mediation plays 
in the overall Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey’s difference as a mediator. Among the 
scholars, Gürkaynak focuses on Turkey’s third party role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
highlighting what sort of third party role Turkey plays and should play.
142
 She argues that 
Turkey plays more of a facilitator role than a power mediator role. She also suggests that 
structural prevention and conflict transformation are the best third party intervention 
strategies for Turkey in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
143
  
Similarly, Altunışık and Çuhadar explore Turkey’s third party role in the Israeli–Syrian 
and Israeli–Palestinian conflicts concluding that Turkey’s mediation has evolved from 
                                                                                                                                                                
George Friedman, “The Turkish Role in Negotiations with Iran,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, January 11, 
2011, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110110-turkish-role-negotiations-iran#axzz3ObO26oof; Reina 
Zenelaj, Nimet Beriker and M. Emre Hatipoğlu, “Determinants of Mediation Success in Post-conflict Bosnia: 
A Focused Comparison,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2015, 
DOI:10.1080/10357718.2015.1024200; Reşat Bayer and E. Fuat Keyman, “Turkey: An Emerging Hub of 
Globalization and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?,” Globalizations 9, no.1, 2012: 73-90; Bülent Aras, 
“Turkey’s Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative,” Turkish Policy Brief Series, International Policy 
and Leadership Institute; TEPAV, no.6, 2012; Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Mediation: Critical Reflections 
from the Field,” Middle East Policy 20, no.1, 2013: 83-90. 
138
 Gürkaynak, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 89-108.  
139
 Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts,” 371-392.  
140
 Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu, ““Determinants of Mediation Success in Post-conflict Bosnia.” 
141
 Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 945-964; Aras and Polat, “Turkey 
and the Middle East,” 471-488; Aylin Gürzel, “Turkey's Role as a Regional and Global Player and its Power 
Capacity: Turkey's Engagement with other Emerging States,” Revista de Sociologia e Politica 22, no.50, 
2014: 95-105. 
142
 Gürkaynak, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 89-108. 
143
 Ibid. 
25 
 
“neutral facilitator” into “principal power mediator” within a timeframe of eight years.144 
Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu focus on Turkey’s mediation in Bosnia by comparing it 
with that of the EU and the US.
145
 They contend that Turkey’s “low intervention strategy” 
paid off in the Bosnian conflict rather than the power mediation of the EU and the US.
146
 
As such, all these studies refer to Turkey’s role as a facilitator rather than a power 
mediator. 
By referring to Turkey’s co-mediation with Brazil during the Iranian nuclear talks, Ayman 
positions Turkey as an “interested insider” which is directly affected by the conflicts in the 
region and has a genuine interest in resolving them. She also refers to Turkey as an 
“emerging middle power” with a growing economy that uses mediation to secure stable 
markets.
147
 Similarly, by referring to Turkey and Brazil as “middle-sized states,” Özkan 
suggests that the main implication of their mediation in the Iranian nuclear talks has been 
to change the existing “political and discursive arenas” in global affairs and to challenge 
the Western dominance.
148
 Through an analysis of Turkey’s difference in the Iranian 
nuclear talks, Bonab underlines “trust” and “independence” as two important tenets that 
Turkey brought in to the negotiations which differentiate it from Western or Arabic 
countries as well as Israel.
149
   
This thesis, therefore, aims to combine literature from these different areas – international 
mediation, contemporary Turkish foreign policy and Turkish mediation – in order to make 
a contribution to understanding of how Turkey mediates, the role this plays in Turkey’s 
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recent foreign policy, and how and whether Turkey can exercise new and different 
practices in mediation, in contrast to more established “Western” mediatory approaches. 
Hence, it aims to place Turkey’s mediation in the context of its foreign policy, and recent 
academic literature on Turkish foreign policy; and in the context of recent academic 
literature on mediation. 
1.3 Research Design and Methods 
As introduced earlier in the study, the main research question of this thesis is: “To what 
extent does Turkey’s mediation differ from Western modes of mediation?” The concept of 
“difference” in this study stems from the criticisms raised by Turkish foreign policy 
makers regarding the current domination of mainly Western actors in shaping the 
international system.  
As argued by Brigg and Bleiker, the mainstream literature “tends to see difference as a 
problem rather than a resource, leave little room for the possibility that difference can 
make a positive contribution to political order.”150 As such, “difference” in this thesis also 
stems from the criticism of a mainstream, universalist notion of what constitutes mediation 
and how an “ideal” mediator, mediation process and outcome need to be. This study will 
explore the potential of mediation alternative to mainstream Western mediation practices 
and seek to what extent Turkish mediation deviates from these. 
This thesis is informed by constructivism as an approach to understand international 
relations which holds that ideas and interests are important in the construction of the 
identities of policy makers who then determine the policies. Constructivism emerged as a 
reaction to neo-realism, by arguing that, contrary to the realist claim, reality is not given 
and is constructed upon perceptions, ideas, norms, and interests of actors. This study leans 
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towards the liberalist strand of constructivism influenced by the works of scholars such as 
Alexander Wendt, Christian Reus-Smit and Emanuel Adler.  
Constructivism claims that identities and interests of agents are not necessarily given by 
the structure but are under construction through continuous social and political 
interaction.
151
 As such, “systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural 
characteristics, and they exert a powerful influence on social and political action.”152 This 
view is also supported by Wendt who argues that, social structures are not only affected by 
“agents and their interactions” but also by “the shaping of identities and interests, which 
are conditioned by discursive formations by the distribution of ideas in the system as well 
as by material forces, and as such are not formed in a vacuum.”153 In this view, the social 
structures consists of three determining element including “material conditions, interests, 
and ideas.”154  
As such, the study argues that ideas and interests of Turkish policy makers were important 
in the development of a new perception of Turkey’s position in the region and beyond. As 
such, the ideational background of Turkish policy makers were influential in their interest 
in post-Ottoman geographies, and a self-attributed responsibility to protect these 
geographies and to seek for new opportunities brought about a need for ways of 
engagement such as mediation. 
Turkey’s search for a new identity under the imperatives of domestic balances and 
international structure paved the way for the emergence of its new foreign policy, and 
subsequently its mediator role. As such, the study also draws on the agent-structure debate 
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in constructivism to explain the shift in Turkish foreign policy towards a more proactive 
stance vis-à-vis the problems in Turkey’s neighbourhood. Turkey’s emergence as a 
mediator in its region was not only a result of the changing ideas, interests and perceptions 
of its policy makers but also a change in the regional and international structure as a result 
of developments such as the end of the Cold War, the September 11 events and US-led 
invasion of  Iraq.  
According to Reus-Smit, agents and structures continuously reproduce one another and 
“are mutually constituted.”155 Similarly, Wendt argues that “human agents and social 
structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating 
entities.”156 In this view, the structure is constructed through the socialization of actors and 
vice versa. As such, structure is not given (as argued by neo-realists). Turkish policy 
makers utilized their relational links with the communities in their region and beyond 
particularly by underpinning Turkey’s identity as the successor of the Ottoman Empire.  
As discussed further in the thesis, Turkish policy makers argue that particularly the Iraqi 
War left Turkey in a position either to become a part of the problem or emerge as a 
responsible problem-solving agent in its region and reclaim its influence in post-Ottoman 
lands.  
There is also an emphasis on the importance of bringing “order” and “stability” to 
Turkey’s areas of influence in the discourses of policy makers which is indicative of how 
Turkish policy makers perceive mediation as a tool of changing the regional structure 
towards a more stable and cooperative one which corresponds with Wendt’s understanding 
that “Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. 
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Anarchy is what states make of it.”157 In this view, anarchy is not a given and inevitable 
state of world governance but is rather constructed. As such, the image of a “responsible” 
and “collaborative” regional leader that Turkey tried to promote is suggestive of how 
Turkey tried to utilize mediation as a tool of socialization in its region. 
The constructivist claim that power is not only material but can also be ideational
158
 also 
well suits the emphasis on soft-power and diplomacy in Turkey’s new foreign policy 
which drives its legitimacy from a constructed identity based on the historical and 
geopolitical projection of Turkey as a former empire and the leader of the Islamic world. 
Liberal constructivism also helped me in explaining the emphasis given on establishing 
mutual dialogue, encouraging trade, and promoting culture and shared norms in the new 
Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, although the main level of analysis of this thesis 
remains at the level of the state, I also examined the role of non-state actors such as NGOs, 
businesses and individuals in Turkey’s mediation. I was particularly interested in changing 
norms, changing forms of communication and changing discourse amongst policy makers 
and representatives of NGOs on the elite level in order to understand how they explained 
Turkey’s mediator role through language and symbolic interactionism.  Constructivism 
also helped me explain how I used the interview material by looking for the ideas of 
Turkish policy makers about norms, practices and Turkey’s identity. 
Drawing on constructivism, this study built on qualitative research methods including case 
study, semi-structured in depth interviews and analysis of texts. The case studies helped 
me assess the extent to which my research questions can be answered with reference to 
specific examples. I used the information gathered from interviews and from written 
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sources as well as the indicators from the literature in order to make judgements about 
Turkish mediation at certain key points. 
As indicated by Hogan, Dolan and Donnelly, unlike quantitative research which relies on 
numerical data, qualitative research relies more on words, “either the research participants’ 
own words, the words written in documents or the words used by the researcher 
herself/himself to describe the activities, images and the environment observed.”159 
Qualitative research further relies “on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive 
interviews or in depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be 
concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit.”160 These 
methods enable scholars to “unearth enormous amounts of information” despite the small 
number of cases analysed.
161
 As also postulated by Duursma, “In contrast to quantitative 
studies, case-studies can examine the unique context in which mediation takes place.”162 
The research conducted in this thesis ties in with the debates in the mediation literature. 
Throughout the course of my research I have come across a range of themes and indicators 
in the mediation literature that enabled me to suggest inferences on the possible ways in 
which Turkey’s mediation could be considered as different to that of its Western 
counterparts. These indicators which will be discussed extensively in Chapter 2 include 
previous experience of the mediators, their motives for mediation, characteristics as 
mediators, style of mediation, means supportive of mediation such as aid, methods of 
mediation, and their progress as mediators. This study uses these inferences in order to 
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shed light on Turkey’s ability to mediate differently. These indicators will be used to help 
in considering the cases discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
1.3.1 Case Selection 
This thesis examines two different cases of Turkish mediation. In Chapter 4, it analyses 
Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations between 2007-2008. It will draw on 
the mediation literature mentioned above, and, in order to sharpen the assessment of 
Turkey’s capacity to mediate differently, it will set Turkish mediation in the context of the 
much longer mediation by the United States between 1974-2000. It is impossible to 
understand why and how Turkey mediated without drawing out elements of this 
background. In Chapter 5, it will examine Turkey’s ongoing mediation in Somalia, starting 
in 2012. Here, the thesis considers how Turkish mediation differed from mediation 
conducted by two very different “Western” mediators in Somalia, Britain and Norway. 
This study aims first and foremost to understand how Turkey can mediate differently from 
the US, Britain and Norway in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations and in Somalia respectively. 
The thesis does discuss the mediation conducted by these other countries, but it does so in 
order to shed light on Turkish policy and consider how Turkey can mediate, and present 
itself, differently to these powers. In addition, the Syrian-Israeli talks, and Turkey’s 
initiatives in Somalia, were very different from each other, and hence, provided the 
opportunity to comment on different kinds of Turkish mediatory practices; as well as to 
consider how these mediation efforts might fit together as part of Turkey’s foreign policy.   
Since I focused on Turkey, I made some references to mediation by other powers in order 
to bring this into clearer emphasis. Since I did not aim to compare Turkey to the entire 
“West” I did not, in any way, attempt to systematically contrast “West” and “non-West.” 
However, throughout my research, I was struck by how much the idea of “non-Western” 
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featured in Turkey’s rhetoric of its foreign policy; and hence, it is present as an important 
part of its identity construction and therefore its mediation policies.  
Despite using these inferences to shed light on Turkey’s difference by comparing it with 
Western mediators such as the US, Britain and Norway, this is not a comparative study. 
The study does not aim to make rigid comparisons among these actors. It rather aims to 
bring out Turkey’s difference more clearly and systematically. As such, the main focus of 
this thesis is Turkey and the amount of data introduced on Turkey is visibly larger than the 
other mediators. Therefore, the primary source material consulted refers almost exclusively 
to Turkey, although the thesis does examine considerable amount of data on the US, 
Britain and Norway. 
The US and Britain set suitable examples of great power mediators. The US has extensive 
power capabilities as a mediator and is also a major ally of Turkey. It had also been the 
lead mediator in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks from 1974 until 2000. Comparing its 
mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks with that of Turkey’s also offers a good opportunity to 
understand the limits of Turkey’s independence as a regional actor as well as the use of 
mediation in its quest for more influence. It also enabled me to seek how Turkey mediates 
vis-à-vis US interests in the region. 
The Syrian-Israeli case is also representative in that it offers an opportunity to analyse 
Turkey’s role as a mediator in an interstate conflict. The longevity of the conflict and the 
difficulty to offer any kind of lasting resolution are reasons that makes this case interesting 
to study. It is also interesting regarding the broader debates it triggered with respect to 
Turkey’s policies in a region where it has deep historical-geopolitical roots. As a result of 
its proximity to Turkey, the Syrian-Israeli case also allowed me to understand how Turkey 
mediates in a conflict that directly affects it. When I selected the Syrian-Israeli case, the 
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Arab Spring had not yet erupted. However, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that, 
one way or another, the course of the events did have an impact on Turkish foreign policy 
and similarly on Turkey’s mediator role.  
The Somali case offers an opportunity to analyse Turkey’s role in an intrastate conflict 
where its mediation should be understood in a broader sense. As will be discussed in detail 
further in the thesis, Turkish policy makers emphasize that Turkey’s mediation comes in “a 
package”163 which entails that when necessary, it is supported by means such as 
development aid, humanitarian assistance or medical relief. As such, the Somali case offers 
an opportunity to test this proposition and understand in what circumstances Turkey 
combines these measures with its mediation and to what extent these means can be 
supportive of peacemaking. 
Comparing Turkey with Britain offered me an opportunity to investigate Turkey’s 
difference vis-à-vis an great power mediator that is also a former colonial power in 
Somalia. Norway, on the other hand, poses a sound example for a small-state mediator 
whose role was particularly interesting regarding its extensive work on the grassroots. 
The Somali case also offers a ground to examine the role of non-state actors such as 
HNGOs or businesses in peacemaking. It also helped me understand Turkey’s engagement 
with regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It is a sound case to analyze why and 
how Turkey uses mediation as a tool of opening up to regions such as Africa where it has 
limited or no previous engagements with. Choosing a case from two different regions also 
enabled me to wipe out the possibility of limiting my analysis to a single geopolitical 
context. It also gave me the opportunity to investigate different aspects of Turkey’s 
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mediation policies and offered a variety of themes and indicators to bring to light its 
difference as a mediator.   
1.3.2 Data Gathering 
I gathered the majority of my original primary source material by conducting a number of 
semi-structured in-depth interviews with open-ended questions with Turkish officials 
engaged in Turkish mediation policies at various levels. The interview subjects were 
selected according to their relevance to Turkey’s mediation as well as their availability. 
Despite the fact that the analysis of this study focused more on Turkish actors, and thus the 
number of Turkish subjects interviewed is visibly higher, I also interviewed people from 
other countries to be able to derive more insight on how Turkey mediates differently and 
how other mediators have operated in the same conflicts. Although most of the interviews 
were conducted in Turkey and in person, in certain cases I had to conduct interviews 
through phone due to logistical problems. The inability to reach some of the potential 
participants as a result of their reluctance to participate in the research, availability or 
logistical problems have appeared as limitations to the research.  
Among the participants, Ufuk Gezer, former Head of Department of Directorate of Policy 
Planning at Turkish Foreign Ministry (the department that inter alia coordinates Turkey’s 
official mediation attempts), provided invaluable insight about Turkey’s official policy on 
mediation. Three Turkish diplomats who preferred to remain anonymous provided insight 
about Turkey’s policy in Somalia. They were particularly helpful in understanding how 
Turkey utilizes mediation as a tool of foreign policy. Interview with former Academic 
Adviser in Chief to Turkish Foreign Minister Bülent Aras was particularly insightful about 
the theoretical and empirical background of Turkish foreign policy and mediation with 
specific references on Ahmet Davutoğlu’s approach. Similarly, interview with Ertuğrul 
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Apakan, former Undersecretary of Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Permanent 
Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, was invaluable for understanding Turkish 
mediation. I also interviewed Head of Department of Public Diplomacy under Turkish 
Prime Ministry Cemalettin Haşimi, Head of Directorate for Strategy Planning at the 
Directorate for Religious Affairs Necdet Subaşı and Head of Strategy Development at the 
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities under Turkish Prime Ministry 
Zahide Erdoğan. Among these, Necdet Subaşı was particularly helpful in deepening my 
understanding of what role religion has in Turkish mediation. 
In addition to Turkish bureaucrats I also interviewed Head of Department of Foreign 
Affairs at Turkish Red Crescent Bayram Selvi, Deputy Chairman and Board Member of 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) Hüseyin Oruç, Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy 
Coordinator of IHH İzzet Şahin and General Coordinator at The Union of NGOs of the 
Islamic World (UNIW) Cihangir İşbilir. In addition, I also interviewed Şeyda Sever, 
former coordinator of Shifa Hospital in Somalia which was built by Doctors Worldwide in 
cooperation with Medical Park, a private hospital chain in Turkey. Her comments were 
insightful in understanding the impact of Turkish aid on the ground. 
I have also embedded primary data gathered at a workshop on “The Role of NGOs in 
Turkey’s Peacebuilding” held at Istanbul Policy Center on December 3, 2013 where 15 
senior representatives of Turkish HNGOs participated. The data gathered from the 
workshop has also been compiled into a journal article I co-wrote with Bülent Aras.164 
From Britain I interviewed former British Ambassador to Somalia (1987-1989) Jeremy 
Varcoe who gave me valuable insight on Britain’s foreign policy in Somalia and what role 
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mediation has in British foreign policy. I also interviewed Thomas Wheeler and Mohamed 
Enow from Saferworld who are Conflict and Security Adviser and Somalia/Somaliland 
Field Coordinator, respectively. They have provided some valuable insight on Britain’s 
policy and mediation in Somalia. 
From Norway, I had the opportunity to interview Hilde Frafjord Johnson, former Minister 
of International Development of Norway, member of the Norwegian Government, the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission 
in the Republic of South Sudan. Hilde Frafjord Johnson mediated between the Government 
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement in 2005 which resulted in 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Interviewing Ms. Johnson was 
particularly helpful in understanding Norwegian mediation approach. 
From Somalia I interviewed Ambassador of Somalia to Turkey Mohamed Mursal Sheikh 
Abdurahman who provided with valuable information regarding Turkey’s mediation 
between Somalia and Somaliland. In addition, I also interviewed three NGO 
representatives from Somalia including an anonymous representative, Somali Ambassador 
to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Abdirazak Siyad Abdi and Executive Director 
of Watchful Association for Relief and Development Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein. 
Their contribution was particularly significant in uncovering the local perceptions on 
Turkish involvement in Somalia.  
I also had the opportunity to interview the Spokesperson for the Palestinian Government in 
Gaza Tahir al-Nunu which provided me with insight on the perception on Turkey in Gaza, 
to what extent Turkey is able to play a leadership role in the region and how influential it is 
as a mediator. The interview was also insightful in terms of understanding the civilian 
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dimension of Turkey’s peace initiatives particularly with respect to the Mavi Marmara 
flotilla crisis. 
Finally, I interviewed William Quandt who is a scholar and former staff member on the 
National Security Council in the Nixon and Carter administrations who took active part in 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations in 1978-1979. Interviewing Quandt gave me 
invaluable insight about US mediation in the Arab-Israeli negotiations which enabled me 
to deepen my chapter on the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. It also helped me draw on 
Turkey’s difference as a mediator from the US. 
In addition to the interviews conducted, I also weaved in data from the proceedings of 
former Turkish Foreign Minister and current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende on Turkish and Norwegian mediation 
approaches in three conferences and a workshop which I had the opportunity to attend. The 
conferences were the first and the second Istanbul Conference on Mediation held in 
Istanbul in 2012 and 2013 respectively by Turkish Foreign Ministry as part of the Friend of 
Mediation Initiative cofounded by Turkey and Finland within the UN. During the second 
conference, I also had the opportunity to interview former Deputy Foreign Minister of 
Somalia Jamal Mohamed Barrow which was later published on the weblog of the Center 
for Strategic Research at Turkish Foreign Ministry (SAM).
165
 I used this published data on 
my thesis as well. The workshop I attended was entitled “Turkish and Norwegian 
Approaches to and Experiences in Mediation Seminar” which was organized in Ankara on 
November 6, 2013 by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research at Bilkent 
University, SAM and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center (NOREF).  
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Alongside the data from the interviews, conference and workshop proceedings, I also 
consulted press releases of Davutoğlu, former Turkish Prime Minister and current 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, British Prime Minister David Cameron, Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Børge Brende and a number of US Presidents and Secretaries of State 
which have provided valuable insight on the foreign policy and mediation approaches of 
respective countries. These press releases were accessible online mainly from the official 
websites of the respective institutions or in newspapers that published these speeches.  
In addition, I also analysed text from books, journal articles, policy briefs, reports, 
newspapers and op-ed articles. Among these, particularly material written first hand by 
Davutoğlu such as his renowned book Strategic Depth or Vision Papers written by him and 
published by Center for Strategic research, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have 
provided me with insightful information on understanding Turkey’s approach to foreign 
policy and mediation. While publications from the Turkish ministries, and speeches by 
Turkish politicians are likely to be biased, these are crucial sources in helping me to 
reconstruct the attitudes and policies of key Turkish decision makers. Indeed, in the 
absence of archival data, these are the only sources we have to glean information about 
Turkish intentions and policies, and therefore, it was essential to use these documents. 
In February-March 2013, I also went to George Mason University, School of Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution in Virginia, USA as a visiting scholar in order to conduct library 
research and meet prominent scholars in the field of conflict resolution. My time in SCAR 
was particularly fruitful in terms of expanding my theoretical knowledge and my academic 
network. In addition, in July and August 2014, I attended a series of trainings on 
mediation, negotiation and alternative dispute resolution at Virginia Mediation Service, 
USA which enabled me to diversify my theoretical and practical knowledge in the field. 
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An ethical approval was sought from Keele University before beginning the interviews 
which was a challenging and educative process.
166
 Longitude was a setback of timeframe 
and also might be thought to have diminished my room for manoeuvre, in some cases, as I 
had to wait for the approval before beginning interviews, and as the meaning of the official 
forms could be interpreted differently in a different cultural and political context. The 
obligation to sign a formal document acted as a repellent element with one of the potential 
participants, a mid-level Turkish bureaucrat, who could have contributed significantly to 
the thesis but rejected to participate since he was wary of signing the document. 
1.3.3 Problems in the Course of the Research 
 
All research necessarily has limitations and since the outcome of a research is influenced 
by the interpretation of observers based on their ideas, values and previous experiences, the 
evaluation process often bears the risk of being filtered by the subjective analysis of the 
researcher. Thus, knowledge is often political. In addition, it is also often a challenge, if 
not impossible, to gather sufficient amount of data and conduct a “perfect” research.167  
For instance, first-hand information is often limited and difficult to reach.
168
 Although 
these handicaps may lead to “uncertainty about our conclusions,” they should nevertheless 
not hold researchers back from conducting research.
169
 
One of the challenges of this research was that most of the participants were elites from 
various ministries, state institutions and non-governmental organizations. As such, there is 
a danger of bias, because they are likely to say what their institutions want them to say, and 
are unlikely to be critical of Turkish policy. Similarly, they may also limit what they say 
                                                     
166
 See Appendix 6: Ethical Approval Letter. 
167
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994, 6. 
168
 Ibid. 
169
 Ibid. 
40 
 
since there may be things they will not want to reveal. As argued by Moore and Stokes, 
elites are “individuals and collectives that form a separate and distinct echelon or grouping 
in a given society or section of society.”170 As such, “they can be seen to have knowledge, 
influence, control and power in a given setting or situation.”171 It is nevertheless difficult to 
speak of a homogenous group of elites since their “knowledge, influence, control and 
power” may vary according to their status in the society or their given organization as well 
as the fluidity of a given context. For instance, given the volatility of the political 
environment in Somalia, it is difficult to speak of a stable and continuous elite structure. 
Nevertheless, the participants of this research were selected among key informants who 
were assumed to have first-hand information about the topic.  
Even if there are biases, as also underlined by Delaney, elite interviewing also enables a 
researcher to understand the worldview of the decision makers providing them with 
valuable insights.
172
 As such, despite the fact that bureaucrats who are on active duty may 
be restrained to say everything about policy, what they say allowed me to interrogate how 
they talk about Turkish mediation, and therefore, gave me evidence about how people with 
a stake in its mediation articulate Turkey’s policy.  
The interviews showed how officials interpret the parameters available to them in carrying 
out Turkey’s mediation policy. They also enabled me to see how difficulties are dealt with 
and potential contradictions smoothed out. In order to avoid loops in my analysis to the 
possible extent, I tried to crosscheck the data provided by the participants by comparing 
and contrasting it with that of other participants or the secondary resources to the possible 
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extent. This study is primarily based on data gathered from these interviews which provide 
a great deal of original information. This information was also supplemented with 
published sources that gave additional information in their own right. Using published 
sources also enabled me to cross check information.  
As also argued by Zuckerman, conducting semi-structured interviews and asking open-
ended questions are often essential and facilitative in elite interviews since elite subjects do 
not want to be restricted by structured questions.
173
 Similarly, Moore and Stokes argue that 
elites “do not like to be strait-jacketed and cornered; rather they often wish to be 
diplomatic or measured in their responses.”174 In order to ease the tension and make the 
participants feel more comfortable with the process, I started the interviews with more 
general and easier questions such asking the participants how they define Turkey’s 
mediation or how this role has emerged before moving towards more difficult or 
challenging questions such as the ones on Turkey’s interests in mediation or its 
impartiality.  
Laurila argues that gaining access to elite participants is also difficult.
175
 I tried to be as 
resourceful as I could by utilizing my existing network among policy and academic circles 
to be able to secure interviews. Although I was always careful to explain that I was 
conducting an academic study based in a UK university, so there was no possibility of their 
thinking I was either a journalist, or another Turkish policy maker, there were, 
nevertheless, certain people I was unable to reach as a result of their busy schedule or 
unwillingness to participate in the research. I also chased conferences and meetings to 
meet potential participants. This was especially helpful in meeting people from Somalia 
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since I was unable to travel there due to security reasons and the likelihood that the 
university ethical review process would not have permitted it. 
Another problem faced in the course of this research was the outbreak of the Arab Spring. 
The course of the Arab Spring changed the parameters of Turkish policy towards the 
region to a certain extent and particularly towards Syria. In a way, it brought Turkey’s 
ambitious foreign policy to a halt. Subsequently, for Turkey, mediation has turned from 
being an instrument of expanding its area of influence to one of preserving its existing 
power. The Arab Spring also demonstrated the limits of Turkish foreign policy and its 
mediation thereof. Although, demonstrating an extensive analysis of Turkey’s policy 
during the Arab Spring is out of the scope of this thesis, its mediation in the Syrian-Israeli 
case cannot be analysed in isolation from the changing context. Therefore, there are 
occasional references to the period of the Arab Spring throughout the thesis to be able to 
draw out certain inferences regarding the potentials and limits of Turkey’s mediation. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to set out an introduction to the thesis. It discussed the research 
question and rationale, situated the subject matter within the existing literature on 
international mediation and Turkish foreign policy, and explained the research design and 
methods. This thesis will look into why and how Turkey mediates, and on what premises 
one is able to say that Turkey mediates differently. The following chapter will draw a 
comprehensive framework to answer the question of how difference in international 
mediation can be identified through different themes and indicators and how these 
indicators can be applied on different mediation cases. Chapter 3 will elaborate on the 
background that paved the way for the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role as a result of a 
shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. Chapter 4 and 5 will draw on two case studies namely, 
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Turkish mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks and in Somalia aiming to conduct an 
empirical study that will test the theoretical discussions brought out in the previous 
chapter. Chapter 6 will be a concluding chapter in which a final discussion will be raised 
regarding Turkey’s difference as a mediator. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE IN MEDIATION 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the literature on mediation in order to draw out ways in which 
mediation can be assessed and to lay out a conceptual framework to understand how 
Turkey is able to draw on the existing traditions and establish new traditions of its own.  
This framework will then be applied in the case chapters to examine the specifics of 
Turkish mediation; in particular to think about how Turkey uses mediation in its foreign 
policy as well as make claims about its difference from Western mediators.  
As such, the chapter intends to understand how difference in international mediation can 
be identified which is one of the research questions of this thesis. The chapter first 
investigates how mediation can be utilized as a tool of foreign by different mediator states. 
It then highlights certain themes and indicators through the various aspects of mediation to 
be able to shed light on how difference may be defined and understood.  
These indicators range from the interests and motives of mediators to their previous 
experiences in mediation; their characteristics as mediators such as the power they bring 
into the mediation process and the determinants of their positions as mediators including 
their impartiality and neutrality, proximity to the conflict, previous relations with the 
conflicting parties, their insider/outsider position and historical record; methods they use 
while mediating such as direct talks, indirect talks or shuttle diplomacy, holding 
conferences or workshops; their style of mediation such as being persistent or reluctant, 
inclusive or exclusive, building partnerships with other actors, bringing culture into 
mediation, adopting a normative approach or mobilizing regional mechanisms; whether 
they use other means to support mediation; and their progress as mediators.  
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2.2 International Mediation and Foreign Policy
176
 
International mediation is a form of international conflict resolution referring to “the 
diplomatic interventions of third parties into conflicts motivated by a combination of their 
desire to mitigate violence, establish peace, and protect their own interests.”177 According 
to Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille international mediation is usually consulted in four 
main conditions when “disputes are long, drawn out and complex; the disputants' own 
conflict management efforts have reached an impasse; neither side is prepared to 
countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute; the disputants are prepared to break 
their stalemate by cooperating with each other and engaging in some communication and 
contact.”178 Similarly, Zartman suggests that parties to a conflict accept mediation when 
they have reached a level of “mutually hurting stalemate.”179 
As mediation gained popularity, different types of mediators emerged in the international 
arena such as individuals, organizations, and states.
180
 Individuals refer to professional 
mediators who are either appointed by a state, an NGO or act independently to resolve a 
given conflict. While these individuals may be former politicians or career diplomats, they 
may also be religious leaders, opinion leaders, journalists, academics or as heads of clans 
or traditional elders. Some popular examples of this kind of mediation may be listed as 
former US president Jimmy Carter’s initiatives in Haiti, Cuba, and North Korea or the 
American veteran civil rights advocate Jesse Jackson who served as a private mediator 
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between the US and the Taliban regime whose mediation was allegedly demanded by the 
Taliban representatives.
181
  
Institutions or organizations refer to various non-governmental organizations, regional or 
international governmental organizations
182
 such as religious or humanitarian NGOs or 
charities (Quakers, the International Network of Engaged Buddhists, International 
Committee of the Red Cross), peace centres and institutes (Institute for Multi-track 
Diplomacy) or think-tanks (the Carter Center, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) 
working on the field of peace and conflict resolutions.
183
 While a typical example of an 
international governmental organization that comes to mind may be noted as the United 
Nations, some regional organizations of such kind may be noted as the European Union, 
the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union.   
Another popular mediator in international conflicts is the state. A state may be invited to 
mediate by the conflicting parties, by other nation-states, organizations, the public, or in 
times it may take on a mediator role by itself. This thesis argues that states usually adopt 
mediator roles as a tool of foreign policy, if not as foreign policy itself. As argued by 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, “governments are not always willing to shoulder a 
mediating role when their national interests are not at stake, and, where they are, mediation 
readily blurs into traditional diplomacy and statecraft.”184 
Touval criticizes the understanding of international mediation “as an autonomous activity 
that is impacted by politics but is not part of politics” and rather suggests that mediation 
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should be considered “as part of foreign policy”185 when practiced by states. In this view, 
“the mediator's perceptions of the international system,” “its domestic needs,” and “its 
foreign policy objectives and strategies” are influential in determining the role of a state as 
a mediator.
186
 This whole orientation eventually affects the outcome of a mediation 
process. Martin notes that, “much like a commercial sponsor who puts money into a 
football match because there are clear benefits from being publicly associated with a 
successful event, diplomatic power also seeks to profit from opportunities for peace.”187  
Another problem may stem with respect to a mediator’s flexibility in a mediation 
process.
188
 In that sense, when a state mediates in a given conflict it sits on the table with 
its own interests which may affect its flexibility in terms of resolving the problem. The 
potential solution to the conflict may contradict with the mediator’s own interests making 
it difficult to come to a solution which inter alia affects the outcome of mediation. 
When embarked on a mediator role, states often use mediation as a tool of foreign 
policy.
189
 Bercovitch and Jackson indicate that, “mediators bring with them, consciously or 
otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or 
organization they represent.”190 The situation is not very different when states mediate. In 
this view, “mediation can serve as a means of advancing a state’s interests by expanding its 
sphere of influence or defending what is seen as a favorable status quo.”191  
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Mediation may sometimes serve as a tool to moralize or legitimize the interests of a state. 
For instance, Touval argues that while intervening in the domestic issues of another 
country by means such as using military force or applying economic sanctions is usually 
perceived as immoral, intervening by using peaceful, non-violent means such as mediation 
is often regarded as ethical and moral. In this view, it is often a wiser choice for a state to 
try peaceful means in order to achieve its political objectives rather than or before it 
actually takes on controversial measures and provoke public reaction.
192
  
A state’s ultimate goal as a mediator, in this sense, may not always be solely altruism or to 
end a conflict but to achieve its foreign policy goals. As Wall suggests, “to enhance his 
reputation or to please his constituency” may be the goals of a mediator.193 While this goal 
may sometimes be just to end a human tragedy, as Kamrava notes, it may as well be 
strengthening a state’s regional role, enhancing its legitimacy, image, or prestige in the 
international arena.
194
 In times, it may even be used as a “survival strategy.”195 In other 
words, the success of a mediation process may sometimes be “subordinate to the mediating 
state's primary domestic and foreign policy concerns.”196 When the mediator is a state, 
“mediation may well be seen as the continuation of foreign policy by other means.”197 
Touval argues that mediation is actually part of domestic and foreign policy of a state, 
which also determines “the strategies and tactics of mediation.”198 Some examples may be 
the US mediation in the 1970 Israeli-Egyptian talks, which merely aimed to keep the 
Soviets out of the Middle East or the US mediation in the Bosnian crisis in 1995 with the 
actual intention to preserve the US-EU relations and protect its domestic image rather than 
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resolving the conflict.
199
 Another example may be the Soviet mediation between India and 
Pakistan in 1965-1966 that aimed to improve relations with Pakistan and enhance its 
regional status vis-à-vis China.200 Evidently, states sometimes mediate to keep other actors 
out of the game. 
States may sometimes adopt mediation as a national role conception. According to Holsti, 
national role conception “is their [policymakers] image of the appropriate orientations and 
functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.”201 Holsti indicate 17 roles 
that states may conceive in international affairs one of which is the “mediator-integrator” 
role.
202
 In this view, mediation may be a major role conception for a state that aims to 
position itself as a peacemaker in the international arena as discussed further in the text. 
2.3 States as Mediators 
The literature offers a variety of themes and indicators that may be utilized to highlight 
difference in mediation by comparing and contrasting mediation approaches and practices 
by different states. On the state level, the field of mediation is occupied either by 
established mediators that have significant experience and knowledge in the field as a 
result of having mediated a range of peace talks for a considerable amount of time or by 
emerging mediators that are relatively new in the field lacking substantial experience and 
knowledge. Each type of mediators bring with them certain advantages and disadvantages. 
This section aims to understand difference in mediation by comparing and contrasting 
mediation by these actors based on different indicators.  
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The history of international mediation is mainly dominated by established mediators most 
of whom are Western states. This study analyses established mediators under two subtitles 
such as “great powers” and “European small-states.” Great powers refer to those states that 
possess, or once possessed, considerable level of power in the international system and are 
able to shape the course of international affairs according to their needs and interests.  
Some scholars, such as Faget, criticize great powers for using mediation as a tool of 
exerting their interests and tending to regard peace as the “ultimate objective” to sustain 
“international order and consequently the interests of the Great Powers.”203 Other scholars 
criticize studies on conflict resolution for depicting weak states as potential threats to the 
international order. For instance, according to Eriksson and Kostić, “weak and failing 
states, and the resulting wars and migrations, have been framed as one of the main threats 
to the United States-led international order.”204 This understanding creates a typology that 
legitimizes intervention into weak and fragile states. 
Having extensive capabilities enables great powers to use diverse foreign policy tools 
ranging from military intervention to positive or negative sanctions as well as diplomacy to 
realize their goals. According to some scholars, great powers are the most “suitable” 
mediators in international relations. This view derives its legitimacy from the extensive 
political, economic, and military capabilities that great powers possess. According to Inbar, 
another advantage that a great power may have as a mediator is the “global perspective” it 
may have regarding the given conflict.
205
 Since a great power has a wide network and 
power of intelligence at a global scale, it may have greater ability to control the mediation 
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process. However, it is also noteworthy to address the problem of coherence of overall 
foreign policy with respect to mediation.
206
 This problem usually pertains to great powers 
whose wide range of interests and policy tools make it difficult for them to sustain 
coherency in their policies. As discussed later in the text, in times being a great power may 
be a disadvantage in a mediation process. 
In addition to great powers, certain European small-states may be regarded as established 
mediators in international crisis as well. The term “small-states,” in this context, refers to 
the states that do not possess “hard-power resources, such as the military and economic 
resources available to larger powers.”207 These small-states have gained prominence as 
mediators in recent years since the great powers no longer had a major interest in 
peacemaking as a result of the removal of the Soviet threat. The emergence of new kind of 
conflicts mainly on issues of identity, recognition or sovereignty created a need for the 
resolution of these conflicts opening room for new mediators. Some examples to these 
countries may be the Scandinavian or Nordic countries such as Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland. Another common example may Switzerland as a mediator.
208
  
Emerging mediators are states that are relatively new in the scene of international 
mediation on the periphery in recent years. As discussed in Chapter 1, their emergence as 
mediators is in line with their emergence as more influential actors in global politics. Their 
mediation often plays an alternative or complementary role to that of the established 
mediators or they occupy the stage when established mediators are not particularly 
interested in a given peace process. 
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2.3.1 Previous Experience of Mediators  
Previous experience of mediators is an important indicator in order to understand 
difference in mediation since it may affect the process and outcome of a mediation. In the 
field of mediation, established mediators are recognized for their extensive experience. 
Great powers, or more powerful countries within the international system may have greater 
institutional experience of mediation and hence a greater array of resources and 
expectations upon which to draw. Although European small-states have been less 
prominent on the international stage, they have developed considerable expertise and fame 
as mediators. Experienced mediators have the required capacity to conduct efficient 
mediation such as personnel trained in conflict resolution and mediation or institutions and 
NGOs that provide international mediation services and technical assistance owing to their 
long-term expertise in the field. Established mediators are also often experienced in terms 
of coordination and collaboration among different state and non-state institutions.  
Emerging mediators, on the other hand, may lack substantial experience and knowledge in 
practices of mediation since they are new in the field. The lack of sufficient previous 
experience may appear as a disadvantage for them. The conflicting parties may be 
reluctant to believe in their capability to resolve problems. In addition, these powers may 
lack sufficient expertise and capacity in mediation unlike established mediators that have 
substantial capacity. It is also important for states to be aware of their capacities before 
embarking on multiple journeys in their foreign policy orientations. This problem becomes 
more apparent with the emergence of new mediators in global politics especially whose 
overall capacity may not allow them to pursue multiple goals of foreign policy. 
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2.3.2 Mediator’s Motives  
Analysing why states mediate can also be a way to assess whether it is possible for Turkey 
to mediate differently from other, more established mediators. Motives may refer either to 
the short term or more specific goals that states wish to achieve by mediation; and the 
motives associated with the place of mediation in wider foreign policy. As such motives 
here can be more wide ranging, and involve the quest for prestige or influence in a given 
area.  
States may also be motivated to mediate in order to bring order, security and stability into a 
given region, usually where they have certain interests. For instance, a mediator may be 
motivated to prevent the spill over of a conflict into its territory or other countries that it 
has interests in. The mediator state may be either located geopolitically nearby or may be 
indirectly affected by the conflict as a result of consequences such as the flow of refugees, 
weapon and drug trafficking, spread of epidemics. The suspension of trade relations may 
also be affecting the mediator state. This is often the case with states that mediate in their 
own regions since they are directly affected by those conflicts.
209
 Ensuring energy security 
may also be important for a mediator state in a given region. 
For instance, one of the similarities among emerging mediators is that they often benefit 
from stability. The stability of their region is important for their own security since a 
conflict in their region may affect them on many levels. As Kamrava notes, during the 
course of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia used mediation as a tool of containing the revolts 
and prevent them from challenging the regional status quo as well as its own regional 
stance.
210
 Saudi Arabia has had the fear of experiencing its own Spring in the last few 
years. A possible spill over effect of the Arab Spring would inevitably challenge the status-
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quo of the Saudi regime. Therefore, containing the Arab Spring became a foreign policy 
objective for Saudi Arabia for which it has used the tool of mediation. 
Emerging mediators may also take initiatives in regions outside their immediate 
neighbourhood particularly if they have certain economic or political interests. The 
involvements of Turkey, Brazil or India in Africa may be noted as examples to such 
initiatives.
211
 Their peacemaking activities in those regions offer them a safe entry into 
volatile zones providing opportunities for securing later deals such as Turkey’s mediation 
in Somalia as will be discussed extensively in Chapter 5. 
Fighting radicalism may be another priority for a mediator state. The mediator state may be 
a target for radical attacks, a recruitment venue for radical groups or a transit route for such 
elements. The post-September 11 era witnessed a visible rise in radicalism especially 
following the US “war on terror.” This has also increased violence by radical groups 
particularly against Western countries. The US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan further 
fuelled tension. Some scholars in the field of conflict resolution such as Abu-Nimer
212
 and 
Irani
213
 criticize Western mediators for using conflict resolution and mediation as a tool to 
fight radicalism in the Middle East. In this view, states sometimes use mediation to design 
an order based on Western ideals, such as imposing a moderate form of Islam, with more 
emphasis on allegedly Western norms and values.  
Some scholars also criticize the use of mediation as a tool of promoting broadly Western 
interests in peripheral settings.
214
 While Richmond
215
 and Mac Ginty
216
 criticize the use of 
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mediation as a tool to promote liberal democracy, Brigg and Bleiker
217
 highlight its use by 
Western powers to pursue their neo-colonial ambitions. According to Richmond, liberal 
peace often follow “a top-down approach” that imposes Western norms, values, and 
concepts such as “secularism, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, free markets, and 
development” and reinforces “institutions rather than communities and society” by 
neglecting and undermining local traditions and cultures.
218
 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and 
Miall note that, “what is being constructed is not an emancipatory peace, but a liberal 
peace led by hegemonic powers, who may be concerned more to stabilize a world order 
dominated by the rich and powerful than to enable a liberating transformation out of 
violence.”219 
As mentioned earlier in the study, mediation may also be a tool of foreign policy, if not 
foreign policy itself. For instance, mediation is an integral part of Finland’s foreign 
policy.
220
 As in the words of former Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb, 
“to stand out from the crowd a small nation needs to be creative.”221 In this sense, 
mediation serves as an  ideal tool of foreign policy for small states to get involved with 
international politics without taking too much risk. Peacemaking also provides these states 
with a safe engagement and legitimacy in regions often regarded as “zones of conflict” 
such as Africa or the Middle East.  
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States may also use mediation as a survival strategy which is particularly the case with 
small-states. For instance, given its small-state position and lack of hard power, it may be 
argued that Norway has developed a survival strategy based on a discourse of peace. As 
also argued by Skånland, this discourse also underlines the notions of “self-interest” and 
“altruism” as other main motivations behind Norwegian peace.222 Peace has also become a 
tool of ensuring Norway’s security in the international system.223 As Waage pinpoints,  
A powerless international actor has many reasons for seeking a peaceful 
international order. Indeed, a small state is dependent on the existence of such a 
peaceful international community in many ways… A well-organized 
international community can be seen both as a counter to the exercise of raw 
military power and as a protector of small states in general. Norway’s support 
of the United Nations and its involvement in peacekeeping and peacemaking 
operations should also be viewed against this background.
224
 
 
Popular evidence of Norway’s ownership of peace may be the renowned Nobel Peace 
Prize given annually by Norway since 1901. As a result, peace has been an important part 
of Norwegian national identity construction.
225
 
According to NORAD, the “Norwegian Model” of peace is “characterised by a 
commitment to long term engagement, involvement of Norwegian researchers and NGOs, 
and the pragmatic, flexible use of human and financial resources in support of peace 
processes.”226 According to Skånland, this model consists of four elements. The first one is 
the “small-state advantages” based on Norway’s lack of “colonial past, great power 
interests, historical or vested interests, and muscle to pressure the parties” which are 
significant inputs that secures its image as an impartial, neutral, and confident mediator. 
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The second element is Norway’s multi-track approach to peace-building providing Norway 
with “flexibility, experience and contacts in conflict areas.” Third is building “close 
contact” with the conflicting parties that enables Norway to gain their confidence. The 
fourth element is, “a long-term perspective on peace-building, including aid and economic 
support for reconstruction.”227 These four elements constitute the backbone of the 
Norwegian Model of peacemaking. 
As a small state, for Qatar as well the image of a peacemaker serves as a tool of ensuring 
national security in a volatile region such as the Persian Gulf by reducing “the number of 
regional or global opponents Qatar might face otherwise.”228 As Ulrichsen also postulates, 
“The most convincing explanation of Qatari regional and peace-making efforts lay in a 
multifaceted strategy of political and economic liberalization, state-branding, and pursuit 
of an independent foreign policy.”229 
For small states, mediation is one of the major elements of their foreign policy as evident 
in Qatar’s Constitution adopted in 2003. According to Article 7 of Qatar’s constitution,  
The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening 
international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of 
international disputes; and shall support the right of peoples to self-
determination; and shall not interfere in the domestic affairs of states;
230
 and 
shall cooperate with peace-loving nations.
231
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Mediation serves Saudi Arabia as a tool of achieving its foreign policy objectives as 
well.
232
 One of these objectives is ensuring regime security by enhancing its domestic and 
international legitimacy.
233
 In addition, mediation also serves as a tool to enhance Saudi 
Arabia’s role conception as a “regional superpower and hegemon.”234 Mediation also 
serves Saudi role conception as the “big brother” of the Islamic world. Mecca, the capital 
of Saudi Arabia, is the pilgrimage destination for all Muslims in the world. Being a central 
destination for the Muslim world has long become a tool of foreign policy as well as a role 
conception as a responsible protector of the Islamic world for Saudi Arabia which also 
polishes its mediator role.  
Denmark followed adaptive foreign policy as a small state reaction during the Cold War 
based on “adaptation to great powers, pacifistic positions and a strategy of non-
commitment within the alliance structures.”235 This position was a result of an “interest-
based foreign policy” which opposed “to the use of military force,” supported 
“international law and order,” and followed the principle of “non-involvement in 
international conflicts.”236 It also gave Denmark a role as a peacemaker and peacekeeper in 
international conflicts especially based on its engagement with Western institutions such as 
the NATO, the UN, and the EU.  
Since the shadow of the Soviet threat was removed from Danish foreign policy after the 
Cold War, Denmark started to follow a more active foreign policy based on “a strong 
defense of an international order, rule of international law and reinforcement of the role of 
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international organizations in the international system”237 which reiterated its mediator role 
in international conflicts; this time with an emphasis on the protection and extension of 
liberal ideas, norms, and values.
238
  
Referring to Qatari foreign policy Kamrava notes that, “mediation appears to be an integral 
part of its toolbox.”239 As Kamrava indicates, unlike other ad hoc mediators, for emerging 
mediators, “mediation is not simply a response to specific, emerging developments.”240 
According to Kamrava, Qatar uses mediation as a tool of enhancing its international 
prestige. In this view, mediation is a role conception for small-states such as Qatar.
 241
  
2.3.3 Characteristics of Mediators 
The characteristics of mediators serve as a way to analyse how states mediate differently 
from one another.  In assessing how states mediate differently from each other, it can be 
useful to draw upon certain characteristics identified in the mediation literature. While 
Bercovitch lists the required characteristics of an ideal mediator as, “intelligence, stamina, 
energy, patience, and a sense of humor,”242 according to Kleiboer, the literature on 
mediation converges in three main characteristics of a mediator that determine the 
acceptability as well as the success of mediation such as impartiality, leverage, and 
status.
243
 By departing from the discussions in the literature, this thesis analyses the 
characteristics of mediators with respect to their power capabilities such as their leverage, 
hard power/soft power, status, and legitimacy, and their positions by assessing their 
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impartiality and neutrality, proximity to the conflict, previous relations with the conflicting 
parties, and their insider/outsider positions.  
2.3.3.1 Power Capabilities of Mediators  
Power in mediation is often defined as the ability of a mediator to exert influence on the 
conflicting parties and moving them to accept certain outcomes either by persuasion or 
coercion.
244
 “Power” is often used synonymous with “leverage” in the mediation literature. 
Kleiboer defines leverage as “a mediator’s ability to put pressure on one or both of the 
conflicting parties to accept a proposed settlement.”245 While previous studies emphasize 
the importance of possessing hard power in forms of carrots and sticks,
246
 scholars such as 
Nye underpin the growing role of soft power in international affairs.
247
     
Hard power criteria such as population, economic power, landmass, and military power are 
often used to explain power in international mediation. This study argues that although soft 
power criteria based on diplomatic, political and social power are influential in a mediation 
process they may not be sufficient to implement the decisions taken on the table. Drawing 
on the literature on social psychology, Shapira outlines different sources of power of a 
mediator such as being able to coerce or reward, the ability to provide expertise, the ability 
to identify with the parties, the power of having sufficient information, or the ability to 
manipulate the environment or the context of the mediation.
248
 According to Bercovitch 
and Houston,  
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to exercise any degree of influence, mediators need “leverage,” or resources to 
search for information and move the parties away from rigid positions. 
Leverage or resources buttress the mediator’s ability to facilitate a successful 
outcome through the balancing of power discrepancies and enhancing of 
cooperative behavior.
249
  
 
Similarly, Ott suggests that, “If a mediator were in a position to put pressure on one or both 
parties to accept a proposed settlement, the chances of success would logically be 
enhanced.”250 While some scholars see leverage of a mediator as indispensable for 
mediation success others argue that in times lack of power may increase mediator’s 
credibility since a powerful mediator may sometimes be regarded a threat by weaker 
states.
251
 According to a literature review conducted by Kleiboer,
252
 there is usually a 
relationship between leverage and impartiality.
253
 In this view, when mediators are partial 
they should also have enough power to support their positions. 
 
As discussed earlier, in the mainstream mediation literature great powers are often 
regarded as suitable mediators based on their power capabilities. These capabilities also 
enable them to have sufficient leverage over the disputing parties. For instance, while 
mediation may sometimes be a greater foreign policy priority for small-states or emerging 
mediators, in times even being the foreign policy itself, for great powers it may be easier to 
give up on their mediator role and replace it by different policy tools present in their 
toolboxes.    
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Having enough carrots and sticks also enables them to keep the promises they make on the 
table.
254
 To that end, “power” comes to fore as an important concept of mediation by great 
powers. According to Fisher, what differentiates power mediation is “the use of leverage 
by an influential third party through promised benefits or threatened punishments.”255 
Fisher further posits that, “pure mediation is typically practiced by esteemed persons, small 
powers, or international organizations, especially the UN, while power mediation is more 
likely to be employed by the major powers, such as the USA or the UK.”256 
 
Martin indicates that bringing in too much power may sometimes halt the negotiations 
which may be defined as, “the dilemma of power of diplomacy in mediation.”257 He notes, 
for instance, that in the cases of South Sudan, Cyprus, and Northern Uganda the 
application of too much power by the US during the negotiations helped both in bringing 
parties to the negotiation table as well as intimidating and pushing them away.
258
 In this 
sense, great power mediation has both its advantages and disadvantages. On the other 
hand, lack of power may sometimes be an advantage for mediators. For instance, with 
respect to European small-states, the lack of hard power gives them considerable 
legitimacy and credibility as mediators especially in settings that have unpleasant 
memories of colonial or imperial legacies. Their reliance on soft power
259
 rather than hard 
power in their mediation activities also gives them an upper hand by providing them with a 
less threatening image. 
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The power capability also determines whether mediators should be coercive or persuasive. 
Since great powers possess greater hard power capabilities they may be more coercive as 
mediators compare to small-states or emerging mediators. They are more able to apply 
pressure or offer incentives to manipulate the parties to accept an outcome. European-small 
states and emerging mediators, on the other hand, may rely more on their soft power 
capabilities since they lack sufficient hard power or “sticks” when compared with great 
power mediators. They have to be more persuasive and rely more on their discursive power 
in addition to their diplomatic activism. Wallensteen defines persuasion as, “developing 
confidence with the parties, finding intelligent propositions and, thus, attempting to 
transcend some of the difficulties.”260  
While great power mediators may sometimes be more coercive in their mediation style, 
European small-states and emerging mediators may need to be more persuasive since they 
lack the necessary measures to coerce the parties into a solution. Soft power is also 
embedded in the foreign policies of these states. One of the instruments of soft power of 
these states may be cultural diplomacy such as the Bollywood of India
261
 or the Turkish 
soap operas that have become considerably popular across the region in recent years. 
Instruments of soft power used by these states vary from education to health diplomacy or 
even religion.  
Qatar is another state that utilizes soft power by using its international media organs, such 
as Al-Jazeera, to support its mediation activities by promoting peace in its areas of 
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interest.
262
 One of the advantages of Qatar as a mediator is the amount of wealth the state 
possesses at its disposal. It has the highest gross domestic product per capita among rentier 
states.
263
 The economic power that it possesses enables Qatar to keep the promises it 
makes on the negotiation table by offering carrots to the conflicting parties. The ability to 
offer such financial incentives provides it with an image as a reliable mediator. Offering 
financial incentives also encourages the parties to take concrete steps towards peace.
264
 
While emerging mediators may well have interests in the outcome of the conflict, 
particularly in the ones that take place in their own region, similar to European small-
states, their lack of sufficient power may come to fore as an asset in terms of making them 
less threatening actors compared with great powers. It may also make them more 
accessible to other stakeholders to the conflict. For instance, reaching the Turkish foreign 
minister may be easier than reaching the US secretary of state. 
It would not be fair to argue that the West is completely indifferent to the capabilities and 
the potential emerging mediators offer as peacemakers. In fact, the established Western 
mediators and the UN sometimes need mediation by these states as was evident in the 
Iranian nuclear swap mediated by Brazil and Turkey. Another leading example may be the 
US support for Malaysia’s mediation in the conflict between the Philippine government 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
265
 Bush’s call for India to assist him in his quest for 
democratizing North Korea or Myanmar is another example.
266
 As such, supporting 
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emerging mediators may be a way of becoming more legitimate in some regions for 
Western actors who are sometimes seen as meddlers.  
Another characteristic of international mediators is their status which refers both to the 
status a mediator state holds in the international platform and to the rank of its 
representatives within their institutions. The rank of mediators determines their ability to 
realize the promises they make by having the support of their institution.
267
 According to 
Bercovitch and Schneider, “(i) the position they [mediators] hold in their own country, (ii) 
the leeway given to them in determining policies, and (iii) the different resources, 
capabilities, and political orientations of their countries” are important determinants of a 
mediation process.”268  
In some peripheral settings, due to the strong influence of patriarchal norms and values 
embedded in the culture, a mediator is often expected to have a certain degree of status and 
leverage in order to gain the respect of the parties.
269
 In this sense, it would be more 
effective in these settings to have high-level officials and/or recognized leaders as 
mediators rather than ad hoc professionals who have no power or positional status.  
2.3.3.2 Positions of Mediators 
In the mediation literature, the position of mediators refers to the impartiality and 
neutrality of mediators in a mediation process, their previous relations with the conflicting 
parties, and their insider/outsider position. The position of mediators is crucial since it inter 
alia affects their legitimacy, accountability and credibility. 
The concepts of impartiality and neutrality receive considerable attention in the mediation 
literature. Despite being often used interchangeably there is still a difference between 
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them. According to Cooks and Hale, in order to be neutral, a mediator should not have any 
prior relationship with the parties or interests in the outcome of the mediation that would 
prevent him/her from being “fair, unbiased and impartial.”270 According to Faget, 
impartiality refers to “an objective position which requires that mediators do not take sides, 
contrary to neutrality, a more subjective and probably impossible position as all mediators 
are ‘influenced’ by their own beliefs and values.”271 In this view, while impartiality is 
more about not taking sides, neutrality refers to not having a stake in the outcome of 
mediation thus maintaining an equal distance from both parties. However, when the 
mediator is a state this is rather difficult since states often bring their interests and previous 
relations into the mediation process. For instance in intrastate conflicts, mediator may 
come onto the table with his own interests sometimes without thoroughly understanding 
the realities of the intervened country. The mediator may have his own agenda and may 
impose a deadline which could create unease among the parties and make them feel 
pressured.
272
 As Bercovitch and Jackson note, “the relationship between a mediator and 
disputants is thus never entirely devoid of political interest.”273 
Great powers are often criticized on the basis of their impartiality. Since great powers have 
an extended scope of interests in world affairs, reaching out to various regions of the world 
on highly diverse issues, they often have stakes in conflicts. Their frequent mediation 
attempts on a variety of issues may trigger suspicion regarding their interests as 
mediators.
274
 The mediation literature often considers impartiality as an indispensable 
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element of success in mediation.
275
 However, there are also critics who maintain that 
impartiality is not indispensable.
276
 Some even posit that at times it may be better to be 
partial in order to empower the weaker side.
277
 In this view, the impartiality of the 
mediator may balance out the power disparity between the parties. For instance 
Moolakkattu underlines that, “the desirability of such an impartial role is questionable in 
asymmetric conflicts, since there is no guarantee that the interests of the weaker parties 
will be protected, as the outcome of the Oslo Accords for the Palestinians has 
suggested.”278 Critics also suggest that in times, a partial mediator who empowers the 
weaker side may in fact offer a more fair solution. The empowerment of the weaker party 
could also help in balancing the asymmetric power relations usually endemic in conflicts 
taking place in peripheral settings.
279
  
Similarly, by criticizing neutrality from a Turkish NGO viewpoint Hüseyin Oruç, Deputy 
Chairman and Board Member of Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), maintains that, 
If there is a crisis, there is an oppressor, a murderer, a massacrer. There is 
one whose rights are violated and one who violates. You cannot go there 
neutral and say you are at equal distance from both the parties because to be 
able to resolve [the conflict] you have to take from one and give it to the 
other. This work cannot be done in another way.
280
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Another important issue of discussion in the mediation literature is whether an ideal 
mediator should be an insider or outsider referring to mediators’ political, social, historical 
or geopolitical proximity to the conflict. Mainstream mediation scholars often argue that an 
ideal mediator should be an outsider and impartial.
281
 Scholars who are critical of this 
thinking, on the other hand, argue that especially in mediation attempts taking place in 
peripheral settings, being an insider may be more advantageous for mediators since they 
may be considered more trustable and enthusiastic to resolve the conflict. As suggested by 
Faget, “mediators may be insider-partial, and not outsider-neutral, the acceptance of their 
action resting not as much on their distance or objectivity, but rather on their links with the 
conflict and their relations of trust with the warring parties.”282 Being an insider also helps 
with establishing rapport with the disputants, which can be vital to mediation. 
Emerging mediators may also have deep historical and cultural ties with the parties which 
may come to the fore as an opportunity to relate with the problems and enhance their 
positions as insiders. They may also have better insight and understanding of the issues at 
stake as well as a well weaved network in their region which they can utilize during their 
peacemaking initiatives.  
While being an insider appears as an advantage, in times it may be a disadvantage as well 
especially in terms of suspicions over their neutrality since they often have a stake in the 
outcome of the conflict. Having historical ties may not always be an advantage either 
particularly if the mediator has in the past been in a contested or colonial relationship with 
one or more of the parties. For instance, the mediator may be a former colonizer or an 
empire and the history could still be contested.  
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On the contrary, small-states, for instance, lack such histories. As argued by Ingebritsen, 
their lack of colonial or imperial past coupled with their lack of hard power may give them 
potential legitimacy as mediators especially in those settings which have suffered from 
colonial or imperial legacies for centuries. In addition, their neutral and non-aligned 
political status further strengthens their image as honest and impartial peace-brokers.
283
 
For instance, given its neutral position in international affairs, mediation seems to be an 
expected role for Switzerland which also allows it to act as a facilitator among those states 
who are not in direct contact with each other such as Cuba, Iran, and US.
284
 These 
characteristics also provide small-states with an image more of a facilitator than a power-
mediator enhancing their non-threatening image. 
The positive record in their domestic politics, usually based on a social-democratic 
outlook, and the application of aforementioned values at home are often highlighted by of 
the European small-states to legitimize their mediator roles. Also striking is the peace 
discourse that these countries have adopted both in their domestic and foreign politics. For 
instance Norway’s discourse of peace has been employed by Norway’s government to 
position itself in international politics since its independence struggle in the 1890s. Some 
other assets for the European small-state mediators are their “small bureaucracy, a 
consistent foreign policy and the geography to keep the talks secret without much 
publicity” as evident in Norway, among others.285 These traits provide them with the 
ability to respond quickly to calls for mediation as well as follow a more consistent 
approach in their mediation practices. 
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2.3.4 Style of mediation 
The mediation styles adopted by mediators are other indicators to understand difference in 
mediation. Being persistent or reluctant, inclusive or exclusive, building partnerships with 
other actors, bringing culture into mediation, adopting a normative approach, mobilizing 
regional mechanisms or supporting mediation by other means are all discussed in this 
section as differences in style among mediators.  
Being persistent or reluctant refers to a mediator’s commitment to a mediation process. 
Mediation is a complex process that often needs the long term commitment and patience of 
mediators. Particularly, in international mediation, it may sometimes take decades to 
resolve a conflict. While mediators may be persistent and invest considerable time and 
money in a mediation process, they may in times be reluctant. The commitment of a 
mediator may be dependent on a number of variables ranging from the domestic 
conjuncture in mediator state’s home country to the international context. The priorities of 
the mediator may change through the course of the conflict which may affect his/her 
willingness to resolve the conflict. For instance, there may be a change of government 
back home and a new representative may be appointed to mediate a conflict that may not 
be as persistent as the previous one. 
Another indicator to understand different mediation styles may be the inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness of the mediator. Particularly in intrastate conflicts, there are often a range of 
actors beside the government such as different clans, militia groups, regional 
administrations, opposition parties, ethnic groups, political parties. As Paffenholz and 
Spurk indicate, “civil society rarely has a seat at the negotiation table based on the 
assumption that the lower the number of actors involved in negotiations the easier it is to 
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reach agreement.”286 Studies reveal that the involvement of civil society in peace talks 
increases chances for sustainability.
287
 Excluding an actor from the peace process may 
create tension and resentment against the mediator which may fuel the conflict. However, 
the inclusion of a particular party into the mediation process may as well trigger problems 
by providing it with certain degree of legitimacy, enhancing its visibility and increasing its 
political power. This may also further fuel the conflict by raising criticism among other 
parties.  
The inclusion of unrecognized actors may also challenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of 
the government. States as mediators usually refrain from engaging with illegitimate actors 
during peace processes such as certain militia groups since this may raise criticism among 
their public. Unlike great powers, European small-states and emerging powers are often 
more enthusiastic to invite different actors into peace processes by pinpointing the 
importance of inclusiveness in mediation. Norway’s mediation during the peace talks in Sri 
Lanka and Sudan,
288
 Turkey’s engagement with Hamas during the Palestinian-Israeli peace 
talks are some relevant examples.
289
  
Mediation may sometimes serve as a tool of reproducing existing power relations and 
enhancing elite structures which may not serve long-term peace. Papagianni argues that 
compromises made by elites during peace agreements “often fail to address the causes of 
the conflict, do not take power away from those who started the conflict in the first place, 
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and do not create the conditions for political and social reform.”290 In that sense, the 
mediator should encourage the participation of different political groups into the political 
processes. 
Another indicator of difference in style may be whether or not a mediator follows a 
normative approach in mediation. European small-states often emphasise the normative 
aspect of their mediation highlighting “universal” norms and values such as peace, 
equality, freedom, human rights, gender equality and democracy. For instance, mediation 
plays a significant role for Denmark and its active foreign policy based on “a strong 
defense of an international order, rule of international law and reinforcement of the role of 
international organizations in the international system”291 which reiterates its mediator role 
in international conflicts with an emphasis on the protection and extension of liberal ideas, 
norms, and values.
292
  
Finland also follows a normative approach in mediation by framing itself as “a strong 
advocate of democracy and human rights” that “actively promotes the values of the Nordic 
and Scandinavian countries in the development of world peace and human well-being.”293 
According to Christen, Scandinavian countries have become “norm entrepreneurs” in 
international relations on areas such as “the environment, international security, and global 
welfare” as a result of their “remote geographic position, limited material capabilities, and 
unique domestic institutions.”294  
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Similar to European small-states, in recent years, emerging mediators have also come to 
fore as “norm-defenders” in the international arena. Brazil’s advocacy of human rights or 
its introduction of the concept of “Responsibility while Protecting (RwP)” to replace the 
Western introduced concept of “Responsibility to Protect (R2P),”295 India’s advocacy of 
democracy or Turkey’s advocacy of democracy and reformation of the existing 
international order may be highlighted as leading examples. These countries also indicate a 
need for “the reform of global governance institutions and the revision of global norms”296 
as evident in the calls of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff
297
 or Davutoğlu for such 
reforms.
298
 They often have overlapping discourses on global affairs particularly with 
respect to their criticisms of Western institutions on issues such as the lack of 
comprehensive and all compassing global governance schemes or the failure of these 
institutions to attend to the needs of people in global scale. For instance, according to 
Davutoğlu, “the UN system is unable either to accommodate current political conditions or 
to address the growing number of global challenges.”299 Rousseff indicates a similar 
concern by noting, “increasingly intense regional wars and conflicts, the tragic loss of 
human lives and the immense material losses for the peoples involved demonstrate the 
utmost urgency of undertaking the institutional reform of the United Nations, in particular 
of its Security Council.”300  
Emerging powers also often call for global justice and equality for opportunity that 
unfolds, for instance, in their quests for securing seats in institutions such as the UN 
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Security Council. These states often emphasize the importance of multilateralism and 
multipolar world order that leaves room for new players.
301
 For instance in Davutoğlu’s 
words: “The existence of multiple centers of power/authority can serve to prevent anyone 
from dominating the others. Governance, in this regard, means the mutual and respectful 
interaction of different actors.”302 The emphasis of emerging powers on the urgency and 
need for a novel and different approach to international relations and their claim that 
peripheral states should be allowed to play greater roles in doing so trigger the question of 
whether they would really be able to offer anything novel or alternative to the dominant 
norms and practices of international relations. More specifically in the Turkish case, 
Turkish policy makers often argue that they are different from previous Turkish elites and 
from Western powers in that they have a different mind-set and mode of operation. 
While emerging powers defend norms and values such as human rights, justice, and 
equality on international platforms and criticize the West for failing to adhere to these 
norms on the practical level, unlike European small-states, they often have deficits on such 
issues on domestic level. For instance, while Brazil is a strong defender of human rights on 
the international level, its domestic human rights record is often subject to criticism. 
Similarly, while it defends equality on the global scale and claims to be colour-blind, its 
domestic elite mostly consists of white Brazilians.
303
 Similar examples may easily be noted 
for other emerging mediators as well. 
Mediation is often confused with arbitration, which is a legal procedure for the settlement 
of disputes where an independent third party makes a decision that is binding on the 
disputants based on factual evidence. Mediators, on the other hand, are not interested in the 
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“truth” as such which is often relative and contestable. Instead, they are interested in 
resolving the conflict in a fashion agreeable to both parties. According to the literature on 
mediation, value-based conflicts are the most difficult ones to resolve. For instance Moore 
argues that, 
Many dissensual or value-based disputes focus on such issues as guilt and 
innocence, what norms should prevail in a social relationship, what facts 
should be considered valid, what beliefs are correct, who merits what, 
and what principles should guide decision makers. Parties who frame 
their differences in these terms often can only see outcomes in complete 
wins or defeats, or in terms of yes-or-no decisions.
304
 
 
Moore further suggests that as difficult as it is, to be able to resolve a value-based conflict, 
a mediator should try to reframe “dissensual or value-based conflicts into consensual or 
interest-based ones.”305 Drawing on Moore’s analysis one may argue that the adoption of a 
normative and value-based discourse by a mediator may in fact hamper the mediation 
process. As such, it could be more effective to highlight the common interests of the 
parties towards a resolution. 
Established mediators often build partnerships during their peacemaking initiatives while 
emerging mediators seem to be relatively more independent. For instance, European small-
states mainly operate within the UN system by effectively utilizing the UN tools for 
mediation. The UN is a significant partner for Norway and the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry indicates that, “the UN has an advantage because of the breadth of the tools at its 
disposal, and we [Norwegians] are therefore a strong supporter of UN efforts to assist these 
countries.”306  
                                                     
304
 Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 4
th
 Edition, 356. 
305
 Ibid, 357. 
306
 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway and the United Nations: Common Future, 
Common Solutions,” meld. st. 33 (2011–2012) Report to the Storting (White Paper), 2013, 32. 
76 
 
The institutionalization process at the foreign ministries of European small states are often 
complemented by close collaboration with NGOs in terms of capacity building including 
the training of the official personnel as well as trainings of the relevant stakeholders in 
conflict zones. These NGOs often go on to the field to train opinion leaders, NGO 
representatives, education personnel, and even religious leaders in conflict resolution and 
mediation. For instance, Peace and Reconciliation Unit operating under its foreign ministry 
govern Norway’s official peace initiatives. In addition, several other institutions operate in 
collaboration with the ministry such as the Christian Michelsen Institute, Norwegian 
Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), Fafo Applied International Studies, International 
Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the Research Council of Norway (NORAD). Norway is 
also the first country that established a state funded peace institute.
307
  
Another NGO actively working on international conflict resolution may be noted as Crisis 
Management International founded by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari who 
received the Peace Prize in 2008. Ahtisaari mediated the Helsinki Talks between the 
Government of Indonesia and the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) in 2005. The Helsinki 
Talks also set example to cooperation between European small-states. In that sense 
Switzerland supported Finland in these talks by coaching the GAM during the 
negotiations. Another leading example may be cooperation between Switzerland, Norway, 
and Spain to facilitate the talks between the ELN and the Government of Colombia in 
2005.
308
 
Like Norway, Finland's mediation approach is also based on partnerships with "parties to a 
conflict, other mediators, governments, the civil society and international 
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organizations."
309
 According to Finnish policy makers, "working in isolation is a recipe for 
failure."
310
 As the Finnish Foreign Minister points out, “a prominent individual can bring 
the necessary political weight with useful networks and resources to the process, whilst 
those closer to the conflict can bring the capacity to create a dialogue and the necessary in-
depth expertise to find solutions to the situation. The better we combine our strengths, the 
stronger the chances are to reach sustainable peace. If we can rely on cooperation, each of 
us can focus on deepening our particular competences, instead of trying to master all 
areas.”311 In that sense, European small-states often rely on networking and partnership 
with other actors. Cooperation with other European small-states is also part of their 
mediation style. Cooperation between Finland and Norway in Myanmar is notable in that 
sense.
312
  
Emerging mediators often rely more on regional mechanisms to resolve conflicts. The 
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform or Iraq’s Neighbouring Countries Process, 
both initiated by Turkey, are examples to such mechanisms. They also often call on or 
cooperate with regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African 
Development Community, or the Arab League to take initiative in regional peacemaking. 
While in times these organizations play a direct mediator role, in other times they assist or 
complement the mediator states by creating the conditions necessary for peacemaking.
313
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Emerging mediators also call on the Western organizations to cooperate and collaborate 
more with regional organizations on relevant matters.
314
 This call has so far been returned 
on various occasions such as the EU’s support for the African Union in capacity building 
in mediation through NGOs such as the Crisis Management Initiative or the HD Centre.
315
 
These states also initiate the establishment of various mechanisms within the UN that 
contribute to global peacemaking such as the Mediation Support Unit and the Standby 
Team of Mediation Experts initiated by Norway and the Friends of Mediation Initiative 
established by Finland alongside Turkey. These establishments promote the use of 
mediation as a nonviolent tool of conflict resolution. The Friends of Mediation Initiative is 
also a good example of cooperation between European small-states and emerging powers 
in terms of conflict resolution and mediation. 
Some of these states also encourage civil society involvement in their peacemaking or 
peacebuilding initiatives. Some of the leading examples are Turkey or Brazil. For instance, 
the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation often encourage cooperation and 
collaboration with the civil society in member states.
316
  
2.3.4.1 Bringing Culture into Mediation 
Definitions of culture vary across the literature.
317
 While some define it as a set of customs 
and tradition, others define culture more as intellectual and aesthetic accumulation of 
knowledge.
318
 Williams defines culture in two levels as both “a whole way of life” and 
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“the special process of discovery and creative effort.”319 While Ting-Toomey defines it as, 
“patterned ways of thinking, acting, feeling, and interpreting,”320 for Faure and Rubin, 
“Culture is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize 
national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behaviour.”321 
Zartman considers culture as irrelevant to a mediation process and argues that there is a 
common international diplomatic culture that dominates the world of diplomacy. He 
argues that, “In this internationalized world, is it not clear that previous national 
differences prevail any longer, because many have disappeared into a homogenized 
cosmopolitan culture of international negotiations.”322   
This approach is problematic on two levels. Firstly, it limits mediation (or negotiation) to a 
process that takes place in a vacuum and in isolation from its overall context. Particularly, 
in intrastate conflicts, the involvement of grassroots plays an important role in the 
resolution of conflicts in which culture becomes a significant determinant. In that respect, 
the subject matter is not only the cultural background of the official actors but also the 
grassroots.   
Secondly, the idea of “a homogenized cosmopolitan culture of international 
negotiations”323 reminds us of the discussion on “the end of history”324 which once argued 
that liberal democracy would dominate the world into a homogenized cosmopolitan 
political culture. Recent developments in international politics have proved Fukuyama 
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wrong. Today we are faced with a world where even the nature of conflicts has changed 
from interstate to more of an intrastate characteristic and more often than not, conflicts 
emerge from cultural differences. In such instances, it would be misleading to ignore the 
role culture plays in mediation. As argued by Bercovitch and Schneider, since culture plays 
a crucial role in a mediation process, parties may be more likely to accept a mediator who 
comes from a similar cultural background with the parties.
325
 
Some scholars criticize Western approaches for failing to address and consider the issue of 
culture while resolving conflicts. Scholars such as Bleiker and Brigg imply that, the 
“imposition of Western values upon culturally diverse conflict situations can lead to a 
regime of domination that is resented by those who are subjected to its ethnocentric 
implications.”326 They criticize the neglect of local traditions and homogenous approaches 
to political life and conflict in Western practices of conflict resolution.  
This literature also emphasizes the importance of understanding the needs and realities of 
peripheral settings and criticizes the failure of Western approaches in achieving it.
327
 
Cultural differences constitute a major block of this failure. For instance, Hall 
differentiates between “high” and “low-context” cultures.328 By “high-context cultures” he 
refers mainly to non-Western societies which are more collectivists, emotional, 
hierarchical, and relational. In high-context societies the insider-outsider division is strong; 
the style of communication is mainly non-verbal and implicit (rituals are important); 
feelings, intuitions, and trust-building are important components of cultural interaction. In 
low-context societies, on the other hand, communication is more verbal and implicit; the 
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society is more individualistic, rational and logical; knowledge is more factual; and the 
society is more action oriented.
329
 
This study argues that culture is a significant determinant in the process of mediation. 
Understanding cultural differences is significant both in the process and outcome of a 
mediation attempt.  
2.3.5 Supporting Mediation by Other Means 
Particularly in intrastate conflicts, it is often necessary to support mediation by a range of 
other tools such as aid, humanitarian assistance, medical relief or peacebuilding in a 
broader sense. While mediation refers to the process of “peacemaking” between parties to 
the conflict, peacebuilding is the “implementation” process of mediation outcomes.330 
According to recent studies, about a third out of 69 peace agreements signed between 1989 
and 2000 recurred as civil wars, which indicates the importance of long-term commitment 
to peace which can be achieved by combining different tools.
331
   
As underpinned by Papagianni, “Third-party engagement can create the political space 
within which long-term reconstruction, development, and reconciliation issues can be 
discussed among national actors.”332 Mediation is vital for building sustainable peace since 
it encourages parties to come out of the sphere of violence and enter the sphere of political 
discussion. Mediation, in this sense, “tries to keep the signatories of the peace agreement 
engaged, to bring new parties in the process, and to expand as much as possible political 
participation.”333  
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In fact, peacebuilding in itself is a sort of mediation in that, as argued by Richmond, 
peacebuilders “should endeavour to see themselves as mediatory agents of empathetic 
emancipation, whereby their role is to mediate the global norm or institution with the local 
before it is constructed.”334 As Bercovitch and Jackson contend, complementary to 
mediation, “peacebuilding is a holistic concept aimed at no less than the complete 
transformation of the political, economic, and social structures within a nation that can lead 
to violent conflict.”335 In this view, peacebuilding is “a comprehensive, multidimensional, 
and long-term conflict transformation project.”336 
Combining different tracks is important in achieving comprehensive and sustainable peace. 
It is however important to ensure coherence among different tracks based on a horizontal 
logic and a “systems-based approach to conflict resolution.”337 Studies increasingly find 
“that only the involvement of a variety of different actors and approaches can succeed in 
sustainable peacebuilding, including grassroots organisations or other civil society 
actors.”338 As also highlighted by Richmond, “NGOs offer the flexibility, expertise, rapid 
responses and commitment in local environments necessary to provide essential services, 
and they have to capacity to inform and mobilize opinion.”339 
In post-ethnic conflicts, especially in those where there is a government collapse, 
mediation and peacebuilding are often accompanied by statebuilding. The implementation 
of decisions taken on the negotiation table requires the establishment or resurrection of 
certain institutions particularly in terms of ensuring security and governance. Often, a 
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number of transitional governments need to be established before a viable political system 
is in place. These transitional governments are often recognized as the legitimate authority 
by the international community which may create some problems. Drawing on the Somali 
example Papagianni highlights that the desire to make the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) viable created a dilemma among the international community that 
refrained from criticizing it for the sake of protecting its legitimacy. Menkhaus suggests 
that in times statebuilding may deteriorate the mediation process since “it is seen by local 
parties as taking sides”340 through the empowerment of the internationally recognized 
government.  
Complementing mediation by peacebuilding also encourages the participation of the 
grassroots into peace processes. As also argued by Atashi, “peace dividends can create 
incentives and convince people that they are stakeholders, thereby increasing public 
support at different stages of the peace process.”341 Faget postulates in a similar vein that, 
“the peace process must involve not only high officials and notables, but all the societal 
and cultural strata.”342 In this view, peace should be mass driven rather than elite driven to 
be able to ensure sustainability. It should nevertheless be noted that, while in some cases 
inclusiveness solidifies the peace process, in others it may trigger certain problems. For 
instance, in intrastate conflicts, there are often a range of actors such as different clans, 
militia groups, regional administrations, ethnic groups, political parties, and the state.  
                                                     
340
 Ken J. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004, 10. 
341
 Elham Atashi, “Ending the ‘Troubles: Brokering Peace in Northern Ireland,” in Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. 
And William J. Lahneman, From Mediation to Nation-Building: Third Parties and the Management of 
Communal Conflict, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013, 43. 
342
 Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 14. 
84 
 
2.3.6 Methods of mediation 
Another indicator which may be used to understand difference in mediation may be the 
methods applied by mediators such as direct talks, indirect talks or shuttle diplomacy, 
summit diplomacy by holding conferences or workshops or supporting local conflict 
resolution mechanisms.  
A mediator may choose among a number of methods based on reasons such as the relations 
between the parties regarding whether they recognize each other as legal, legitimate 
entities and accept to speak face to face; or the nature of the conflict regarding whether it is 
an intrastate conflict between various ethnic groups or an interstate one which maybe 
between two or more nation-states.    
One of the most common methods is direct talks where parties sit together with the 
mediator in order to solve their problems. This kind of talk usually occurs when parties 
recognize each other as legal, legitimate entities or their relationship has come to a point 
where they are ready to sit face to face. 
Another method used is indirect talks or shuttle-diplomacy which refers to delivering 
information back and forth between conflicting parties through a number of diplomatic 
visits. The term “shuttle-diplomacy” was first used to describe Kissinger’s style of 
mediation “shuttling back and forth” between the various Arab states and Israel to resolve 
the conflict.
343
 As noted by Hoffman, “mediators often use private caucus sessions, in 
which the mediator shuttles between or among the parties in conflict, using these separate 
meetings to discuss the conflict and to advance the negotiation.”344 Shuttle diplomacy is 
mainly used to conduct indirect talks usually consulted in situations where parties do not 
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want to engage in direct talks. However, there may be a positive side to indirect and secret 
talks as well. According to Assefa, there is a greater chance for the parties to compete with 
each other in negotiations with higher visibility.
345
 Since the parties do not see each other 
in indirect talks, the risk of stubbornness is potentially lower. 
Summit diplomacy through holding international conferences or workshops are other 
common ways of practising international mediation where parties join the conference or 
workshops usually together with other stakeholders to the conflict under the auspice of the 
mediator state(s) in order to discuss their problems extensively with the hope to come to a 
solution or at least to improve their relations. These kinds of conferences may or may not 
be open to media based on a strategic decision of the mediator and the parties for the sake 
of the mediation process. 
Another commonality among these mediators is their support for local conflict resolution 
and mediation initiatives. For instance both Finland and Norway offer mediation and 
conflict resolution training courses for local opinion leaders, clan leaders, traditional 
elders, teachers, security personnel. They also empower locals to utilize their traditional 
mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms.
346
 In addition to promoting UN norms and 
values, European small-states are also strong advocates of gender equality and inclusion of 
women in conflict resolution, mediation and peacebuilding processes. 
The imposition by the mediators of a top-down approach instead of empowering grass-
roots and encouraging a bottom-up process may also raise criticism. There is also a risk 
that the mediation process may be exploited by the ruling elites to legitimize their political 
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positions instead of achieving an inclusive peace process. In that sense, it is significant to 
include grassroots into the peace process in order to ensure durability of peace.  
Teaching conflict resolution and mediation skills to influential grassroots figures such as 
opinion leaders, clan leaders or religious leaders may also be an effective and feasible way 
of peace. This would enable parties to build their own capacities in term of peacemaking. 
In certain indigenous settings, there are often existing traditional conflict resolution and 
mediation methods such as certain rituals that people utilize to resolve conflicts pertaining 
inter or intra-group or clan conflicts. Empowerment of these mechanisms may also 
contribute to local containment of local conflicts preventing them from spreading and 
growing into regional or national conflicts. Mobilizing local mechanisms of conflict 
resolution also creates and enhances local ownership of the peace process. 
In intrastate ethnic disputes, the conflict often exists on multiple levels such as local, 
national and sometimes even regional and international with the involvement of external 
stakeholders. In this kind of situations, it might be necessary to pursue a multilevel 
mediation initiative including mediation on the grassroots level through the use of above 
mentioned mechanisms, on the national level through national peace talks and on the 
regional or international level though the utilization of more inclusive mechanisms such as 
holding international conferences or workshops. In this sense, a range of methods of 
mediation may be utilized to achieve peace. 
2.3.7 Progress of mediators 
Progress of mediators is another indicator that may be used to understand their difference. 
This study prefers to use the term “progress” rather than “success” because success can be 
measured against what a mediator state attempts to do in a mediation process. As such, it is 
87 
 
challenging to measure the success of a mediator state independent from its initial goal. As 
Faget argues, trying to define success in mediation, 
raises more methodological questions than provides definite answers. It 
reveals an “instrumental” approach to mediation which gives more 
importance to the short to mid-term objective result-signing a treaty, a 
ceasefire, an arrangement, opening talks, curbing violence- than to the 
operating mode or its mid to long-term subjective consequences – the 
quality of communication, a change in the population’s attitude, the 
building of common projects.
347
  
 
The literature diverges visibly on the definition of and the criteria for mediation success. 
For instance, Frei, one of the early scholars on mediation, argues that mediation is 
successful “when both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator and 
a mediative attempt within five days after the first attempt.”348 Bercovitch, Anagnoson and 
Wille rather focus on the outcomes of mediation by articulating that success in mediation 
means a “ceasefire, a partial settlement or a full settlement.”349 Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, 
McGillicuddy, and Syna point out “reaching agreement, goal achievement, and immediate 
satisfaction with the agreement”350 as the determinants of short-term success of a 
mediation attempt while Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, Welton, and Castrianno note that, 
“compliance with the agreement, improved relations between the parties, and the absence 
of new problems between them” determine the long-term success of mediation.351 
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According to Siniver, success in mediation does not always bring effectiveness which may 
be more crucial to ensure the sustainability of a settlement.
352
 For instance drawing on the 
example of the Oslo Accords, he notes that “the conclusion of political settlement (let 
alone the reduction in the level of hostilities) does not necessarily translate to effective 
results. The 1993 Oslo Accords is perhaps the most pertinent example of an objective 
mediation success (a binding political agreement), while the issue of its effectiveness to 
end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains highly contentious.”353 
The above discussion reveals the difficulty of reaching an objective criterion for 
determining success in mediation. As a result, the study will instead focus on the progress 
of mediators by looking into whether they were able to achieve their initial goals. In some 
cases, progress may be measured based on criteria such as the ability of the mediator to 
commence direct talks, sign disengagement agreement, constitute confidence building 
measures, or urge sides to consider unconditional talks. In other cases it may be related to 
the broader foreign policy goals of the mediator state. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter drew a conceptual framework by drawing out certain themes and indicators in 
order to answer the research question, “How can difference in international mediation be 
identified?” These may be listed as the previous experiences of mediators; their 
characteristics including the power they bring into the mediation process, the determinants 
of their positions as mediators including their impartiality and neutrality, proximity to the 
conflict, previous relations with the conflicting parties, their insider/outsider position and 
historical record; methods they use while mediating such as direct talks, indirect talks or 
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shuttle diplomacy, holding conferences or workshops; their style of mediation such as 
being persistent or reluctant, inclusive or exclusive, building partnerships with other actors, 
bringing culture into mediation, adopting a normative approach or mobilizing regional 
mechanisms; whether they use other means to support mediation; and their progress as 
mediators.  
These themes and indicators will be considered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to examine the 
cases of Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks and in Somalia to be able to answer 
the questions of “Why and how does Turkey mediate?”, “What role does Turkey’s 
discourse on difference play in its foreign policy making?” and “What are the main 
determinants of Turkey’s role as a mediator on the periphery?”.   
In this chapter, mediator states were divided into two main categories as “established 
mediators” and “emerging mediators according to their experiences as mediator. 
“Established mediators” were further divided into two subcategories as “great power” and 
“small-state” mediators based on their international status, power capability and experience 
as mediators.  
An important finding of this chapter has been how mediation relates to foreign policy.  As 
such when mediation is foreign policy, its priorities, criteria and objectives often follow a 
parallel route to the overall foreign policy of the mediator state. Intrinsically, mediation 
becomes political which affects its main tenets as neutrality, impartiality or legitimacy. 
When the mediator is a state, mediation may become a tool of intervention, extending 
interests or achieving certain foreign policy priorities. This study considers mediation as a 
tool of foreign policy. The thesis will build on this assumption by drawing on Turkey’s 
experience as a mediator in order to understand its difference as a mediator from its 
Western counterparts. In the following chapter the study will examine the background that 
90 
 
paved the way to the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role and what role mediation plays 
in its foreign policy.  
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CHAPTER 3 – CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF TURKEY’S ROLE AS A MEDIATOR354 
3.1 Introduction 
Turkey’s mediator role is a new phenomenon that has emerged in line with its new foreign 
policy. In the last decade or so, Turkey has mediated a number of peace talks including the 
ones between Syria-Israel, Iran-the West, Croatia-Bosnia-Yugoslavia in the Balkans, the 
Sunni-Shia groups in Iraq, Somalia-Somaliland, Palestine-Israel and Georgia-Russia. 
While its mediator role has been both praised and criticized among various circles, Turkish 
foreign policy makers defend it as a means of bringing peace, stability and order to its 
areas of influence.  
For instance, as also underlined by Bülent Aras, former Academic Adviser to Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish policy makers argue that the only way to 
achieve peace and stability at home passes through achieving these ideals outside.
355
 In the 
words of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s former foreign minister and current prime minister, 
“Turkey’s strategic interests lie in peace, stability, security, and prosperity in its 
neighborhood and beyond.”356  
Although, there had been a few mediation attempts of Turkey before the AKP government, 
its mediator role has come to the fore mainly in the last decade. During the coalition 
government of 1999-2002, Turkey was enthusiastic to play a facilitator role between Israel 
and Palestine under the auspice of former Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem.357 Its 
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efforts, however, were brought into practice during the AKP government. Similarly, while 
Turkey had some minor peace initiatives during the 1990s, especially in the post-Soviet 
countries, its mediation efforts have increased significantly in recent years, becoming an 
important focus of its foreign policy.  
As a result, Turkey appraised its advantages by repositioning itself as a peace and stability 
promoter, and a soft power in neighbouring regions. It reconstructed its identity by 
referring to its historical-geopolitical depth in addition to its social and cultural affinities. It 
pursued a “multidimensional” foreign policy by extending even to regions such as South 
America, South East Asia and Africa which were once considered as distant parts of the 
world both physically and mentally. Concepts such as “peace,” “cooperation” and 
“proactiveness” have replaced “threat” and “enmity” which had once dominated Turkish 
foreign policy discourses. Accordingly, hundreds of strategic partnerships, free trade, free 
mobilization and security agreements have been signed even with protracted enemies such 
as Syria and Greece.  
This study argues that the ideas and interests of actors have been influential in the 
formation of the new foreign policy. The turn in Turkish foreign policy has been informed 
by Turkey’s response to domestic, regional and international developments. It has also 
been part of a search for identity within the dynamics of the new world order. In this 
respect, this chapter aims to understand the reasons behind the emergence of Turkey’s 
mediator role.  
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3.2 Change in Turkish Foreign Policy 
3.2.1 The Domestic Context 
One of the catalysts for the emergence of a new foreign policy in Turkey was the change in 
its domestic environment. As also underlined by Aras, “The signiﬁcance of Turkey’s 
domestic transformation is the consolidation of stability in the country, enabling it to 
emerge as a peace-promoter in neighbouring regions.”358 A few triggers may be listed to 
understand domestic change such as the AKP’s ascendance to power in 2002; the rapid 
economic growth in the last decade; Turkey’s EU accession process; the process of 
democratization and the rise of the civil society in Turkey. By drawing on the change in 
Turkey’s domestic environment, this section aims to analyse some of the underlying 
reasons for the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role. 
3.2.1.1 The Rise of the AKP and the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy 
The 2002 elections was a milestone in Turkish politics resulting in the AKP’s ascendance 
to power. A few reasons may be noted for its apparent success such as the wide scale 
charm of its leader Erdoğan; the AKP’s promising neo-liberal economic program which 
attracted many businessmen and entrepreneurs at a time when Turkey had been struggling 
with a severe economic crisis; its discourse on democracy which appealed to a large 
audience; and its conservative and Islamic references. These elements may have paved the 
way to the AKP’s victory as a party appealing to masses and a visible majority of the 
population.         
The AKP was founded by a group of politicians, businessmen, academics and 
miscellaneous civilians who, according to Erdoğan, are proponents of “conservative 
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democracy”.359 The party hosts members from various backgrounds including the 
“reformist wing” of the Welfare Party, a political embodiment of the National Outlook 
Movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969 whose followers had come from 
religious and conservative backgrounds.
360
 
The AKP’s conservative democratic outlook provided it with popularity not only in Turkey 
but also abroad particularly across the Islamic world. Turkey’s democratic and secular 
image also prepared the ground for its mediator role. Although, realpolitik played an 
important role on the decisions of Turkish foreign policy makers on a daily basis, the 
overall policy vision was highly influenced by a wider perspective based on making 
Turkey a “leading country” by 2023 – a target set by the AKP government.361 
3.2.1.2 The Economic Developments in Turkey   
The AKP’s successful and stable economic policy is one of the important reasons for its 
consequent electoral victories. A number of scholars draw attention to the economic 
dimension of change in Turkish foreign policy.
362 For instance, Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu 
suggest that, “Turkey is becoming a ‘trading state’ and increasingly this is having an 
important impact on Turkey’s domestic politics as well as foreign policy.”363 The 
economic developments in Turkey also deserve attention since they were influential in the 
emergence of Turkey’s mediator role on a few levels.  
                                                     
359
 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Uluslararası Muhafazakarlık ve Demokrasi Sempozyumu, January 15, 2004. 
360
 Some of the members were Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül, and Deputy Prime 
Minister Bülent Arınç, among others from the current government. 
361
 AKP, “Türkiye Hazır: Hedef 2023,” 12 Haziran 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi, 2011, 146-
158, http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname2011.pdf (accessed September 26, 2012). 
362
 Ziya Öniş, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisinin Ekonomi Politiği,” in Hakan Yavuz (ed.), Ak Parti: Toplumsal 
Değişimin Yeni Aktörleri, 2010, 266-269; Mustafa Acar, Ömer Demir and Metin Toprak, "Anatolian Tigers 
or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges," Middle Eastern Studies 40, no.6, 2004: 170. 
363 Kemal Kirişçi and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle 
Eastern Studies, 47, no.5, 2011: 705. 
95 
 
Firstly, these developments enhanced Turkey’s confidence and its search for new markets 
making it more active both in its region and beyond. Secondly, the increasing level of 
prosperity fostered Turkey’s charity activities which subsequently extended abroad. These 
activities constitute an important part of Turkey’s mediation model. Thirdly, Turkey’s 
economic record even at the time of global crisis increased its stability, credibility and its 
ability to keep the promises it makes on the table as a mediator.  
According to Öniş, there are a few reasons for the AKP’s economic success. These may be 
listed as the political stability that came with its electoral success in three consequent 
terms; the initiation of Turkey’s EU accession process which inter alia attracted foreign 
investment; the AKP’s commitment to the economic program of the IMF followed by a 
growth rate of 14 per cent in the first quarter of 2004, a rate higher than the expectations of 
the IMF; the improvement in the banking and finance sector; the government’s promise at 
the time to fight corruption and its support for the small and middle size enterprises.
364
  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Exports 73,476 85,535 107,272 132,002 102,143 113,883 134,969 152,462 151,803 
Imports 116,774 139,576 170,063 201,961 140,929 185,544 240,838 236,545 251,661 
Trade Volume 190,251 225,111 277,334 333,963 243,072 299,428 375,807 389,007 403,464 
Trade Balance -43,298 -54,041 -62,791 -69,959 -38,786 -71,661 -105,869 -84,083 -99,859 
Turkish Foreign Trade (in US Dollars)
365
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The implication of the AKP’s economic performance on foreign policy has been 
significant. As a member of G-20, the OECD, the EU Customs Union, and BSEC, Turkey 
is the 17
th
 largest economy in the world and the 6
th
 largest in Europe. It has free trade 
agreements with more than 50 countries worldwide. In the last decade, Turkish exports 
have diversified and increased more than 20 times in volume exceeding 300 billion dollars, 
in more than 200 countries.
366
  
As such, the economic developments that took place in Turkey were important in boosting 
the confidence of policy makers. As a result, by 2023, the 100
th
 anniversary of its republic, 
Turkish government aims at raising its exports to 500 billion dollars, and its total trade 
volume to 1 trillion dollars.
367
 To be able to achieve this goal, Turkey needs to diversify its 
markets and grow its trade volume and mediation is an ideal tool to bring stability to 
Turkey’s areas of influence and build a trustable image to encourage further involvement 
with its neighbours and beyond. 
3.2.1.3 Turkey’s EU Accession Process 
Turkey’s EU accession process has been a significant catalyst in terms of change in its 
foreign policy and the emergence of its mediator role. Following the recognition of its EU 
candidate status in 1999, a series of democratic reforms were launched in Turkey. Aydın 
suggests that, “European pressure in terms of the Copenhagen Criteria has provided the 
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necessary external impetus to overcome, firstly, existing inertia within the country and, 
more importantly, resistance among Turkey’s traditional elite to further reforms.”368  
The accession process has also increased Turkey’s regional and international credibility by 
enhancing its democratic image as well as making Turkey a more active player in its 
region and beyond. In addition, the adaptation of EU policies, such as its neighbourhood 
and security policies, paved the way for the emergence of Turkey’s peace-brokering role in 
its region. For instance, Turkey’s “zero-problems with neighbors policy” is an 
interpretation of the EU’s neighbourhood policy which aims to avoid problems and 
conflicts in neighbouring lands by encouraging cooperation and integration.  
Likewise, the concept of “security for all” in EU foreign policy is clearly visible in 
Turkey’s new foreign policy understanding, which enhances its image of a peacemaker.369 
According to Polat and Aras, Turkey’s activism in the Middle East is a consequence of its 
EU accession process.
370
 They argue that Turkey’s journey towards the EU helped it gain 
confidence in its foreign affairs, making it more active in its region. 
In terms of economy, it was a period when regional trade had also surged and since then 
the EU has become the largest trade partner and the largest foreign investor of Turkey. 
Former Head of Department of Directorate of Policy Planning at Turkish Foreign Ministry 
Ufuk Gezer underscores that there is a vision of integration with the EU based on 
economic interdependence; the EU’s policy of transforming its neighbourhood through 
soft power, projects of transportation corridors, and policy of communication and energy 
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lines.
371
 He notes that this is the EU’s way of transforming and stabilizing its surroundings 
through integration and exporting its values. In this view, Turkey’s vision, interests and 
discourse overlap with that of the EU’s.372 Gezer further pinpoints that Turkey and the EU 
can cooperate in mediating crisis. He notes, “I believe Turkey and the EU have 
complementary powers in terms of providing stability in our common areas of 
neighbourhood. And we also have common interests.”373  
So far, there has been cooperation between Turkey and the EU in terms of establishing 
mediation mechanisms. For instance, Turkey and Finland together established the Friends 
of Mediation initiative on September 24, 2010 within the UN aiming to promote mediation 
as a tool of peaceful resolution of conflicts.
374
  
Despite its important role as a catalyst in the emergence of its mediation, recent years have 
witnessed a decline of enthusiasm among policy makers in Turkey’s EU accession process. 
As Bilgin contends, “the initial enthusiasm towards the EU lost pace in the later period.”375 
By the same token, Meral and Paris argue that despite an initial enthusiasm towards EU 
membership in the period of 2002-2004, “prolonged talks without tangible success and 
other priorities for the AKP have resulted in ‘accession fatigue’.”376  
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3.2.1.4 The Process of Democratization and the Rise of the Civil Society  
According to Mardin, civil society secures the free flow of the non-state life and the 
autonomy of economic practices in a country.
377
 Although the history of civil society in 
Turkey dates back several centuries, until recent years it had served rather as a top-down 
mechanism of furthering state control over the society. The civil structures and institutions 
were allowed to exist as long as they had remained in a predetermined space. Some of 
these institutions were even initiated by the state authority itself.  
The progression of the civil society took place vis-à-vis the process of democratization in 
Turkey. The 1999 earthquake was another milestone for Turkish civil society which 
revealed the inadequacy of the state to provide with the necessary services and 
subsequently resulted in the mobilization of civilians to help rescue efforts. The success of 
the NGOs also had a positive influence on the state, helping it overcome its hesitancy to 
make more space for them.
378
 
The late 90s witnessed two other developments for Turkish civil society including the 
recognition of Turkey’s EU candidate status starting a serious of democratic reforms and 
the introduction of the internet to wide public use. The internet became a popular space for 
networking and getting organized for civil initiatives. It also made people more aware of 
the surrounding problems. The civil society agents that are influential in the process of 
foreign policy making may be listed as charities, NGOs, academics, think tanks, business 
federations and the public.  
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The rise of civil society has been important for Turkey’s mediator role in that it has served 
as a mechanism which pushed the government into certain decisions such as opening up to 
new regions and taking on more proactive roles in certain issues. For instance, the 
involvement of Turkish businessmen and HNGOs in Africa created a demand on the 
government to deepen its involvement in the continent by opening diplomatic missions, 
signing various agreements, lifting visas or starting Turkish Airlines flights. 
Civil society’s involvement is significant for peacemaking for a number of reasons. First, 
civil society usually has extensive networks within the target countries, not only among 
officials but also among non-state actors and grassroots, affording them significant 
advantages. For instance, NGOs, charities and sometimes even businessmen may have 
access to people that the official channels do not. Second, civil society often has more 
mobility and flexibility than officials. It can build direct contacts with actors that the 
officials cannot due to issues of legitimacy. Third, since civil society, especially NGOs and 
charities, usually have hands-on experience in the field, they can have better insight into 
the needs and demands of the people at a grassroots level. Fourth, aid by NGOs and 
charities or investments by corporate entities help the government uphold the promises it 
makes at the negotiation table.
379
  
Turkish foreign policy was supportive of expanding Turkish business and charity 
organisations in different parts of the globe, and policy makers later described this as 
strength of Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy. Turkey’s diplomatic missions embraced this 
new notion, facilitating the international activities of Turkish NGOs, including 
humanitarian organisations.
380
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3.2.2 The Regional Context 
In addition to domestic developments certain regional developments have also been 
effective in the formation of Turkey’s new foreign policy and the emergence of its 
mediator role. These developments opened up space for Turkey to become more influential 
in their regions. This section will focus on the regional environment that prepared the 
ground for the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role. 
3.2.2.1 The Emergence of a New Regional Role 
Although there was a positive atmosphere and motivation for the emergence of a new 
regional policy, one incident particularly expedited the pace of adaptation of a new policy 
line namely, the US-led invasion of Iraq. The invasion was in line with the new US policy 
of making the world a “safer” place through war on terror. However, this invasion was a 
largely unilateral military move, which was not authorised by the UN mechanism. It also 
failed to generate a wide or lasting international and regional support indicating the lack of 
its legitimacy.  
The invasion also increased the anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in this region 
and in some of the Muslim majority states in the world. As a result of such developments, 
the US-led invasion of Iraq posed enormous problems to tackle with for Turkey, as it had 
been a traditional Western ally. This section elaborates on the new regional atmosphere 
during the Iraqi War and its impact on the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role in the 
region. 
The invasion of Iraq had serious repercussions on Turkish politics both domestically and 
externally. Before invading Iraq, the US had asked Turkey for support by opening Turkish 
military bases for its use as well as by providing with troops. Although in the initial phase, 
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the AKP government was planning to support the invasion it had to change its policy due 
to a number of developments.
381
 Firstly, there was a serious criticism from the opposition 
parties. Secondly, large scale public rallies triggered massive reaction against the invasion 
of Iraq and Turkey’s support for it.  
As Oruç notes, Davutoğlu’s personal initiatives to convince the members of the parliament 
to vote against the decree were also very influential. Oruç postulates that the reason for the 
AKP’s support for the US was the fact that during the initial phase of its rule the 
government did not have much to lose even if it had failed in its policy. Also, the public 
opposition had become more visible in the coming days.
382
 
Turkey’s policy makers failed to prevent the invasion but also avoided cooperation with 
the US despite a long history of strategic partnership. However, Turkey was not able to 
prevent the negative consequences of the war for itself. The American invasion of Iraq, the 
collapse of the Saddam regime, and the ethnic and sectarian disputes that broke out 
consequently affected Turkey by directly jeopardizing its own security, stability and peace. 
While trying to respond to the new situation, policy makers recognized that the old pattern 
of foreign policy would not be sufficient to counter the challenges of the new 
environment.
383
 
The first implication of the regional change was on domestic politics. The invasion of Iraq 
was likely to further strengthen Kurdish autonomy if not lead to independence. The 
Kurdish question in Turkey had been a serious issue at home both political and security 
wise and policy makers had concerns about further deterioration of the problem. It was 
necessary to have reforms at home and resolve Turkey’s protracted Kurdish problem by 
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giving more rights to Kurds. The domestic reforms eased the hands of policy makers in 
their Iraqi policy. Consequently, Turkey adopted a renewed perception towards its 
neighbourhood in light of changes on the ground based on an understanding of cooperation 
and opportunity.  
The second implication was on the style and content of foreign policy. Turkey’s regional 
policy had a new experience based on shuttle diplomacy and regional ownership. This 
policy envisioned increased contact with countries in the region and a more proactive role 
in regional and international organisations. One consequence was Turkey’s establishment 
of the Platform for Iraqi Neighbours in 2003 aiming to bring Iraq’s neighbours together to 
discuss issues pertaining to peace and stability in the region.
384
 
At first, shuttle diplomacy and promoting regional ownership were results of the policies 
developed vis-à-vis the Iraqi situation but subsequently have become important 
components of Turkey’s mediation style. For instance, Turkey later on initiated the 
Istanbul Process for Afghanistan, the Friends of Syria, the Caucasian Stability and 
Cooperation Platform following the Georgian-Russian crisis and two trilateral mechanisms 
which included Turkey, Bosnia, Croatia and Bosnia, Serbia, Turkey. Davutoğlu maintains 
that regional ownership, 
can be achieved only through a more effective regional cooperation and 
active engagement with all regional systems in our neighborhood. This, 
in turn, necessitates enforcing existing regional integration structures, 
and forging new ones as necessary. This is why Turkey supports and 
seeks to promote regional cooperation in its neighborhood and to boost 
the profile of regional organizations for that purpose.
385
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As Özkan underscores, “Turkey’s reconciliation efforts in the domestic politics of Iraq and 
Lebanon, championing for a just solution to the Palestinian issue and its mediation role 
between Syria and Israel in 2008, are some of the examples of Turkey’s re-integration with 
the region.”386 Regional mechanisms also create platforms for the discussion of regional 
problems under Turkey’s mediation in addition to enhancing its legitimacy, visibility and 
credibility which are important characteristics of a mediator. Promoting regional 
ownership also aims to contain the problems and develop a sense of confidence for the 
resolution of problems within the region as well as preventing a possible international spill 
over effect. It also encourages the creation of channels through which the international 
actors find counterparts to communicate with as they may look for legitimate structures for 
involvement.
387
  
The third implication was on the actor preferences of the foreign policy makers. Turkey’s 
Iraqi policy was centred on preserving Iraq’s territorial unity and having close relations 
with all sides within the country. Turkey developed a close relationship with the central 
Iraqi government in addition to pursuing good relations with the Sunnis, different Shia 
groups and the Kurdish Regional Government. As a result of its Iraqi policy and rejection 
of the US request of sending troops to Iraq, Turkey aimed to increase its credibility, 
accountability and legitimacy in Iraq paving the way for its mediation between the leader 
of Iraq’s Hizbul Islam Tariq al-Hashimi and the US ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad 
conducted in Istanbul by then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül.388 These were important 
steps that led to Turkey’s future mediator roles such the one between Syria and Israel. 
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Developing relations with sub-national actors and getting involved in their relations were 
new traits of Turkish diplomacy. Initially this attitude was adopted as a reflex to manage 
the situation in Iraq but later on has become a cornerstone of Turkey’s regional policy. As 
argued by Gezer, mediation was one of the tools of Turkey’s foreign policy in search for 
regional integration.
389
 Being able to speak to all parties also corresponds with the “all-
inclusive” approach in Turkey’s mediation. As Cemalettin Haşimi, Head of Department of 
Public Diplomacy under Turkish Prime Ministry maintains, “regarding mediation, being 
able to speak to all parties simultaneously is an important asset and Turkey is the only 
country which is able to do that.”390 Similarly, Aras argues that, 
Turkey has access both to the North and the South. Of course, this has its 
limits. Its relationships are not perfect neither with the North nor with the 
South but it has access to both which makes Turkey a unique actor. It is 
both transatlantic and regional which provides Turkey with a large area to 
manoeuvre. Its main capacity is being able to reach everyone, talk to 
everyone and bring them together.
391
 
 
As also evident in the words of Turkish foreign policy makers, the emergence of Turkey’s 
new and more proactive regional role was inter alia shaped around an understanding that 
places significant importance on the concept of “historical-geographical depth” which 
refers to the fact that Turkey has a long historic role in the region and is also part of the 
region.
392
 This view is underpinned by Davutoğlu who argues that, 
Our [Turkey’s] long history provides us with a unique set of relations 
with countries and communities all around us. Our geostrategic location 
in the midst of a vast geography, on the other hand, places us in a 
position to relate to and influence the developments that are key to the 
future of the world. So the question is not achieving the strategic depth, 
but using it for regional and global peace. This requires us to engage with 
the countries with which we share a common past and geography in a 
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way that will promote our shared interests and create a mutually 
beneficial framework for cooperation and dialogue.
393
  
 
In an attempt to highlight the roles the AKP government has conceived in its foreign policy 
in the Middle East, Aras and Görener adopt six role conceptions from Holsti including 
“regional leader,” “regional protector,” “regional sub-system collaborator,” “global sub-
system collaborator,” “example,” and “bridge.”394 They argue that “the AKP foreign policy 
elite hold multiple role conceptions, and this is consistent with the theory’s prediction that 
multiple roles are associated with foreign policy activism.”395  
 
While these concepts explain Turkish policy in the Middle East in recent years, another 
role conception could easily be added to the list. “Mediator-integrator,” one of Holsti’s role 
conceptions, may be appropriate to explain Turkey’s peace-brokering initiatives in recent 
years. According to Holsti, “the themes for this national role conception indicate 
perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their differences.”396 The role 
as a peacemaker and mediator also helps Turkey in the consolidation of its self-claimed 
“order instituting” role in the region in line with its new foreign policy.397 
Turkey is directly affected by the conflicts in its region and is a party to a considerable 
amount of them. As maintained by Haşimi, “when Norway mediates the Palestinian 
conflict, it would not be directly affected by the outcome. This is why its mediation can 
remain on a technical level. But both our [Turkey’s] lives and politics are directly affected 
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by the duration and outcome of such mediation process. This is the reason why there is a 
huge difference.”398 Haşimi further notes that, 
The process in Egypt is a matter of democracy for us [Turkey]. The 
problem in Syria is the massacre of humanity and the transformation of 
the region into an island of instability. The problem in Iraq seems to be 
the effort of Maliki to maximize his power despite the north and the 
south and to keep the Sunnis out of the process. We are a party to each 
of these cases. Not as a matter of choice but directly a party to the 
conflict. We have been a party to the process of the Palestinian-Israeli 
issue since Israel did not keep its promises during the process of 
mediation. Subsequently, we are directly party to each of these cases. 
But despite all these examples, Turkey still continues its mediation. 
Being a mediator does not mean not having a position about a given 
issue. It means to be a party whose word would be wanted by both 
parties to be included.
399
 
 
By referring to its historical ties, Oruç posits that being the last centre of the caliphate has a 
vast significance on Turkey’s image as a mediator. He notes,   
For the last twenty years, we [IHH] have been visiting geographies all 
around the world; places we had never heard of yet faces massacres, such 
as East Turkestan. In every place that we go, there was hope that Turkey 
would come. Wherever you go, Turkey is where people turn to. I think 
the most important factor is that the last centre of the caliphate was here 
[Turkey] and that people’s old habits persist. Back then too, it [the 
caliphate] was a structure that people turned to whenever they got into 
trouble. It was such a structure that its verbal intervention was sufficient 
even if it had not done anything de facto. It was a structure that was 
much stronger than USA of today even in its weakest times.
400
 
 
Necdet Subaşı, Head of Directorate for Strategy Planning at Directorate for Religious 
Affairs, notes in a similar vein that, “For instance, in the Balkans people tell us, ‘You are 
our predecessors, the ones we used to be affiliated with.’ People demand Turkey to act as 
an elder brother in disputes and there begins an effective process.”401 
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3.2.2.2 Turkey’s Regional Policy 
The situation in Iraq was a catalyst for Turkish policy makers to revise their regional 
policy. As also put forward by Altunışık and Çuhadar one of the consequences of the Iraqi 
War was that, “the decline of traditional Arab powers, such as Egypt, left room for non-
Arab countries like Turkey and Iran to ﬁll in this regional vacuum.”402 Tocci argues in a 
similar vein that the regional vacuum and the unfolding disputes were significant in the 
emergence of Turkey’s mediator role. She notes that, “Turkey’s efforts in mediating the 
manifold conflicts in the region can be credited… mainly to the lack of effective mediation 
in the region.”403 As also argued by Yalvaç, “Turkey tries to increase its international 
effectiveness by using foreign policy tools that are ignored by great powers and focusing 
on issue areas those are not addressed by the great powers.”404  
Gezer maintains that Turkey’s mediator role was self-attributed in line with its regional 
interests. As he notes, “Turkey wanted to contribute to the resolution of conflicts in its 
region as a requisite for its regional vision within the framework of its own interests.”405 
Turkey’s regional policy is formulated around four principles. First is promoting high-level 
political dialogue among political actors in the region by signing high-level strategic 
cooperation council agreements, establishing dialogue and regional cooperation 
mechanisms. Building regional mechanisms is a strategy aiming to create legitimacy and 
encourage burden sharing through regional ownership of regional problems.  
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The Second premise is developing economic interdependence to back political dialogue 
through various trade agreements and the policy of lifting visas. The Third premise is 
building comprehensive security frameworks. The last premise is to promote and support 
multi-cultural co-existence in the region through the inclusion of all actors in the 
processes.
406
 It could be argued that these principles were effective in the formation of 
Turkey’s mediation approach.  
A considerable body of literature has also flourished on Turkey’s policy in the Middle East 
in line with Turkey’s activism in the region.407 While some of this literature highlight 
Turkey’s rapprochement with its neighbours,408 others discuss the possibility of its 
leadership role in the region
409
 and concepts such as “model country”410 or “central 
country.”411  
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Turkey’s Iraqi policy played an important part in the constitution of its mediator role in 
line with its regional policy. According to policy makers, Turkey played a constructive role 
by defending the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq.
412
 One of the reasons why it 
was against a sectarian war in Iraq was a possible spill over effect it could have on its own 
unity, which is composed of a diverse population of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds, among 
others.
413
 As such, Turkey followed a stance on behalf of the unity of Iraq by emphasizing 
the role of using diplomacy and soft power instead of hard power and military intervention.  
In line with its policy on dialogue and cooperation, in 2008, High Level Strategic 
Cooperation Council was also signed between Iraq and Turkey which aimed to strengthen 
ties on issues ranging from security to energy and trade. Turkey also mediated between the 
Sunni and Shia groups to promote democratic elections and the inclusion of the Sunni 
groups into the electoral process. As also argued by Erdoğan, at the time, Turkey had been 
the only country that had good relations with all groups in Iraq and with all of Iraq’s 
neighbours, at least until the Arab Spring.
414
  
3.2.3 The International Context  
The change in the international context was a result of certain developments such as the 
termination of the Cold War and the September 11 events.
415
 The new imperative created a 
widening room for manoeuvring for regional powers, such as Turkey, to become more 
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proactive in the resolution of conflicts. As such, Turkey positioned itself as a candidate for 
cooperation in dealing with problems in its region.  
This section will dwell on the change in the international context, its impact on Turkish 
foreign policy and the subsequent emergence of Turkey’s mediator role. It focuses on two 
major incidents including the end of the Cold War and the September 11 events in order to 
understand how Turkey’s mediator role in international crisis has come to the fore.     
 3.2.3.1 The End of the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War triggered major political, economic and social shifts in the 
international system. The prolonged bipolarity in the international system was replaced by 
a multipolar international order. According to Davutoğlu, as a result of the new distribution 
of power among “multiple” and “overlapping centers,” the concept of governance replaced 
the previous “notions of government, hegemony, or imperialism” thus, the dichotomist 
perceptions of  “insider/outsider, or center/periphery or above/below” has become much 
more elusive.
416
 The end of the Cold War has also pushed countries towards a search for 
new regional and international identities and roles.  
Turkey was positioned in the Western bloc during the Cold War. Due to its geopolitical 
position, it had served rather as the buffer zone between the Western and Eastern power 
blocs which strengthened its role in world politics. Its NATO membership made it a 
component of the Western defence strategy. Furthermore, the deployment of the U.S. 
forces on its territory made Turkey a strong U.S. ally.
417
 Under the confines of the Cold 
War, Turkish foreign policy operated within the limited boundaries of Western interests.  
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The end of the Cold War also resulted in the emergence of various conflicts in the post-
Soviet countries. Turkey had historical, cultural, religious or national affiliations with most 
of these states most of which were former Ottoman lands. It utilized these links in order to 
increase its influence in these regions and took on mediator roles in a number of conflicts 
pertaining in these countries. As also argued by Aras, the new foreign policy emerged as a 
result of “a redefinition process that has been underway since the end of the Cold War.”418  
In the wake of the Cold War, Turkey had to reposition itself in the international system. 
Several concepts have been proposed so far in the literature to explain Turkey’s new 
position including regional power,
419
 middle power,
420
central country,
421
 emerging power 
or bridge country.
422
All these terms including middle power as a popular term of the Cold 
War era are polemical among scholars and policy makers. Middle power is often criticized 
for being too categorizing.
423
 On the other hand the terms “regional power” and “emerging 
power” have become relatively more popular in recent years the latter mainly used to 
indicate countries that are becoming more influential in the global economic and political 
arena such as the BRICS countries, Malaysia or Indonesia. Bridge country has also been 
criticized by some. Yet these concepts, particularly the concept of “bridge country” have 
often been associated with Turkey’s mediator role. Altunışık and Çuhadar highlight that, 
“The bridge metaphor provided a suitable framework for third party activities as well, 
which encompassed notions like ‘impartiality’, ‘in-betweenness’, and reaching out to ‘all 
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sides.’”424 Haşimi, on the other hand, attributes a higher role for Turkey that exceeds the 
label of “bridge country.”425 He argues that,  
Mediation has such a dimension: Turkey has been labelled as a bridge 
country since the past. Our emergence, meaning the vision of the 
Public Diplomacy Department, has been built on the perception that 
Turkey is more than a bridge country. We are a central country; this 
is the argument; this is the main framework. The activities are shaped 
around this.
426
 
 
As also evident in the above discussions, labels such as central country or bridge country 
also fortify some of Turkey’s certain characteristics as a mediator such as legitimacy, 
status, position, connectivity, insiderness and inclusiveness. As such, after the Cold War, 
Turkey has been in an effort to reposition itself within the new world order. As will be 
discussed more in depth later in the text, mediation inter alia was a role conception 
adopted by Turkey to reidentify itself as an influential actor in world politics.    
 3.2.3.2 The September 11 Events 
The September 11 was yet another rupture in world politics. One major impact has been 
the change it has created on the perception of security. Although, low-intensity conflicts 
have long been recognized phenomena on the periphery of the international system, they 
were novel and shocking experiences for Western countries. Having been attacked on the 
heart of US financial and military infrastructures, President George W. Bush declared a 
“war on terror” and contended that any state which was not with the US in its “war on 
terror” would be regarded against it.427  
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In light of these developments, Turkey has been portrayed as a “model country” to the 
Muslim world with its moderate form of Islam and democratic outlook. As Kaddorah 
argues, “The combination of modernism and traditionalism, secularism and Islamism, and 
its dual Western and Eastern orientations is unique to Turkey.”428 Turkey’s unique 
characteristics which include being both a liberal democracy, the only Muslim majority 
country affiliated with Western institutions such as the NATO and being an EU candidate 
were frequently emphasized by Turkish policy makers to be able to attribute it a role as a 
mediator. As such, “the example of Turkey as a pro-Western secular Muslim state with a 
multi-party political system and free market economy”429 has been consolidated on the 
aftermath of September 11. Turkey’s portrayal as a model country also brought it forth as a 
suitable candidate for a mediator role in various disputes that took place particularly in the 
Middle East. 
Turkey’s mediation was generally welcomed by Western countries such as the US as well 
as regional actors. It was also seen as an opportunity by the foreign policy makers to be 
able to become more influential in regional issues. As noted by Apakan, there has been a 
demand from the West for Turkey’s mediation in Syria, Libya and Iraq. Similarly, 
sometimes conflicting parties consult Turkey for mediation.
430
 Haşimi maintains that, 
The historical tradition, the Islamic modernity, the West-the East, Islam 
and politics, the tradition and modernity that Turkey represents, the 
discussion on global war against terror in the Middle East and the 
situation that the world found itself in following the September 11… 
There emerged an experience as “the Turkish experience” as a result of 
all these.
431
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The moderate form of Islam that Turkey promotes in the Muslim world made it an ideal 
candidate as a mediator. For instance, Subaşı posits that many conflicts today pertain as a 
result of religious disagreements and the only institution that sets an example to the 
Muslim world is Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs.
432
 He notes that,  
There is no clarity in Islamic countries as to how the religion-state 
relations should be. Muslim countries do not have such structure as 
Vatican… The Presidency has an institutional power. On one hand it is 
modern; on the other hand it is warm-hearted to tradition and builds 
itself on a moderate ground. Thus, it has many buyers and followers… 
They [Muslim countries] send us officials and we give them 
information on the structure of the Presidency.
433
 
 
According to Prof. Görmez, the President of the Directorate, “Turkey’s rational and liberal 
approach to the issue of religion has made very strong contributions to the extension of 
peace and happiness in Turkish society as well as in other Muslim communities.”434 
Görmez also notes that Turkey’s domestic and global capacity “is supported by Turkey’s 
unique interpretation of secularism and freedom of thought and faith which are legally 
guaranteed.”435 In this respect, it may be argued that Turkey aims to set an example for the 
Muslim world with its liberal and secular interpretation of Islam. This attitude does not 
only aim to set a role model but also to promote liberal, secular Islam as a shield against 
the spread of radical Islam especially the Wahhabi, Salafi, and the Shia of Iran which fuel 
polarization and consequent conflicts in the Middle East. In addition to radical Islam, 
Görmez also lists traditional orientalism and Islamaphobia as other problems that increase 
polarization which are in the agenda of the Directorate.
436
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Tahir Al-Nunu, Spokesperson for the Palestinian Government in Gaza, postulates that 
currently there are two models in the Islamic world.
437
 He elaborates, "The first model is 
al-Qaida, Taliban and other similar fundamentalist groups. The second model is Turkey. 
You ask anyone in the Arab countries and they prefer Erdoğan. Also the West prefers 
Erdoğan. Hamas also prefers to work with Erdoğan because he is moderate."438 
Turkish policy makers argue that the concept of “moderate Islam” Turkey promotes may 
offer a possible solution or somewhat of a “middle way” to the Sunni-Shia divide which 
fuels conflicts in the Islamic world. They further posit that Turkey tries to fulfil this role of 
setting an example to the Muslim world with a moderate Islamic identity in peace with 
Western norms and values such as secularism and democracy. For instance, by referring to 
the “model partnership” that Turkey and the US could build to overcome problems that 
pertain as a result of “tensions between cultures” Barack Obama noted in a speech, 
Where there is the most promise of building stronger US-Turkish 
relations is in the recognition that Turkey and the United States can build 
a model partnership in which a predominantly Christian nation, a 
predominantly Muslim nation - a Western nation and a nation that 
straddles two continents -that we can create a modern international 
community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous, that there 
are not tensions- inevitable tensions between cultures, which I think is 
extraordinarily important.
439
 
 
Similarly, by referring to Turkey as an “example,” Haşimi notes that,  
Turkey sets an example to Eastern countries with its story of 
democratization and its Muslim identity. It also shows the West that 
Islam can enter politics and develop a positive relationship with politics. 
We give out the message that secularism and Islam can coexist. In terms 
of experience, culture and the current government Turkey may be called 
Eastern, that is; non-Western, that does not fictionalize Westernism as a 
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political representation yet has a Western face in terms of its relations 
with the European Union and the United States. It is located in the East 
end of the West and the West end of the East.
440
 
 
İzzet Şahin, Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy Coordinator of IHH, pinpoints in a similar 
vein,  
It is a natural consequence that the West often utilizes its relations with 
Turkey to reach out to the East, since Turkey, rather than any other 
Muslim country, approached the West following the establishment of its 
republic, wanted to enter the EU and built a bridge between the West and 
the East. There is nothing more natural than you becoming a bridge or a 
mediator in times of crisis between two parties if you have close relations 
with both of them.
441
 
Apakan emphasises that Turkey is a trustable mediator in the East, its Western ties do not 
create suspicion or resentment and it does not use its Western ties against the East.
442
 
These attributes have brought Turkey forth as a suitable mediator in crises that have 
emerged on the aftermath of the September 11. As such, it may be argued that Turkey have 
acted as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West. As Haşimi notes, 
Turkey does not have a particular, strategic, growing fight neither with 
the East nor the West. It is politically Northern yet reflexively Southern. 
It resembles the Northern countries with its parliament, liberal 
democracy and its electoral system yet it resembles the Southern 
countries with the political reflexes it adopts. It talks about the 
Palestinian issue, about Somalia and Africa. It talks about the inequities 
and the problem of representation in the international system. There is no 
other Northern country that talks about such things. No other country 
exists that belongs to the North with the structure of its parliament yet 
belongs to the South with its reflexes.
443
 
 
3.3 The Principles of the New Turkish Foreign Policy 
The developments discussed above laid the foundation for the emergence of Turkey’s new 
foreign policy, and subsequently its mediator role. The end of the Cold War, the September 
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11 events and the Iraqi War paved the way for Turkey to take initiatives regarding issues 
concerning the international society, its region and Turkey itself. The new foreign policy 
had been designed according to certain principles which were also influential in 
determining Turkey’s mediation approach.  
 
Davutoğlu is often regarded as the main architect of Turkey’s new foreign policy. He was 
chief adviser to the prime minister prior to his appointment as the foreign minister in 2009 
and as the Prime Minister in 2014. Davutoğlu’s personal attributes and his academic 
background as professor of international relations have been influential in the formation of 
the foreign policy.  
According to Aras,  
There is a person who is very important in understanding Turkey’s 
mediation: Ahmet Davutoğlu. His foreign policy vision foresees a 
Turkey that has resolved its problems with its neighbours and a 
foreign policy that is multidimensional. His understanding of 
diplomacy foresees diplomats active in the field. One of the tasks of 
the diplomat in the field is to understand and grasp the problems, 
convey them to the centre and implement the solutions produced by 
the centre in the field.
444
  
 
Davutoğlu’s academic background, his proactive personality and his capacity as foreign 
minister gave him the ability to bring his ideas into practice. His policies have received 
both admiration and criticism. The emphasis on peace, diplomacy and cooperation in his 
discourse was interpreted by some as over idealistic while others criticized it for being 
cover for a hidden agenda. These attributes, nevertheless, were effective in paving the way 
for Turkey’s adoption of a mediator role in international conflicts.  
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Turkish policy makers often suggest that Turkey offered a new sort of ethics in world 
politics. For instance, Haşimi argues that Turkey brings up issues that others, particularly 
Western actors as dominant players, refrain from talking. Haşimi underlines, 
Understanding the practices of Turkish foreign policy requires going 
completely out of the frame of the current discipline [of international 
relations]. This is extremely important to us. What others consider 
unusual are very very critical and precious for us. But we know that 
this is how it goes in this field and geography. That is why there is a 
difference. This is the biggest reason why the practice that Turkey has 
produced in the last decade has been subject to intense discussion in 
such a short period. We talk about the issues that others ignore and 
the language that others overlook. It is not about the prime minister 
just doing rhetoric or speaking outloud, as some criticize. The A, B, C 
countries have been criticized for hundreds of years in this 
geography. The same sentences have been spelled out a thousand 
times on different platforms. But this [Turkey’s discourse] has a 
ground. Because it is said by prime minister Erdoğan or foreign 
minister Davutoğlu. They speak on a ground; there is a certain story 
of success.
445 
Aras notes in a similar vein that, “Turkey’s position represents an alternative voice from 
the periphery for solutions to the decades-long conﬂicts in a number of problem-prone 
regions.”446  
 
According to Davutoğlu, three “earthquakes” have been determinant in the emergence of 
Turkey’s role as a mediator. These are; the end of the Cold War, the September 11 events 
and the global economic-political crisis referring to the financial crises and the Arab 
Spring.
447
 In this view, Turkey is geopolitically, historically, and culturally at the centre of 
these earthquakes which makes it vulnerable to these emerging challenges of security since 
it is surrounded by conflicted regions. Davutoğlu argues that instead of being a part of the 
conflict, Turkey prefers to be a part of the solution by resorting to peaceful diplomatic 
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means such as mediation.
448
 As Meral and Paris underlines Davutoğlu, “envisions a 
proactive Turkey that will be a mediator, guarantor, and stabilizing force in the region.”449 
In Davutğlu’s words,  
We [Turkey] suffer from a perception that other powers design regional 
politics and we only perform the roles assigned to us. We need to do 
away with this psychological sense of inferiority which has permeated in 
many segments of our society and amongst political elites.
450
 
According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s new foreign policy is shaped around three 
methodological and five operational principles. The methodological principles are; 
adopting a “visionary” instead of “crisis-oriented” approach towards issues; following a 
“consistent and systematic framework around the world” and adopting “a new discourse 
and diplomatic style” in foreign policy.451 These principles are achieved through the use of 
soft-power as a diplomatic resource. Apakan notes similarly that Turkey has an area of 
geopolitical impact which it influences inter alia with its soft-power.
452
 This view is also 
maintained by Haşimi who notes that, 
There is a changing process and equilibrium in global politics. Countries 
like Turkey are in rise. These rising powers have such concerns as 
explaining themselves. Symbolically speaking, we do not have tanks, 
cannons or airplanes neither are we a nuclear power. We do not have 
underground treasures or oil. The only thing that would enable us to have 
a say in global politics is the perception that we can create. One 
dimension of this perception is conscience; what we call humanitarian 
diplomacy. Another dimension is becoming a new voice, a new breath in 
politics. Another dimension is talking about the issues that others do not 
put emphasise on. There are many dimensions to it.
453
 
 
As such, Turkey’s lack of sufficient hard power to realize its goals motivates it towards 
relying on its soft power in its foreign policy. Mediation, in this respect, emerged inter alia 
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as an instrument for resolving problems without having to exert hard power and taking too 
much risk. 
In addition to methodological principles, five operational principles determine Turkey’s 
new foreign policy approach. The first one is achieving “balance between security and 
democracy.”454 According to this principle, Turkey aims to establish security without 
compromising democracy. In this view, “the legitimacy of any political regime comes 
from its ability to provide security to its citizens and this should not be at the expense of 
freedoms and human rights in the country.”455 This principle has lost its persuasiveness to 
a considerable extent particularly owing to Turkey’s domestic democratic deficit. 
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Turkey has the highest number of 
journalists in jail.
456
  
In addition the right to assembly and protest has been severely limited in the last couple of 
years particularly since the Gezi protests of 2013. The Gezi protests also witnessed severe 
violations of human rights by the government.
457
 Although at the onset of its rule the AKP 
government and Erdoğan promoted democracy and human rights, in the last few years 
their promotion remained outside of Turkey rather than inside. As Oruç notes, “In the last 
ten years, Turkey has become the spokesperson of the oppressed; of those who have been 
massacred up until today which attributes it a natural mediator role.”458 However, it failed 
to apply these norms domestically while it defends them internationally. 
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The second operational principle is Turkey’s “zero-problems with neighbors policy.”459 
According to Şahin, “Turkey tries to resolve problems more with diplomacy and soft 
power than trying to resolve them with weapons; different than many other Western 
countries. Particularly in the last ten years, we have seen such examples in line with its 
zero-problems with neighbors policy.”460 
This principle, however, has been one of the most contested ones particularly during the 
Arab Spring. Zero-problems with neighbors policy could be realized to a certain extent 
during its initial phase. Turkey signed strategic partnerships with many of its neighbours 
even with its old enemies such as Greece and Syria. However, Turkey’s recent policies 
towards Libya and Syria have been criticized as violations of this policy. For instance Oruç 
postulates that, 
Turkey’s zero-problems with neighbors policy emerged during a 
transitional period. No one can have zero-problems with anyone. Having 
zero-problems means accepting everything. This policy was meaningful 
at the time it was first crafted. Now, it has lost its meaning. We were not 
able to practise it in every period. For instance, Turkey could not side 
with the people in Libya. It was not able to side by the oppressed. It 
sided by those that moved alongside Kaddafi.
461
 
Oruç further notes that not siding with them created resentment among the people of Libya 
and Turkey lost considerable credibility in the country accordingly. This gap was 
eventually filled in by Western actors such as France. He highlights that it is the French 
and Italian contractors now who secures deals in Libya rather than the Turkish. Turkey’s 
attitude also damaged its impartiality.
462
 It may be argued that, zero-problems with 
neighbors policy indicates more of an ideal situation rather than a fully achievable 
operative principle on the practical level.  
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Many studies written after the eruption of the Arab Spring suggest a deviation in Turkish 
foreign policy from the zero-problems policy which aimed at developing good relations 
with neighbouring countries. For instance, Hursoy suggests that the zero-problems with 
neighbors policy could not cope with the unfolding challenges of the Arab Spring. She 
notes that, “The good relationship between Turkey and former authoritarian leaders in the 
Middle East is no longer sustainable through the zero problems policy” and “forceful and 
confrontational rhetoric has become the more recent style of Turkish foreign policy.”463 
Regarding the change in Turkish foreign policy after the Arab Spring, Çağaptay suggests 
that the Arab Spring indeed resulted in the consolidation of Turkey’s traditional Western 
stance. He notes that, “Ankara has lately pivoted away from its neighbors, and the 
corresponding notion of Muslim solidarity, and toward NATO and Washington.”464 
While some scholars suggest a change in Turkey’s foreign policy after the Arab Spring, 
others argue that the main doctrine has remained the same.
465
 For instance, unlike many 
scholars Şaban argues that indeed the main tenet of the new foreign policy was, and still is, 
the concept of “central country” rather than the zero-problems which, according to Kardaş, 
“was hardly a policy, strategy or the doctrine. It was only one among several principles 
that have collectively made up Ankara’s regional policy.”466 Oğuzlu, on the other hand, 
suggests that the Arab Spring is likely to “offer Turkey the opportunity to elevate its” zero-
problems policy to “the 2.0. version, in which normative and humanitarian considerations 
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are likely to become more salient” in parallel with “the spirit of Turkey’s liberal 
democratization process already underway at home.”467 
The Arab Spring has posed significant challenges for Turkish foreign policy as well as its 
mediator role. It came as a surprise for policy makers and the regional turmoil created a 
setback for Turkey’s policy in the region. Chances for using soft power and mediation 
have decreased as a result of refusal of actors such as Assad to resolve issues through 
diplomacy. 
The Arab Spring also resulted in a change of actors and emergence of different systems of 
governance in the region. The weakening of the Syrian state and the emergence of a strong 
opposition in Syria, the recent invasion of parts of Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State, the 
establishment of Rojava, a de facto regional Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria are 
examples of such change. It is very likely that this change will continue in the future and 
Turkey will have to build new alliances and coalitions thereof.  
Aras argues that, 
The main difficulty that Turkey’s mediation has faced with the Arab 
Spring is being located within the scope of the nation state system. The 
system of nation state has been dissolved in this geography as a result of 
the Arab Spring. You do not have a state as an adresssee. In one day, the 
prime minister of Iraq changes. There are autorities such as the central 
authority, the Sunni authority or the Kurdish authority. When there is no 
authority as a nation-state you cannot bring about peace between nation 
states. Turkey played the role of facilitator between Syria and Iraq. But 
now if there is a problem between Syria and Iraq, what are you going to 
do? Who will you invite from Iraq, who will you invite from Syria? The 
methods of conflict resolution and mediation that we used to be familiar 
with have become ineffective with the collapse of the nation state system. 
Perhaps Turkey needs to restructure its mediation according to the new 
realities of the region and bring together smaller, micro groups and gain 
new experiences of peacemaking. It should extend to the grassroots. The 
kind of mediation conducted by the foreign minister or the 
undersecretariat of the foreign ministry is not that relevant in the Middle 
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East anymore. It is perhaps an era of empowering the civil society and 
NGOs and conduct a kind of mediation that is spread more to the 
grassroots.
468
 
Although it is too early to speak of a systemic change in the Middle East, one may still 
witness the emergence of aforementioned formations in the region. The Syrian regime has 
lost considerable power and legitimacy. As Aras notes, this creates a lack of authority in 
the region as well as a condition where it is difficult to find an addressee for potential 
conflict resolution attempts.  
It is difficult to achieve peace through mediation under such conditions since the actors 
keep changing. As such, a noteworthy development during the Arab Spring was the 
emergence of IHH as a mediator in the region. IHH’s mediation in Syria between the 
opposition and the Assad government for the release of the Iranians held by the former as 
well as the release of the Turkish journalists held by the Syrian intelligence are examples 
of its mediation.
469
 
In this respect, the real challenge for Turkey’s mediation during the Arab Spring has not 
been its inability to find addressees or to diversify its type of mediators. The example of 
IHH suggests that Turkey is able to find shortcuts to resolve conflicts, in times even by 
utilizing its civilian capacity. The real challenge, however, has been its partial image. 
Turkey has taken the side of the oppositions during the Arab Spring which raised criticism 
vis-à-vis its impartiality. As Aras notes, “Taking sides during the Arab Spring has changed 
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Turkey’s all-inclusiveness which is its main asset as a mediator. Turkey will be successful 
[as a mediator] so long as it can protect this asset.”470 
The third operational principle is following a “proactive and pre-emptive peace 
diplomacy” aiming to prevent crises before they actually erupt or worsen into an 
unmanageable level.
471
 As Altunışık and Çuhadar underscore, “Turkey’s new geopolitics 
also meant that it was surrounded by unstable states and regions, endemic with armed 
conﬂicts that risk spilling over across its borders.”472 The principle of proactive and pre-
emptive peace diplomacy puts emphasis on diplomacy and soft power and how these could 
be utilized to prevent the growth of conflicts. For instance, “security for all, high-level 
political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural 
coexistence” are concepts that Turkey utilizes to apply this principle in regional politics.473 
Turkey’s reconciliation between the Sunni and the Shia groups in Iraq and Serbia and 
Bosnia in the Balkans may be highlighted as examples to such efforts.  
The fourth operational principle that Davutoğlu outlines is following a “multi-dimensional 
foreign policy.”474 In recent years, in line with the changing political and economic 
dynamics in world affairs, Turkey has adapted a multi-dimensional foreign policy 
engaging with multiple actors globally. According to Davutoğlu, this engagement has been 
aimed “to be complementary, not in competition.”475 In addition to its long liaison with the 
US, NATO and the EU Turkey has also been trying to improve its relations with BRICS as 
well as many countries in the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, South America, and the like. 
Multi-dimensionalism in Turkey’s foreign policy is an important feature for its mediator 
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role as well since it increases its visibility, mobility and its ability to talk to multiple actors 
simultaneously. Consequently, it increases Turkey’s credibility as a mediator. 
The fifth operational principle of Turkish foreign policy is pursuing “rhythmic diplomacy” 
which corresponds to following an active diplomatic role by engaging with key actors in 
the international arena.
476
 This principle also suggests an understanding of taking 
advantage of opportunities if they arise. For instance, Turkey’s non-permanent 
membership in the UN Security Council, its memberships in G-20, the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC), its active dialogue with the Arab League, African Union, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council may be listed as some examples of this principle. Following 
rhythmic diplomacy also enhances Turkey’s international status.  
Turkey’s status and mediator role feed one another. While Turkey’s international status 
provides it with certain legitimacy and credibility as a mediator, its mediator role provides 
it with international visibility and fortifies its status. For instance, Turkey is an active 
member of various international organizations which makes it influential in the 
international arena. It also has strong relationships with global players such as the US, the 
EU and Russia which provides it with considerable status and leverage in international 
affairs that further enhances its role as a mediator. Its affiliation with Western institutions 
also fosters its international status. As Gezer notes,  
One of the important dimensions of Turkey’s soft power is its institutional 
relations with the transatlantic and European institutions. Although it is not 
a member of the EU, Turkey is a member of all of the EU’s political and 
economic institutions. It is also a member of the NATO. Such affiliations 
affect perceptions on Turkey. Having both Eastern and Western ties also 
enable Turkey avoid having to make a choice [between the West and the 
East]. For instance, Turkey’s relations with the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization should not be regarded as a deviation from the West but rather 
as complementary pieces of Turkey as a rising regional and global power. 
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Turkey’s affiliations with these institutions also play an important role 
within the process of becoming ripe as a mediator.
477 
The above discussion constitutes the background of the emergence of Turkey’s mediator 
role as a tool of foreign policy. In line with this new understanding, Turkey sought to make 
sense of its mediator capacity and the possibilities for using it.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter elaborated on the change in Turkey’s foreign policy which, as argued here, 
paved the way for the emergence of its mediator role. Turkey’s search for a new identity 
under the imperatives of domestic balances as well as the changing regional and 
international dynamics paved the way for the emergence of a new vision for Turkish 
foreign policy. The end of the Cold War, the September 11 events, the Iraqi War, the 
AKP’s ascendance to power, Turkey’s EU accession process, and the increasing level of 
prosperity in the country are some of the developments that triggered such turn.  
In terms of domestic developments, the EU accession process, the AKP’s ascendance to 
power, the economic growth and the process of democratization have come to fore. The 
AKP’s single party rule provided a relatively stable political-economic environment on the 
domestic scene which helped build a certain level of confidence by the policy makers and 
become more active on the international arena. Turkey’s mediator role developed in 
conformity with the EU’s neighbourhood and security policies. Turkey’s zero-problems 
with neighbors and security for all policies were results of its EU accession process. This 
process also increased its regional and international credibility and contributed to its image 
as a peacemaker.  
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The process of democratization triggered by the EU accession process and the subsequent 
rise of the civil society in Turkey were also important for Turkey’s mediator role 
particularly with respect to the increase in humanitarian activities in conflict zones inter 
alia those that Turkey mediates in such as Africa or the Balkans. As such, Turkish foreign 
policy has significantly relied on domestic political and economic stability which was also 
necessary to consolidate the position of the new elite in Turkey and explains why the 
government was unable to further bend a towards deepening democracy. Instead the 
Turkish elite preferred to secure domestic stability by deepening their ties with the global 
economy. 
In terms of regional developments, the Iraqi War was a milestone that paved the way for 
the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role. Turkish foreign policy makers decided to take on 
a more proactive role in resolving the problems pertaining in their region to avoid a spill 
over effect, bring order and stability to Turkey and pursue its interests in the region. 
Turkey acted as an insider mediator with an all-inclusive approach among various parties 
in Iraq.  
Turkey’s regional policy became influential in the formation of its mediation approach. 
Principles such as promoting high-level political dialogue, building regional mechanisms, 
developing economic interdependence, building a comprehensive security framework and 
support multicultural coexistence through the inclusion of all actors in the processes were 
effective in building its mediation framework. Turkey exists in its region with its economy 
and diplomacy and mediation is an important instrument for implementing its goals.  
In terms of the international context, the end of the Cold War and the September 11 events 
brought about a need for countries to reposition themselves in the international system and 
created an opportunity for peripheral countries to take on more proactive roles in 
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international affairs, as was the case with Turkey. The September 11 created a change in 
the perception of security and Turkey’s mediator role was a welcome development in the 
face of such unrest with its moderate Islamic, liberal, democratic and secular outlook.  
The chapter has also shown that the response given to these developments by Turkish 
foreign policy makers based on their identities and interests, particularly by former Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davuotoğlu, played a significant role in the emergence of Turkey’s 
mediator role. His belief in the virtue of reigniting Turkey’s historical-geographical links 
embedded in its Ottoman past played a particular role in the adoption of a proactive foreign 
policy based on investing in peace and stability in post-Ottoman areas.   
However, the evidence provided in this chapter suggests that Turkey’s newly constructed 
identity rests upon a delicate balance and has not always been able to work. One of the 
challenges to Turkey’s mediator role has been the Arab Spring. The failure of Turkey’s 
Syrian policy during the Arab Spring offers a new context to analyse its previous 
performance as well as the future of its mediator role. It also offers an opportunity to 
inspect the sustainability of this role. Although the following chapter will cover only the 
period of the Syrian-Israeli talks, I will conduct a more detailed discussion on the possible 
consequences of the Arab Spring in the final conclusion of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
CHAPTER 4 – TURKEY’S MEDIATION IN THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI PEACE 
TALKS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to understand the parameters of Turkey’s role as a mediator in the 
Syrian-Israeli peace talks which began in 2007 and were suspended in 2009 following 
Israel’s attack on Gaza. This role was first requested by the Syrian President Bashar Assad 
during his visit to Istanbul in 2004 and was brought to life in 2007.
478
 The Syrian-Israeli 
case offers a sound example to analyse Turkey’s mediation in an interstate conflict. It is 
also a case which was limited to diplomatic negotiations unlike, for instance, the Somali 
case which also includes several other means supportive of mediation such as aid and the 
involvement of the civil society. 
In order to bring Turkish mediation into sharper focus, the chapter considers how Turkish 
mediation compares and contrasts with US mediation in the same dispute that took place in 
1974 following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and between 1991 and 2000. It is not 
possible to examine Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks without considering how 
the US mediated since it has been by far the most influential mediating power in the 
region. It has been the lead mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks, has mediated frequently 
and across many different time frames. It is impossible to talk about Turkey’s mediation 
without this context; and it is instructive to consider how Turkey has managed to mediate 
despite its obvious drawbacks such as extensive economic and military power. Therefore it 
is only sensible to offer some kind of comparison with what has gone before. 
Analysing a case from the Middle East is also interesting in that it offers a ground to 
understand how Turkey mediates in its immediate neighbourhood in which it has deep 
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historical-geopolitical roots. Any conflict that takes place in the region has direct impact 
on Turkey because of the cultural, political, economic impact it may have on it. In 
addition, solving the Syrian-Israeli conflict would also bring considerable prestige to 
Turkey in terms of its support for the Palestinian cause since no Arab-Israeli conflict can 
be considered independent from the overall context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Supporting that claim is the evidence that the Syrian-Israeli talks were suspended upon 
Israel’s attack on Gaza in 2008.  
It should, nevertheless, be noted that there have been significant changes in the region 
since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Turkey is now faced with a different region and 
different Syria. As such, there will be a discussion on the sustainability of this role vis-à-
vis the unfolding reality of the Arab Spring in the final conclusion of the thesis. The Arab 
Spring offers an interesting case to discuss the potential for the future Turkey’s mediator 
role.  
Keeping these questions in mind, this chapter will first illuminate the background of the 
conflict by analysing its actors, issues, its context and dynamics. It will then investigate 
Turkey’s difference as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks by drawing on different 
themes and indicators brought out in Chapter 2 such as previous experiences of mediators, 
mediator’s motives, characteristics of mediators, their style of mediation, methods of 
mediation and finally the progress of mediators.  
4.2 Background on the Syrian-Israeli Conflict 
The Syrian-Israeli conflict, which started upon the establishment of the state of Israel on 
the Palestinian territories in 1948, is one of the tracks of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Following Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights during the Six Day War in 1967 the 
issue ceased to be only a matter of ideology but gained a new dimension as a matter of 
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territorial sovereignty. Unlike the Israeli-Egyptian or the Israeli-Jordanian conflicts, the 
Syrian-Israeli conflict is noteworthy for not having attained a solution in almost half a 
decade.  
Syria positioned against Israel in all Arab-Israeli wars including the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
War, the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Lebanon War. 
According to Rabinovich, “Syria’s bitter relationship with Israel has expressed both its 
genuine attachment to Arab nationalism and to the Palestinian cause and its acute sense of 
rivalry with Israel for hegemony in the Levant.”479As argued by Ma`oz, considering that 
Egypt and Jordan are in a state of negative peace with Israel, Iraq struggles with its own 
internal problems, and Palestine poses more of a political rather than a military threat, 
Syria and Iran constitute the main threats for Israel in the region.
480
 As Kissinger notes, in 
the Middle East there can be "no war without Egypt, no peace without Syria."
481
  
4.2.1 Actors of the Conflict 
Understanding the actors of the conflict is important for understanding how Turkey 
determines its approach vis-à-vis the interests of these actors. For instance, Turkey’s 
previous relations with these actors or to what extent they are included in the mediation 
process may be important in understanding its mediation approach.  
There are various actors that have been involved in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The primary 
actors to the conflict are Syria and Israel. While Israel considers Syria as a threat to its 
existence, Syria considers it as an enemy in violation of its right to sovereignty. The 
conventional power disparity between the two actors coupled with the supremacy of Israel 
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has led Syria to support low intensity conflicts and paramilitary forces in the region which 
created a security threat for the former.  
One of the secondary actors to the Syrian-Israeli conflict is Iran which is also a strategic 
partner of Syria. Iran and Syria constitute a major block of the Shia axis in the Middle East 
alongside Hezbollah. According to Ma`oz, some of the reasons why Syria cooperates with 
Iran is to be able to receive more aid from oil rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, to 
legitimize the Ba’athist-Alawi rule of Assad in a Sunni majority country like Syria, and to 
gain the support of the Shia community in Lebanon.
482
 As a result, a possible peace deal 
between Syria and Israel largely interests Iran. Such an agreement could also bring Syria 
closer to the US in which case Iran would lose its closest ally to its biggest enemy. As 
Moubayed notes, “Syrians went to Maryland [the peace talks under the US mediation] 
despite loud objections from both Iran and Hamas.”483 
Another secondary actor is Hamas which is an important stakeholder in the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict as a result of its close relations with Syria and Iran. Hamas is regarded a "terrorist 
organization" by many actors including the US, the EU, and Israel and is considered a 
security threat for Israel. 
Hezbollah also comes to fore as a secondary actor in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The 
organization was founded in 1982 subsequent to Israel's invasion of South Lebanon. Its 
ideology is based on Shia-Islamism, anti-Imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Supported by Iran 
and Syria, Hezbollah is an important stakeholder in the Syrian-Israeli dispute. One of the 
reasons behind the Syrian government's support for Hezbollah is to foster the Shia axis.
484
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4.2.2 Issues of the Conflict 
There are four main issues in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. These are; the Golan Heights, the 
asymmetric exercise of power, the Jewish minority in Syria, and the soldiers abducted by 
Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah.  
The Golan Heights is probably the most important issue in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The 
Heights are located in Hauran region in the south-western part of Syria.
485
 Israel invaded 
the Heights during the Six Day War in 1967 and annexed it in 1981. Israel's annexation of 
the Heights is declared "null and void and without international legal effect" by Resolution 
497 of the UN Security Council.
486
 The occupied territories are the Mount Hermon in the 
north, the Yarmuk Valley in the south, the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee (Lake 
Kineret) in the west and the borders determined by the ceasefire agreement in May 1974 in 
the east.
487
 
Among these, the 2814 meters high Mount Hermon is the highest and most strategic one 
from which Damascus, Syria, and Lebanon can be easily monitored which makes it much 
more strategic than Sinai. In addition, there is a much larger demilitarized zone in Sinai 
than Golan which makes it harder for Egypt to attack Israel.
 488
 Israel has established 33 
Jewish settlements with a total population of 19,000 in the Golan.
489
 If Israel withdrew 
from the Golan, it would have to pay high amounts of compensation to the residents and 
reallocate them. 
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In addition the above mentioned reasons, the Golan Heights are also crucial for their 
natural water resources. The Jordan River consists of four currents which are; Hatzbani 
and Iyon flowing through Lebanon, Banyas flowing through Syria, and Dan originating 
from Mount Hermon.
490
These four currents meet in Huleh Valley, pass through the Sea of 
Galilee, join Yarmuk and Jabok rivers and flow into the Dead Sea. The Jordan River and 
the Sea of Galilee together constitute 40 per cent of Israel's main water supply.
491
 
Based on the above information, the Golan Heights is the primal issue of the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict and should be resolved as a prerequisite to a sustainable peace between Syria and 
Israel. 
Syria's link with organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah is another important disputed 
issue between Syria and Israel. Israel considers these organizations as "terrorist 
organizations" and it has always stood both against them and against the supporters of 
these organizations. Israel's withdrawal from the territories it had occupied in Lebanon 
during the 1982 Lebanon War was considered a success for Syria gained through Iran and 
Hezbollah.
492
 
Supporting the militias in the region may be seen as a kind of survival strategy of the 
Assad government. In addition, the asymmetric power disparity between Syria and Israel 
may be a reason why Syria supports militias such as Hamas and Hezbollah rather than 
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counting on its conventional power.
493
 The asymmetric and unpredictable nature of the 
Syrian-Israeli conflict is a handicap for the resolution of the conflict. 
The situation of the Jewish minority in Syria is one of the issues that were discussed during 
the negotiations between Syria and Israel. While the number of Jews in Syria was recorded 
as 30,000 in 1947 and 5,000 in 1949, as of 2011, it was under 100 residing in Damascus 
and Aleppo.
494
 
The Jewish neighbourhoods and synagogues in Aleppo were attacked and burned down by 
angry crowds to protest the establishment of Israel in 1947 and 75 people lost their lives.
495
 
A synagogue was bombed in Damascus following the 1949 War resulting in 12 casualties. 
Jews were prohibited to travel outside Syria after 1947 except for special conditions. 
Despite the ban, Jews kept fleeing Syria and a vast majority of them settled in USA and 
Israel.
496
 
During the peace talks following the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 the US started 
pressing Syria to lift the travel barriers and reduce restrictions on property ownership by 
Jews. 1262 Syrian Jews immigrated to Israel in an undercover operation in 1994. Most of 
the remaining Jews were freed by Syria as a result of heavy pressure. The participation of 
the remaining Jews in political and economic life is under heavy restrictions and they are 
officially banned from public and military service.
497
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The abduction of Israeli soldiers by Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah is another issue of 
contention between Syria and Israel. Israel demanded Syria to provide information on the 
soldiers and use its leverage on Hamas and Hezbollah for their return. The soldiers in 
question are; Zachary Baumel, Yehuda Katz, and Zvi Feldman abducted by Syria in 1982; 
major Ron Arad abducted by the Lebanese Shia militia group Amal in 1987; Joseph Fink 
and Rahamim Alsheich abducted by Hezbollah in 1986; the businessman and reserve 
colonel Elchanan Tenenbaum and Israeli soldiers Adi Avitan, Benyamin Avraham and 
Omar Sawaid abducted by Hezbollah in 2000; Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regeviki 
whose abduction by Hezbollah resulted in the outburst of the 2006 Lebanon War; and 
Gilad Shalit who was abducted by Hamas the same year.
498
 
While the situation of Zachary Baumel, Yehuda Katz, Zvi Feldman and major Ron Arad is 
still unclear, the bodies of Joseph Fink and Rahamim Alsheich were returned in 1996, the 
bodies of Adi Avitan, Benyamin Avraham, and Omar Sawaid’ were returned together with 
Elchanan Tenenbaum in 2004, the bodies of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regeviki were 
returned in 2008, and Gilad Shalit was returned in a prisoner exchange swap in 2011.
499
 
4.2.3 The Context and Dynamics of the Conflict 
The Syrian-Israeli conflict is a long-standing one that has been on-going since the 
establishment of the State of Israel in 1947. Although it has been exposed to several 
interventions in the past, to date, it has not reached a comprehensive settlement. The 
context surrounding the Syrian-Israeli conflict is determined by a region that is rich in 
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conflict over power, sovereignty, territory and resources while poor in security and 
communication let alone cooperation.  
The context of the Cold War further fuelled the conflict by turning the region into a zone 
of proxy wars between the USSR and the US. Although the USSR supported Israel upon 
the establishment of the latter, throughout the Cold War its position changed on behalf of 
the Arab states while the US sided with Israel to counterbalance the Soviet influence.
500
 
The nature of the Syrian-Israeli conflict indicates an issue of sovereignty, ideology, 
territory, natural resources and security. It is protracted and intractable. The quality of 
communication between the parties is poor and indirect. As Stein notes, “the history of the 
Middle East is littered with aborted peace proposals”501 and there is no doubt that the 
Syrian-Israeli conflict got its share from this trend.  
The first and second Iraqi Wars also had negative impact on the security and stability of 
the region. As Salem underlines, after the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq and the 
subsequent American presence across its borders, the Syrian regime started to feel under 
threat.
502
 The establishment of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq also raised concerns 
over the possible uprising of Syria’s own Kurdish population. Syria also felt cornered upon 
allegations of its involvement in the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafic Hariri in 2005. Although the 2006 July War between Lebanon and Israel resulted in 
the self-claimed victory of Hezbollah, the organization lost considerable power during the 
war which also put Syria at unease.
503
 These developments fed Syria’s enthusiasm to 
revive the Syrian-Israeli peace talks. Israel would also benefit from a peace treaty since it 
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carries the potential of weakening the Shia axis in the Middle East by integrating Syria into 
the Western alliance.  
Ideologically, the Syrian-Israeli conflict signals a conflict of two opposite ends as pan-
Arabism against Zionism. Syria’s Ba’th regime has been one of the pioneers of pan-
Arabism and anti-Zionist rhetoric while Israel has always considered pan-Arab ideology as 
a threat to its survival. The antagonism between the two ideologies constitutes one of the 
dynamics of the Syrian-Israeli dispute.
504
 
In terms of the nature of the conflict, the Golan Heights make the Syrian-Israeli case an 
issue of territory, sovereignty and natural resources. The asymmetric exercise of power and 
the abducted soldiers make it an issue of security. In addition to being strategic in terms of 
security and natural resources, the Golan Heights also has a symbolic significance. For 
Syria it is a symbol of "national pride"
505
 and "sovereignty"
506
 while for Israel it has 
historical and religious significance and is within the borders of Israel designated in the 
bible.
507
 According to Slater, Israel's argument stems from its efforts to gain historical 
legitimacy for its expansionist policies.
508
 By returning the Golan to Syria Israel would not 
only lose an epic value but also a strategic military superiority, more than thirty 
settlements, and a vital natural water resource.  
On the other hand, by gaining the Golan back, Syria would not only get a strategic territory 
and vital water resources back but also regain the credits and prestige that the regime had 
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lost since the Heights were lost during Hafez Assad's term as the Minister of Defence.
509
 In 
addition, the Golan Heights and the rift with Israel had often been used as the scapegoat for 
the shortcomings and weaknesses of the Assad regime.
510
 The Arab-Israeli conflict and 
especially the Palestinian issue have been used as an excuse to legitimize their status-quo 
by many regimes in the region including Syria and Israel.  
Looking at the Syrian-Israeli conflict one may also notice a low quality of communication 
between the parties. The absence of diplomatic relations between the two states is a factor 
that complicates the course of the negotiations often leaving them as indirect and secret.  
4.3 Mediation in the Syrian-Israeli Talks  
4.3.1 US Mediation in the Syrian-Israeli Conflict 
The US has been the frontrunner of the Middle East peace process ever since the eruption 
of the conflict. It had also been the lead mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks until Turkey's 
mediation. Egypt and Saudi Arabia played minor mediator roles during the 1974 
negotiations by convincing Syria to accept US mediation or to prepare the list of the Israeli 
prisoners to be handed over to the US.
511
 Switzerland played a brief mediator role in secret 
informal talks in 2007 to negotiate the repatriation of the remains of Eli Cohen to Israel, a 
former Israeli spy executed by Syria in 1965.
512
 
The US mediated several rounds of negotiations between Syria and Israel from 1974 until 
2000. The first one of these was the peace talks that took place in 1974 following the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973. The renowned US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger under Richard 
Nixon mediated between Syria and Israel through shuttle diplomacy as part of the peace 
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negotiations between Israel and the parties to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War resulting in a 
disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974.
513
 
The US used indirect talks through shuttle diplomacy, summit diplomacy and direct talks 
as methods of mediation across the years. Probably the most notable one among these was 
Kissinger’s signature “step-by-step” approach used during the Arab-Israeli peace talks of 
1974.
514
 During the negotiations Kissinger concluded that there was lack of sufficient 
points of convergence between Egypt, Syria, and Palestine to reach a comprehensive peace 
with Israel. He was not satisfied with the previous approaches such as the memorandum of 
Gunnar Jarring during the 1971 Arab-Israeli talks which “asked Israel for a commitment to 
withdraw to the pre-June war Egypt–Israel border, in return for Arab commitments to 
peace.”515 Kissinger therefore decided to follow a step-by-step approach with the idea to 
resolve each track separately before reaching a final comprehensive peace. He started by 
negotiating the separation of the armies of the three allies. He then conducted separate 
tracks of negotiations with the parties through shuttle diplomacy. The step-by-step 
approach also diverted attention from the main issues that were more difficult to resolve in 
the short run such as the recognition of Israel, the Palestinian issue, or the boundary issues 
into more doable issues such as disengagement agreements or prisoner swaps. In this 
sense, Kissinger followed a more “gradual approach” rather than a “comprehensive 
approach.”516 
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In an attempt to explain Kissinger’s “step-by-step” approach Stein notes, “Beginning 
generally with the issues most amenable to solution, he postponed indefinitely those he 
considered most resistant to compromise, expecting that progress in negotiation would 
itself generate momentum and change the bargaining environment to permit further 
progress.” Stein further notes with a criticism that, “What he [Kissinger] kept off the 
agenda was far more important than what he put on the table.”517 According to Seale, 
Kissinger’s step-by-step approach broke the Arab unity and dragged Egypt out of the 
coalition giving Israel considerable leverage in the negotiations.
518
 
The first direct talk between Syria and Israel was mediated in Washington following the 
1991 Madrid Peace Conference that was initiated by the US, hosted by Spain, and 
sponsored by the US and the USSR. The conference consisted of several tracks including 
bilateral talks between Israel and Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan.
519
 
The talks were held in Washington on November 3, 1991 and were mediated by the US 
Secretary of State James Baker under George Bush based on the principle of "land for 
peace" and resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the UN Security Council.
520
 Israel 
was represented by Yosi Ben-Aharon from the government of Yitzhak Shamir and Syria 
was represented by Muwafiq al-Alaf from the Syrian government. While security was 
Israel’s priority during the talks without addressing the issue of land, Syria sat on the table 
with the precondition that Israel returns to its borders of before June 4, 1967. The 
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negotiations remained unresolved since both sides sat on the table with "zero-sum" 
solutions and were reluctant to make any concessions.
521
 
The projected eagerness towards peace of the Yitzhak Rabin government, which came to 
power in the 1992 Israeli elections, was a new light of hope. The Rabin government 
accepted to withdraw from the Golan in exchange for Syria's word for peace and security. 
Syria, on the other hand, did not only give its word for peace, it also agreed on developing 
diplomatic relations, cooperating on tourism and commerce, allowing the Jewish minority 
in Syria to leave the country, and allowing the Banyas River to flow into the Jordan 
River.
522
 The favourable atmosphere was disrupted by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin 
by Yigal Amir, a radical Israeli citizen, following a peace march held in Tel Aviv on 
November 4, 1995.
523
 
Shimon Peres, Israel's then Foreign Minister, took over the government and continued the 
negotiations following Rabin's assassination. The parties met for another time at the Aspen 
Institute's Wye River Conference Centers on December 27, 1995 hosted by the US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher under President Bill Clinton. Promising decisions 
were taken such as the normalization of relations, the establishment of economic relations, 
and normalization of Israel’s relations with other Arab countries including Lebanon. 
Despite certain ambiguities regarding the Golan and security, the discussion of these issues 
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were postponed to subsequent negotiations. However, as in past negotiations, the decisions 
were not implemented.
524
 
The election of Ehud Barak as the prime minister in 1999 was well received in terms of the 
peace process. The talks were subsequently resumed in December 1999 and January 2000 
under the mediation of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during Bill Clinton’s 
presidency. However, the negotiations did not achieve any concrete results. According to 
Rabinovich, although prospects were higher during 1990s for resolution compare to that of 
the Palestinian track, US mediation collapsed in 2000 as a result of reasons such as lack of 
mutual political will in terms of making concessions, the death of Hafiz al-Assad, change 
of government in Israel and in the US. 
Although, Basher Assad's rise to power following the death of his father on June 10, 2000 
had raised hopes and was thought to bring a new pulse into the peace talks, the 
negotiations were not resumed until Turkey’s mediation in 2008.525 The fact that Ariel 
Sharon preferred to spend his energy on the Israeli-Palestinian track, US growing hostility 
towards Syria, its accusation of Syria for the assassination of Rafic Harriri, and the 
growing tension between Israel and Hezbollah may be listed as reasons of the suspension 
of the talks.
526
 
In 2010, the US briefly mediated between Syria and Israel under the mediation of Frederic 
Hof, a former US diplomat and special coordinator for Lebanon and Syria and Dennis B. 
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Ross, special assistant to President Obama on the Middle East. The talks were suspended 
as a result of the eruption of the Arab Spring.
527
 
4.3.2 Turkish Mediation in the Syrian-Israeli Conflict 
Turkey’s mediator role was first requested by Syrian President Basher Assad who brought 
up the issue to Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Istanbul in 
January 2004.
528
 Assad’s request was heard by Israel’s former ambassador to Turkey Alon 
Liel who was staying at the same hotel as Assad. A few days later Liel was invited to the 
residence of Feridun Sinirlioğlu, then Turkish ambassador to Israel who conveyed that 
Assad asked Turkey to convince Israel to enter negotiations by using its good relations 
with the latter. In return, he asked Liel to convince the Israeli regime. However their 
efforts did not pay off at the time due to Israel’s reluctance to enter official talks. 
According to Uni and Eldar,
529
 and Hof
530
 there were a few round of informal covert talks 
carried out between 2004 and 2007 on the academic level in under Swiss auspices. 
However, although, according to Haaretz, the Israeli and Syrian officials had been 
involved in the talks, according to BBC, the spokesperson for the Ehud Olmert government 
announced that they were not aware of such talks.
531
 
The official talks were resumed under Turkey's auspice on February 2007 and continued 
through 2008 in a total of four rounds of talks,
532
 which took place on May 21,
533
 June 15-
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16,
534
 July 1-3,
535
 and July 28-30
536
 respectively. The method of mediation used was 
indirect talks and shuttle diplomacy since the parties were not ready to sit around the same 
table at the time of the negotiations. Parties either sat in different rooms without seeing 
each other or were on different phone lines under Turkey's mediation.
537
 
Turkey was the sole mediator during the talks.
538
 The Israeli side was represented by 
Advisers to the Prime Minister Shalom Turjeman and Yoram Trubovitz while the Syrian 
side was represented by Adviser to the Foreign Minister Riyad Dawudi. According to 
Salem, one of the reasons for Israel's acceptance of resuming the talks was its failure to 
defeat Hezbollah during the Lebanon War in 2006.
539
  
According to Aras, several issues had reached a point of resolution during the final 
negotiations including the Golan Heights and Syria’s assurance of Israel’s security by 
ceasing its support for Hamas and Hezbollah as well as distancing itself from Iran.
540
 The 
fifth round of talks was planned to be held following the Israeli elections in February 2009. 
However, the negotiations were suspended indefinitely as a result of certain developments 
one of which was the destruction of an alleged nuclear reactor in Kibar, Syria by Israel 
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allegedly built by North Korea. The air strike came as a surprise to Syria. According to 
Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli chief negotiator in the Syrian-Israeli talks between 1993 
and 1996, Israel, Syria and the US all minimized the chance of the attack being publicized. 
Assad refrained from being forced into retaliation. He also wanted to prevent the publicity 
of cooperating “with a member of Bush’s axis of evil.”541 Israel kept it unpublicized to 
prevent Syria from being forced into retaliation. The US was worried that the publicity 
would endanger its nuclear talks with North Korea.
542
 
Although the talks were resumed later on in 2008 the atmosphere was soured as a result of 
the crisis. Suspicions of both sides over the sincerity of one another grew larger. While 
Israel focused on the prospects of Syria’s relations with Iran and Hezbollah, Syria kept on 
with its territorial claims. While the talks to be held on December 22, 2008 were planned 
as direct negotiations, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem did not turn up for the 
meeting. According to Rabinovich, “Syrians were deterred by the fact that Olmert had 
resigned in August because of the scandals he faced, and at that point headed a caretaker 
government.”543 Syria was also not satisfied with the map drawn by Israel during the 
previous talks.
544
 
Subsequently Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and 
President Abdullah Gül by himself.545 Another development that took place five days after 
Olmert's visit to Turkey, which resulted in the suspension of the talks, was the launch of 
Operation Cast Lead by Israel on Gaza on December 27, 2008.
546
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The fifth round of talks was nevertheless planned as a direct talk under Turkey's mediation. 
Despite the fact that in January 2010, Davutoğlu declared in a press conference that Turkey 
was ready to mediate again,
547
 the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis that broke out on May 30, 
2010 resulted in the halt of Turkey’s mediator role between Syria and Israel. 
4.4 Turkey’s Difference as a Mediator in the Syrian-Israeli Talks 
This section aims to examine Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks in order to 
understand the ways it is able to mediate differently from Western mediators, in this case 
from the US. As such, the study will dwell into the specifics of Turkey’s mediator role by 
drawing on the different themes and indicators brought out in Chapter 2. 
4.4.1 Previous Experience of Mediators 
When Turkey took on the mediator role between Syria and Israel, it had limited previous 
experience. It is an emerging mediator which is still not sufficiently institutionalized in 
terms of mediation. For instance, Turkey’s mediator capacity currently consists of those 
who learn the job mainly by practice without prior professional training. Aras posits that 
although the establishment of a general secretariat for mediation within Turkish Foreign 
Ministry was foreseen as a result of an amendment to the law in 2010, the secretariat is still 
to be established. Turkey’s mediation is still undertaken by the Department of Policy 
Planning. He adds that, 
Although diplomats that mediate are in the process of emergence, the 
work is mainly undertaken by the Foreign Minister’s [Davutoğlu’s] own 
initiative. In this regard, it is difficult to talk about a trained group of 
diplomats or institutional infrastructure. The expansion of foreign policy 
to such a wide area has aggravated the workload of the foreign ministry. 
The gap between the importance given to mediation and the institutional 
infrastructure signals a dilemma.
548
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However, Aras argues that Turkey’s commitment to the Syrian-Israeli talks compensated 
for its lack of experience. In his words, “the main problem was not capacity but the lack of 
trustable actors that could achieve peace and secondly the lack of willpower of the parties 
for peace.”549 This understanding suggests that Turkey relied more on its relational ties and 
credibility in the region rather than professional capacity and technical expertise in 
mediation. This view is further underpinned by Aras who argues that, “Turkey’s projection 
of its mediation role relies, to a large extent, on the assumption of itself being a credible 
actor, the promotion of regional ownership, and inclusiveness.”550   
Despite the fact that the US is much more experienced in mediation vis-à-vis Turkey, there 
were instances that it was rather underprepared and some officials had knowledge gaps 
regarding certain topics regarding the negotiations. For instance, according to William 
Quandt, former staff  member on the National Security Council in the Nixon and Carter 
administrations and who was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp 
David Accords and the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty, both former US President Bill 
Clinton and US Secretary of State under Clinton administration Warren Christopher knew 
little about the Middle East when they came to power. When Christopher went to Israel in 
1993, Rubin told him that if he could get the Syrians to agree with certain issues, he would 
accept the 1967 borders.
551
 Quandt notes that when Christopher conveyed this message to 
Syria,  
Assad asks “what do they mean to withdraw to the 1967 border? Does 
that literally mean 1967 line or does that mean the international border?” 
Christopher does not know what he is talking about. He does not know 
the difference between the two but for us [the US] it is very very 
important because when he says “the 1967 line” it means that Syrian 
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sovereignty will go up to the water line on the Sea of Golan. It would 
have meant that Israel would have completely continued to have 
sovereignty around the lake and this becomes a real issue and Christopher 
thinks it is a minor issue. He goes back and reports to Rubin and Rubin 
seems very frustrated. He is angry at the Americans for having made the 
concession too quickly, told Assad what the bottom line was and refuses 
to confirm his view. He decides that Assad argues over the little things he 
is not serious, it is better to go with the Palestinian track and very quickly 
puts his support behind Oslo. The Syrian issue is put back on the back 
burner.
552
 
As suggested by Quandt, Christopher’s knowledge gaps or comparative inexperience in the 
Arab-Israeli peace process may have contributed to the suspension of the Syrian-Israeli 
talks in 1992. Similarly, by referring to US involvement in the Oslo Accord Egeland draws 
attention to the lack of sufficient budget and resources spared for mediation in the US 
government by postulating that, 
International diplomacy is surprisingly underprepared in terms of 
providing the personnel, the expertise, and the material support 
necessary for effective multiparty peace facilitation… It is a 
paradox that there seem to be more such discretionary funds 
available in the Norwegian humanitarian assistance budget than in 
the enormous U.S. foreign and security assistance budget.
553
 
 
The above discussion also suggests that the lack of willingness of the leaders and of 
necessary resources at their disposal may hamper mediation processes. As such, 
experience per se may not always be a relevant reason for failure in a mediation process. 
4.4.2 Motives for Mediation 
This section aims to shed light on to what extent Turkey’s motives to mediate the Syrian-
Israeli talks may be indicative of a difference. To be able to draw a more systematic 
analysis regarding its motives, indicators such as search for prestige, bringing order, 
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security and stability, energy security, keeping other actors out of the game, domestic 
demand, and legitimizing foreign policy will be focused upon. 
4.4.2.1 Search for Prestige 
One of the motives for Turkey to mediate the Syrian-Israeli talks was its search for prestige 
which would help in its identity construction as a reliable, credible and capable actor. 
Turkey was aware that had it succeeded in resolving the Syrian-Israeli conflict, it would 
have closed a major track of the broader Middle East peace process which would enhance 
its regional and international status. This view is also supported by Itamar Rabinovich, 
Israel’s chief negotiator with Syria between 1993 and 1996 who argues that, “It 
[mediation] was a suitable role for a country [Turkey] seeking regional influence, and it 
must have been flattering to fill a role performed in the past solely by the United States and 
denied to such powers as Russia and France.”554 Moubayed postulates similarly that, “If 
the talks succeeded, Turkey would forever be remembered and hailed as the nation to bring 
peace to the Syrian-Israeli front, something that all US Administrations since Jimmy Carter 
have failed to achieve.”555 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, one of the triggers for the emergence of Turkey’s mediator 
role in the region, and also in the Syrian-Israeli talks, was the Second Iraqi War which 
drove Turkey to become more involved with the problems in its neighbourhood. As such, 
Turkey’s new regional policy that emphasized principles such as promoting high-level 
political dialogue, building regional mechanisms, and all-inclusiveness have been 
influential in paving the way to its mediator role. For instance, Turkey’s promotion of 
Syria’s participation into the Iraqi Neighbors Platform was part of its all-inclusive 
approach to regional problems and was in line with its new regional policy.  
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The mediator role also enables a rhetoric of peacefulness, helpfulness, and also helps 
Turkey emphasise its new identity in line with its historical and geopolitical position, and 
its connections to the region. As Aras notes, 
 
Middle Eastern politicians recognise that Turkey is working to resolve 
Middle Eastern problems. And because these problems have global 
implications, the rest of the world is paying attention to Turkey, too. The 
combination of Turkish politicians' political will at home and receptive 
audiences abroad, means Turkish soft power is in ascendance.
556
 
 
Search for prestige was a similar motive for the US as well. For instance, at the time of its 
mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks of 1992-1996, the US had just come out of the Gulf 
War which provided it with an image of a war wager without offering any significant 
gains. The image of a peacemaker would improve its credentials in the region. As 
Campbell notes, it has often projected itself as the “advocate and promoter of peace” in the 
region.
557
  
 
As also argued by Haşimi although people attribute an automatic, intrinsic positive value 
to it, mediation is inter alia something political.
558
 Similarly, Gezer pinpoints that 
mediation is a “political project” that accompanies economic integration, communication 
and contact among people which also underlines how mediation is used as a tool of foreign 
policy.
559
 As such, despite the positive image attached to mediation, mediation indeed does 
seem to be a tool of achieving the political interests of a state. 
                                                     
556
 Bülent Aras, “Turkey's Soft Power,” The Guardian, April 14, 2009. 
557
 John C. Campbell, “American Efforts for Peace,” in Malcolm H. Kerr (ed.), The Elusive Peace in the 
Middle East, 249-310, New York: State University of New York Press, 1975, 249. 
558
 Interview with Haşimi. 
559
 Interview with Gezer. 
154 
 
4.4.2.2 Bringing Order, Security and Stability 
The aim to bring order, security and stability is another motive for Turkey given its 
geopolitical, social, and psychological proximity to conflicts in the region. Many Turks 
live in neighbouring countries including Syria and vice-a-versa. As Haşimi argued, Turkey 
is affected by conflicts in the region, inter alia, as a result of its diverse population that 
includes many ethnicities such as Arabs and Jews.
560
 He notes, 
Speaking to both of the parties is enough to be a mediator but you also 
should have a perspective. The Israeli-Syrian talks were conducted for 
the sake of bringing peace into the Middle East and resolving the 
problems in one way or the other. You have a perspective on the Middle 
East, which entails, politically speaking, the transformation of the Middle 
East from a zone of conflict into a region of trade and an island of peace. 
This was the initial target. This is why Turkey was mediating, not simply 
to provide a platform. The practices in the West are generally limited to 
providing a platform whereas the political agenda and political priorities 
of our mediation is predetermined which is inevitable here in the Middle 
East and there is no other way. This is why our Prime Minister has to 
take a position when one of the parties does something that damages the 
political relationship and the process of partnership.
561
 
 
Compared to the US, for Turkey there is always a greater risk of spill-over which has 
become more evident, for instance, during the Arab Spring. According to a recent report by 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Turkey hosts the highest number of 
refugees in the world with about 2 million Syrians, and a financial cost of about $6 
billion.
562
 Turkey has also become a transit route for militants and faces the threat of being 
dragged into the war. It seems obvious that Turkey would highly benefit from stability in 
the region. 
A Syrian-Israeli peace deal would also have a positive impact on the Turkish economy. For 
instance, the opening of the Syrian-Israeli border would have significant impact on 
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Turkey's trade with the region. As noted in Chapter 3, economic and domestic stability are 
two of the main catalysts for consolidating the position of Turkey’s new elite. As Aras 
contends, Turkey’s mediator role started as a result of its quest for regional stability which 
is also significant for its economic growth. He notes, 
Turkey wants to have influence in its region and utilize those markets. 
Therefore, it [mediation] is significant for adding value to the economy. 
Secondly, Turkey is a country which is very much affected by the 
developments in neighbouring geographies. Turkey cannot be stable 
unless the neighbouring geographies are stable which is apparent, for 
instance, in the spill-over of the events in Kobani.
563
 
 
Turkish policy makers have underlined in a number of occasions that Turkey’s own future 
is bound up with the future of the region and its neighbours such as Syria in a way that the 
future of America or other Western mediators are not. Turkey has vested interest in 
mediating to resolve the problems that could threaten its stability. As Gezer postulates, 
Turkish policy makers maintain that Turkey would be able to maximize its interests much 
more in a cooperative atmosphere. Contributing to regional cooperation would enable a 
sustainable environment that would serve Turkey’s national interests.564 The mediator role 
also provides positive input for Turkey in dealing with its own problems that have regional 
dimensions such as the Kurdish issue.  
Similar to Turkey, the US would benefit from a possible order, stability and security in the 
region considering its political and economic interests.
565
 Looking at all instances of its 
mediation between Syria and Israel, it may be argued that the US was weary of the conflict 
in the Middle East. The on-going disputes only dragged it further into problems with costly 
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consequences attached. As argued by Quandt, many of the crises that erupted within the 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict have challenged American interests in the region.
566
 
This view is also supported by Kurtzer and Lasensky who argue that a possible Arab-
Israeli peace would serve US national interest. They note that, “September 11, Iraq, and 
increasing instability in the Middle East have made US leadership in the peace process 
more, not less, important.”567 Salem contends similarly that a Syrian-Israeli peace deal 
would widely serve the US interests in the Middle East that “include a more stable Iraq, a 
weaker Iran, progress in the Arab–Israeli peace process, a stable Lebanon, a weaker 
Hezbollah, a weaker Jihadi movement, and an improved American image.”568 Moore 
argues in a similar vein that “The United States has had longstanding political, economic, 
and strategic interests in the Middle East and assertively intervened as a broker in attempts 
to promote stability in the region.”569 
Quandt suggests that during the Cold War the US feared a large-scale war in the Middle 
East, similar to that of the 1973 War, and a possible Soviet intervention. Despite the fact 
that the Soviet threat was removed with its collapse, the intifadas and the rise of radicalism 
in the region emerged as new challenges.
570
 Quandt contends that, 
After the intifadas there was a feeling that this kind of violence was going 
to be hard to contain. It could spill over into Lebanon, into Jordan; Arab 
governments would be destabilized by either supporting the intifada in 
which case the Israelis would see them as enemies or not doing anything 
in which case their public might have turned against them. So there was a 
fear that if this was left unresolved, radicalization in the Middle East 
would go further. Of course you know when al Qaida came along it 
played on this issue. In some ways, you wanted to take the Palestinian 
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issue off the agenda of radical Islamic movements. Not that it would 
solve the issue but that it is one less issue for them to play with.
571
 
 
One of the motives for the US to mediate the Syrian-Israeli talks during the Gulf War was 
that it wanted the support of Syria in Iraq and Hafez Assad proposed the Syrian-Israeli 
talks as a precondition for joining the coalition forces of the Gulf War.
572
 Quandt says that 
Syria became an objective ally of the US against Saddam during the Gulf War. He notes,  
Syrian troops were actually going and fighting alongside the Americans. 
Unbelievable; you cannot imagine it now. So, for the first Bush 
administration, the relationship with Syria, this was largely the president 
and Secretary Baker himself, seemed strategically quite important while 
coming out of the Gulf War. Of course, Egypt was already at peace with 
Israel. So, the next building block was going to be Syria, not the 
Palestinians. And so, the Syrian-Israeli relationship began in 1991 with 
Bush and Baker and it led to the Madrid Conference.
573
 
 
Quandt argues that while the main justification for the US to mediate conflicts in the 
Middle East before September 11 was to “promote stability, bolster pro-American regimes, 
and help to avoid conflicts that could prove costly to the United States,” it has later become 
to reverse “the rising tide of anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world, that it might 
reduce the number of recruits for extremist political organization, and that it might 
facilitate the spread of democracy and political reform.”574 These examples demonstrate 
that Turkey and the US had similar motives in wanting to bring order, security and stability 
to the Middle East from which they would largely benefit. 
4.4.2.3 Energy Security 
Any conflict also negatively affects the energy security in the region which would have 
negative impact both on the US and Turkish interests. Ending the oil embargo initiated by 
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the Arab states during the 1973 War was one of the main motives of the US to mediate the 
Syrian-Israeli talks.
575
 The Arab states pressured the US to advance in the Syrian-Israeli 
track as a prerequisite to lift the embargo.  Their pressure bore fruit and the embargo had 
been formally lifted upon the conclusion of the talks.
576
 Likewise, its mediation in the 
Syrian-Israeli talks in the 1990s had similar reasons particularly considering the situation 
in Iraq at the time and its possible consequences on the US oil supply.  
With respect to Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks, one may speak of similar 
reasons since the conflict indirectly effects the oil supplies in the region especially with 
respect to Iraq. In addition, any conflict in the region may hamper Turkey's role as an 
energy transit route between the Middle East and Europe by threatening the security of the 
pipelines. As Meral and Paris also postulate, 
Ankara had to pursue the EU as it was still in its strategic interest, yet it 
had to diversify its economic and political ties to strengthen its own hand, 
especially in energy. It had to seek stability in its neighborhood and 
emerge as a neutral economic and diplomatic bridge between parties in 
conflict.
577
 
 
The image of a secure energy corridor gives Turkey credibility in its EU accession process 
as well. In this respect, for Turkey, the role of a peacemaker contributes to its EU 
membership endeavour. For instance, in line with the East-West Energy Corridor Project, 
Turkey hosts three important pipeline projects including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil 
pipeline, the South Caucasian natural gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas 
pipeline) and the Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe gas pipeline project.
578
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With respect to the US, Migdal maintains that since the US has become more self-
sufficient in oil and it feels rather frustrated with its role in the Middle East, there is a great 
chance that it may “pivot away” from the region towards South Asia in the near future, 
partially if not fully.
579
 Although rather unlikely in the near future, such possibility may 
create a vacuum and a greater role for regional actors such as Turkey to take on mediator 
roles in regional issues. 
4.4.2.4 Keeping Other Actors out of the Game 
One of the reasons why the US mediated the Syrian-Israeli talks or the overall Arab-Israeli 
talks during the Cold War was to keep the USSR out of the game or to at least minimize its 
role.
580
 The USSR was the second most likely actor to mediate the talks in 1974 had the 
US not mediated. It could gain significant leverage in the Middle East if it played a 
mediator role which was a risk that the US wanted to avoid. As argued by Kurtzer and 
Lasensky, during the Cold War the Arab-Israeli conflict was a matter of national security 
for the US as was the case with the Suez Crisis and the October 1973 war. In this regard, 
“Successful US diplomacy often carried with it monumental strategic benefits, as in 
Washington’s shuttle diplomacy in the mid-1970s and the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, 
both of which sharply reduced the Soviet role in the region.”581 This may also have 
increased US enthusiasm to take on a larger role which resulted in its push towards the 
resolution of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. 
As indicated by Freedman the mediator role, “has been a key to American influence in the 
Arab world since the 1973 war, for it demonstrated to the Arabs that it was the United 
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States, and not the USSR, that was able to secure Israeli territorial withdrawals.”582 
Furthermore, had the conflict escalated, chances were that the US and the USSR would be 
dragged into a regional war in the Middle East. The US wanted to avoid war with the 
USSR.
583
 A peace treaty between Israel and its neighbours would therefore serve its 
interests by keeping the USSR out of the game.  
For instance, referring to the Egyptian-Israeli peace Rabinovich argues that it was “one of 
Washington’s greatest Cold War accomplishments: Egypt’s transition from a Soviet ally to 
a nation in the American orbit.”584 Similarly by referring to the US mediation during 1991 
Madrid Peace Conference which took place at the end of the Cold War, Kurtzer and 
Lasensky postulate that it “cemented the US role as the sole power broker in the region.”585 
Despite the above discussion, it should be remembered that the 1974 talks occurred within 
the dynamics of the Cold War in which the rivalry between the US and the USSR 
determined international relations. Turkey’s mediation, however, took place in a different 
context in which the Cold War dynamics no longer existed. Perhaps a more relevant 
example could be diminishing Iranian sphere of influence in the region which is important 
both for Turkey and the US. Iran gained significant leverage from the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict by supporting Syria and securing its alliance in the region. As also underlined by 
Salem, “A Syria at peace with Israel would be less useful to Iran; the anti-American, anti-
Israeli, anti-peace alliance that Iran has built would be broken at its midpoint.”586 Peace 
between Syria and Israel could curb Iran’s influence in the region, a situation which would 
benefit both Turkey and the US.  
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Starting negotiations with Israel was a precondition proposed by the Syrian President 
Hafez Assad to ally with the Gulf coalition during the first Iraqi War which was accepted 
by the US.
587
 Similarly, Syria again used the negotiations mediated by Turkey as a means 
to end its isolation, be integrated into the international system and improve its relations 
with the West. This would also interest the US since it would distance Syria from the 
Iranian sphere of influence and turn Syria into a more benign actor. For the US, the 
resolution of the Syrian-Israeli dispute could also mean ceasing Syria's support for Hamas 
and Hezbollah, two obstacles for its interests in the region.  
4.4.2.5 Domestic Concerns 
According to Aras, one of the reasons for Turkish government’s enthusiasm to push the 
talks through was to divert attention from domestic politics and return home with a success 
story.
588
 In April 27, 2007, the government was faced with an “e-memorandum” wired by 
the military against its “anti-secular” advancements and the presidential election that took 
place on the same day in which AKP candidate Abdullah Gül was the sole runner.589 The 
election was annulled by the Turkish Constitutional Court as a result of a boycott imposed 
by the parliament which prevented Gül to attain the two-thirds of the vote necessary to 
become president. Subsequently, the government called for early general election, 
increased its seats in the parliament, and Gül became the president in the third round of 
presidential elections.
590
 As Aras argues, the Syrian-Israeli peace talks provided the 
Turkish government with a positive image both internationally and domestically.  
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Another reason may be to secure domestic support for foreign policy which envisioned 
becoming more active in the Middle East, a region that used to be avoided by many of the 
previous governments for being seen as problematic. Furthermore, the Palestinian issue has 
been a popular issue in Turkey ever since its emergence as a result of its symbolic value 
for the Muslim world. As also noted by al-Nunu, “the issue that unites all parties in Turkey 
is the Palestinian issue.”591 Referring to the death of Turkish activists during the Gaza 
flotilla crisis al-Nunu contends that,  
Turkey was the only country which gave us political, economic support 
through programs and projects in Gaza. Turkey is the only country in the 
world that gave us martyrs at a time when no one came to help us. No 
one was ready to sacrifice themselves for Gaza.
592
 
As such, the Gaza flotilla crisis is seen as a demonstration of the lengths that Turkish 
people went for the Palestinian cause. For Turkey, the resolution of the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict would create favourable environment for the Palestinian question. The government 
has long relied on its ownership of the Palestinian issue which also helps it gain the 
domestic support it needs for its broader regional politics. The Palestinian issue has also 
been exploited by the government in almost every one of its electoral campaigns. 
Gezer suggests that there is a public demand for Turkey to take on more active roles in 
peacemaking. He notes that there is a domestic discussion on a societal model that is more 
pluralistic which reflects on Turkey’s mediation. He further argues that the recent statistics 
on humanitarian aid suggests more involvement of NGOs, which rely on public donations, 
accounting to about half of the official aid.
593
 
Although there is US popular demand to resolve conflicts in the world, it would still be 
rather difficult to talk about a strong willpower for the US to take on a mediator role in the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict. As also highlighted by Stokes, “Americans simply do not believe that 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes a major threat to the United States.”594 
According to a survey conducted by Pew Research Center, American people believe that 
China or Iran pose a much bigger threat for the US than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
595
 
Stokes further argues that, 
Future U.S. peace efforts will also have to contend with the American 
public's disinterest in the Middle East, disbelief in the achievability of a 
lasting peace, lack of impartiality and long-standing sympathy for Israel, 
and a deep partisan divide on anything regarding these issues.
596
 
 
In this respect, it may be argued that there is more public demand in Turkey with respect to 
the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
4.4.3 Characteristics of Mediators 
This section will focus on Turkey’s characteristics as a mediator in order to analyse to 
what extent these may be helpful in bringing out its difference as a mediator. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, characteristics of mediators are analysed in two sections in this study. The 
first is the power of mediators referring to concepts such as leverage, hard power and soft 
power, positional of mediators and their legitimacy. The second section is the position of 
mediators referring to their impartiality and neutrality, their proximity to the conflict, and 
their previous relations with the parties. 
4.4.3.1 Power Capabilities of Mediators 
One of Turkey’s important differences as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks is the lack 
of its power capabilities when compared with a great power as the US. As also discussed in 
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Chapter 3, lack of sufficient hard power drove Turkey to rely more on its soft power and 
diplomacy. The frequent emphasis laid on Turkey’s “difference” as a mediator by the 
participants of this research may be indicative of a way of maximising Turkey’s power in 
the region to compensate for its lack of hard power. 
As also contended by Quandt, while the US was in times rather coercive as a mediator,
597
 
Turkey had to be more persuasive and depend more on its discursive power. Moore argues 
similarly that,  
The United States has played the role of a mediator with muscle. Its 
representatives have at various times persuaded, cajoled, or aggressively 
pressured involved parties to seek a permanent peace; they have offered 
both arms and resources for development to help achieve these ends.
598
 
 
For instance, during the 1974 negotiations the US provided incentives to Israel such as 
supplying tanks and converting 1 billion US Dollars of loan it had given Israel into a 
grant.
599
 To Syria it offered economic incentives to be delivered upon the signing of the 
disengagement agreement.
600
 As Touval notes, the US also assured Syria that it “did not 
regard the disengagement line as a final boundary and that the US would work for the full 
implementation of Resolution 338, together with a promise to help arrange for the 
Palestinians to join the negotiations.”601 Regarding Kissinger’s partial success during the 
1974 negotiations Stein notes,  
Kissinger disposed of resources as secretary of state that were 
unavailable to any other mediator. He was able to build a bargaining 
triad in part because the United States was able and willing to assume the 
functions of insurer, guarantor, trustee, and benefactor, functions that 
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were critical to the success of the negotiating process and quite beyond 
the scope of the usual mediator.
602
 
 
The US was also able to exert power over the parties when deemed necessary.
603
 Quandt 
argues that, 
The American role in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiation really has to be 
understood as starting in its more or less intense phase and the aftermath 
of the 1973 war and it was built around this idea that we [the US] could 
uniquely reassure the Israelis on security issues.  The other side of the 
coin was we could also uniquely pressure them in a way that no other 
country could. We just could not do it very publicly, we could not do it 
very often but if you look at the nature of the US-Israeli relationship we 
had some influence in a way that maybe Norway would not. Norway 
could be neutral, a safe place where we could talk but it could not twist 
arms or reassure in the same way. During the Camp David and the 
Clinton period there had always been this notion that there is a unique 
American role because we could say to Israelis “If you do not do this we 
are going to do this,” and that nobody else can do. That is what makes the 
American role a little bit different.
604
 
 
As also evident in Quandt’s words, one of the elements that made US mediation different 
than that of Turkey’s was its ability to offer incentives, twist Israel’s arm and provide with 
security reassurance. However, despite the emphasis on the leverage that the US had 
during the negotiations, given that it was not able to resolve the conflict raises questions 
regarding the importance of leverage in mediation. As such, it may be argued that the 
willingness of the parties may be more important in achieving results in mediation.   
While being a great power gives the US some advantages, it gives certain disadvantages as 
well. For instance, the involvement of the US in the conflict during the 1974 negotiations 
worried the USSR resulting in the escalation of an arms race between the two super 
powers. According to Campbell one of the determinants of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
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particularly during the Cold War, was the arms race between the US and the USSR as the 
two main arms suppliers in the region. In an effort to maintain regional balances and 
protect Israel from losing its upper hand in the region, the US did not refrain from shipping 
weapons to Israel every time the USSR further armed the Arab states such as Egypt and 
Syria. This vicious cycle only contributed to further paranoia and adversary among the 
conflicting parties as well as the questioning of the US impartiality as a mediator.
605
 As 
Quandt notes, it also raised concerns that “the United States would make only half-hearted 
diplomatic attempts to promote settlement.”606 
Drawing on the literature, great powers often face difficulties in sustaining their 
impartiality since they usually have their fingers in too many pies. They also usually have 
an interest in the outcome of the conflict.
607
 The impartiality of the US in the Syrian-Israeli 
talks has been often questioned due to the close relations between the US and Israel. Since 
it also has vast oil interests in the region, as a super power it could manipulate the 
resolution of the conflict in line with its own interests. As also highlighted by Kurtzner and 
Lasensky, “Unlike other outside actors, Washington is already deeply enmeshed - 
politically, strategically, and economically - across the entire set of Arab-Israeli 
relationship.”608 
Another issue that deserves attention is the relationship between Turkey and the US. US-
Turkish partnership had started in 1947 in line with the Truman Doctrine and was 
consolidated with Turkey’s entry into the NATO in 1952. During the Cold War, Turkey 
was more of a buffer zone between the Western block and the USSR. The collapse of the 
USSR brought about new challenges and opportunities for the US for which its partnership 
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with Turkey again played an important role.
609As Larabee postulates, Turkey’s “capacity 
to provide a bridge to the Muslim world and serve as a stabilizing force in the Middle East 
and the Caucasus/Central Asia” consolidated this partnership.610 For instance, while US 
military bases in Turkey are significant for its interests in the region, Turkey needs this 
alliance to be able to survive in such a volatile region. The US is also Turkey’s main arms 
supplier providing around 80 per cent of its total arms supply.
611
 
As bold as it is on the discursive level, Turkey’s ability to act independently as an actor 
and thus, as a mediator in the region is limited to the consensus it can build with the US. 
For instance, when Israel declined Davutoğlu’s demand to visit Gaza in 2009, Ankara 
retaliated by barring Israel’s participation to an air exercise to be held in Turkey with the 
participation of the US alongside other NATO forces. As a reaction, the US cancelled the 
whole practice.
612
  
Similarly, the US was regularly informed during Turkey’s mediation between Syria and 
Israel. Aras notes that the US did not need to give any technical assistance since the talks 
had not reached that level of difficulty yet but the peace process was significant for the US 
and there was a very close process of informing and coordination with the US right from 
the beginning. Aras notes that, 
It was very important to inform the US and have its support because one 
of the main motivations for Syria was that peace would lift the isolation 
over Syria and reintegrate it into the international system. This was the 
carrot offered to Syria. Coordination with the US was important and so it 
was facilitated.
613
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Moubayed postulates that,  
Turks realized early on, however, as did both the Israelis and the Syrians, 
that Ankara alone cannot pull through with a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty. 
The Turks can lay the groundwork for negotiations, and even get both 
countries into direct talks, but it will take a committed White House to 
sign a peace deal. Only the Americans can provide the economic, 
security, and political guarantees for a peace acceptable to both 
Damascus and Tel Aviv.
614
 
 
These examples demonstrate that Turkey cannot go too far against what the US wants it to 
do and this then helps to explain that Turkish “difference” is perhaps a way for Turkish 
policy makers to manage their own lack of power while maximising their influence in the 
region. For instance, Haşimi contends that Turkey has a symbolic power based on its 
imperial and caliphatic heritage. He notes that, “In terms of its area of influence, maybe not 
in terms of its economic power but more so of its symbolic power, America is the only 
country that Turkey could be compared to.”615  
As bold as it is on the discursive level, the above statements rules out the fact that 
“symbolic power” is not always enough to implement the decisions taken on the table. As 
Kurtzer and Lasensky argue, one of the reasons why the US role is essential in Arab-Israeli 
conflicts is that “large asymmetries of power require a robust third-party role”616 a quality 
that Turkey lacks. Meral and Paris also maintain that,  
Although Middle Eastern and Caucasus states see Turkey as a strong 
country that needs to be befriended and not offended, no country sees it 
as the ultimate bridge or trusted negotiator in the long-standing conflicts 
of the region. Actual Turkish power in the region is nowhere close to that 
of the United States.
617
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Had Turkey been an entirely neutral outsider to the conflict, perhaps a non-threatening and 
neutral European small-state mediator, it could have been more effective as a mediator.  
However the extent of independence that it is willing to operate with, the contentious 
attitude it adopts and the fact that it is an insider to the conflict that has vested interests in 
its outcome require a certain level of hard power.  
For instance Oruç contends that, 
There is something we know in the entire field. Problems cannot be 
resolved with justice, equity and human rights. There is only one thing 
that resolves problems and that is power; being powerful. More than 
economic power, this pertains to armament, military power; being tough. 
Those who craft Turkey’s foreign policy know this very well. You cannot 
become an actor without fighting and demonstrating your power. Turkey 
has not been able to attain that level yet.
618
 
 
The above discussion suggests that since Turkey lacks large scale military power, it has to 
rely more on soft power. As such, mediation comes to fore as an important policy tool for 
Turkey. In addition, in order for Turkey’s mediator role to be sustainable Turkey will need 
US support as long as the latter is an influential actor in the region. This situation may 
nevertheless change had the US drifted away from the region. Such a scenario would 
widen the power vacuum already in place in the region as a result of the Iraqi War and the 
subsequent US exit from Iraq. For instance Parsi contends that, 
The US is less dependent on oil and because strategically it recognizes 
that the real peer challenge to the US is coming from China in the next 
decades in the East and just getting yourself involved in the Middle East 
weakens you for that challenge. The US is disengaging, not entirely, but 
to the extent that it is clearly not capable of recreating a new order. So 
that job falls into the regional states.
619
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The above analysis suggests that in such a scenario, there would be more room for regional 
actors to take on greater roles inter alia as mediators. However, as Migdal,
620
 Salem
621
 and 
Parsi
622
 all suggest, this scenario is not likely to happen anytime soon if it happens at all. 
Furthermore, the unfolding events in Iraq and Syria that was triggered by the Arab Spring 
signal a possible increase in US involvement in the region. This view is also supported by 
Quandt who contends that,  
I am a bit hesitant to say that we [the US] will ever completely turn our 
back to Arab-Israeli issues partly because so many Americans now have 
some kind of special interest not in the Arab-Israeli peace but in Israel 
itself. It is a little country but has a huge profile in America. When 
anything happens and Israel gets reported on in the US, people in the 
congress are interested in.
623
 
 
Quandt also postulates that, 
It is very hard for the Americans to say we have no interest in this, it does 
not concern us. Because we are after all providing the arms and the 
money to the Israelis and if we just stand by [it would seem as if] we are 
implicitly supporting whatever they do and that has implications for our 
relations with some Arab countries who want us to intervene and like 
[during] the Gaza war there was pressure on the US to bring it to an end. 
And if we had not done anything I think the Jordanians and I think some 
others would have begun to feel uneasy… Some conflicts in the world, 
we really can almost turn our back to such as south Sudan or Congo 
where there is very little American interest. Not this one. If the conflict 
flares up [in the Middle East], we feel the need to do something.
624
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, status is another important indicator in mediation. As Abu-
Nimer notes, status is often considered an important trait in some non-Western settings in 
order to have the respect of the parties.
625
 Quandt points out a similar concern by 
                                                     
620
 Interview with Joel Migdal by Akpınar and Mendoza.  
621
 Interview with Paul Salem by Pınar Akpınar, POMEAS, Istanbul Policy Center, August 30, 2014. 
622
 Interview with Parsi. 
623
 Interview with Quandt. 
624
 Ibid. 
625
 Abu-Nimer, “Conflict Resolution Approaches,” 47. 
171 
 
underlining that in the mediation attempts of the US in the Arab-Israeli talks, “The 
president and his top advisers must be involved and must work in harmony. Unless the 
prestige and power of the White House are clearly behind American policy initiatives, 
leaders in the Middle East will not take them seriously.”626 He further notes that in all 
instances where the US policies succeeded in the Middle East the special envoys and the 
president “were seen to be working closely together” such as Nixon and Kissinger during 
the peace talks of 1974.
627
 
Turkey was represented by former Adviser in Chief to the Prime Minister (later Foreign 
Minister and Prime Minister) Ahmet Davutoğlu who was fully backed by Prime Minister 
Erdoğan who was personally involved in all levels of the process.628 In terms of their 
personality traits, both Davutoğlu and Erdoğan were prominent political figures in the 
Middle East and the Muslim world.  
Similarly, the US was represented by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the 1974 
talks, by Secretary of State James Baker during the 1992-1993 talks, by the US Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher during 1995 talks and by the US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright during 2000 talks. Among them, Christopher is known for his negotiator role 
during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980-1981 resulting in the release of the American 
hostages. He was also the one who persuaded the Clinton administration to resume the 
Arab-Israeli negotiations and was particularly active in the Syrian-Israeli track.
629
 
This section illustrated that power and status has been an important determinant in the 
Arab-Israeli conflicts. It found that although Turkey was committed to its mediator role in 
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the Syrian-Israeli talks, its lack of sufficient power to twist arms or offer incentives came 
to fore as a significant obstacle for resolution. 
4.4.3.2 Position of Mediators 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the position of mediators refers to their previous relations with 
the conflicting parties, their impartiality and neutrality, and their insider/outsider position.  
Turkey's relations with Syria were sour until only a few years before the peace talks. When 
Turkey's borders were drawn following World War I, Hatay province with a majority 
Syrian population was included within its border lines starting a conflict with Syria. Syria 
never recognized Turkey's official borders and always placed Hatay within its borders in 
its official maps. Syria’s alleged support for the PKK, a Kurdish militia group recognized 
as a terrorist group by Turkey, as well as Turkey’s construction of a number of dams over 
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which originate in Turkey and flow into Syria, dragged the 
two neighbours to the brink of war in 1998. As a result, Turkey summoned its troops on 
the Turkish-Syrian border and demanded Syria to deport Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
the PKK who found safe haven in Syria at the time. Syria accepted Turkey’s ultimatum 
and Öcalan fled the country soon to be captured in Kenya in a Turkish-Israeli covert 
operation.
630
 
Although the negative record of the Turkish-Syrian relations had been a challenge for 
Turkey, the rapid improvement in bilateral relations, particularly after the AKP came to 
power, was helpful in eradicating Syrian suspicions.
631
 Turkey’s rejection of sending 
troops to Iraq to support the US-led operation, its criticism of the US policies in the Middle 
East and Erdoğan’s rejection of an invitation by the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to 
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visit Tel Aviv created a sort of excitement on the part of Syria towards Turkey. However, 
the main reason for this rapprochement was Turkey’s new regional policy which aimed at 
boosting relations with neighbours by fostering bilateral relations. Subsequently, Bashar 
al-Assad was the first Syrian President to visit Turkey in 2004 during which he planted the 
seeds of Turkey’s mediator role in the Syrian-Israeli talks. Furthermore, between 2003 and 
2009, more than 80 agreements were signed between Syria and Turkey including 
scientific, economic, military and political agreements such as free trade agreement and 
high level strategic partnership agreements.
632
  
 
According to Aras, before the talks were resumed, Assad made a statement that only 
Turkey would be able to mediate the talks which is indicative of the level of trust Turkey 
was able to build with Syria. Even after the talks were suspended in 2008, Syria mentioned 
its willingness to resume the talks under Turkey’s auspices.633 Although, the relations had 
been severed during the Arab Spring, at the time of the negotiations Turkey and Syria were 
rather close.  
 
As also argued by Quandt, “Turkey is capitalizing on its strong economy, its geostrategic 
location, its historical role, and its ‘soft power’ to expand its influence in the region.”634 In 
order to achieve that, the government intended to improve relations with its neighbours 
such as Syria, open up into new markets through new channels and enhance political and 
social relations with the region and beyond through diplomacy and soft power, as 
discussed extensively in Chapter 3.  
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In addition to having close relations with the Syrian government, Turkey also had good 
relations with the other stakeholders of the Syrian-Israeli conflict such as Iran, Hezbollah 
and Hamas, three actors that the US does not have good relations with if not any relations 
at all. The relations between the US and Syria has been sour throughout the years. Syria 
was a Soviet ally during the Cold War and has never welcomed American friendship 
unlike other Arab countries such as Egypt or Jordan. There have been several unresolved 
issues between the two states throughout the years such as Syria's alleged support for 
terrorism, its close alliance with Iran, its alleged possession of chemical weapons, 
conflicting interests in Iraq, and the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Although the relations are 
currently more severe, at the time of the US mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks in 1974 
and the 1990s, the relations had been comparatively better until 2005 when the US 
imposed sanctions on Syria and claimed it a “rogue state.”  
Unlike its relations with Syria, the US has close relations with Israel. Since World War II, 
Israel has been the recipient of the largest US aid.
635
 Although it had doubts about the 
establishment of Israel, as it did not want a destabilising force in the region, the bilateral 
relations were significantly solidified during the Cold War years particularly owing to the 
rapprochement between the USSR and Iraq, Syria and Egypt.
636
 However, it should also be 
noted that during the Cold War years, America’s close alliance with Israel not only 
damaged its image of impartiality as a mediator, but also pushed some of the Arab states, 
such as Syria, further towards the USSR thus solidified the latter’s position in the Middle 
East. As Quandt suggests, “By granting economic and military aid to the enemy of the 
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Arabs, the United States was providing the USSR with an opportunity to extend its 
influence in the Middle East.”637 
Turkey had had positive relations ever since the establishment of Israel in 1948. Turkey 
was the first Muslim dominated country to recognize Israel in 1949 and had been its 
closest ally in the Muslim world until recent years. Their traditional Western alliance and 
good relations with the US made them regional allies. However, the relations got strained 
as a result of Turkey’s criticism of Israel’s attack on Gaza right after the fourth round of 
the Syrian-Israeli talks; the subsequent crisis between Erdoğan and Peres during the Davos 
summit; and the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid in which nine Turkish citizens were killed by 
Israeli soldiers in international waters onboard a ship which was part of a humanitarian 
flotilla aiming to break Israel’s Gaza blockade by delivering aid. As a result, Turkey 
withdrew its ambassador from Israel and decreased its representation in the country to the 
level of Second Secretary. Despite the tension on the political level, the economic relations 
between Israel and Turkey have skyrocketed in recent years in an average of a 10 percent 
year-to-year increase in trade since 2011.
638
 
One of Turkey’s important differences as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks was its insider 
position. Turkey is geopolitically located very close to both countries. It shares its longest 
border line with Syria while Israel is only miles away from Turkey. Both lands used to be 
parts of the Ottoman Empire. Many Turkish citizens still have relatives in Syria and for 
instance as Haşimi also indicates, the land registry and cadastre system of Israel is still in 
Ottoman language.
639
 Turkey has social, historical, and cultural links with both countries.  
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Turkey also has religious links with Syria. Furthermore, it has a prominent Jewish 
Diaspora that often refers to Ottoman Empire’s welcoming of Jews escaping the Spanish 
massacre in 1492 and Turkey’s welcoming of European Jews escaping the Holocaust 
during World War II with gratitude. Haşimi argues that when an outsider mediates the 
process can be limited to providing a platform however it is not possible for an insider 
such as Turkey to mediate just by providing a neutral platform. An insider, in this view, 
has to be more engaged with the process.
640
 He postulates, 
For us, mediation is a direct part of our identities. For instance, people 
can give this example when the Palestinian, the Syrian or the Somali 
issue are spoken: “Of course Turkey will do it [the mediation] because 
the system of land registry and cadastre in Israel is still in Ottoman 
language.” For instance I, alongside many other people in Turkey, cannot 
write the history of my region independent from Baghdad because the 
moment I do that, it would be deficient... There are strong family 
relations in Hatay
641
 and Syria. This is how this geography extends from 
one end to the other. This is what we mean by Turkey’s geographic 
position. The moment you isolate that region, you cannot construct your 
identity, your area of interest. This is why it [Turkey’s mediation] is 
different and it depends on a different kind of interest [than that of the 
West].
642
 
 
As evident in Haşimi’s account, mediation is part of Turkey’s identity building process 
inter alia as a result of its “insiderness.” That is to say, Turkey is part of the region and a 
natural party to many of the conflicts. The relational ties and trust-building play significant 
part in this role which was also confirmed by Aras.
643
 As also noted in Chapter 2, the 
“high-context/low-context” division of Hall implies that in high-context cultures, which 
are often non-Western, relational ties are important in human interaction.
644
 This then 
affects the socialization of actors and their decision making processes. As such, 
“insiderness” comes to fore as an important difference of Turkey.  
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This view is also confirmed by Apakan who argues that being a party to certain conflicts 
fosters Turkey’s enthusiasm in terms of resolving them.645 The geopolitical, social and 
cultural proximity also makes the region an important area for Turkish interests. The 
debate on Turkey’s “historical-geographical depth” comes to fore in this respect which has 
become a popular topic following Davutoğlu’s use of the concept “Strategic Depth.”646 In 
this view, Davutoğlu highlights the historical, geopolitical, and cultural depth of Turkey’s 
relations with the countries in the region.  
Insiderness is also regarded as an asset that enables Turkey to understand issues 
comprehensively and build empathy with other actors. Subaşı argues that, “if you have the 
information on the codes of both parties, your policy of reconciliation pays off.”647 Gezer 
contends that instead of being a neutral, objective outsider that does not have any interest 
in the outcome of the conflict, Turkey is a regional mediator that understands the dynamics 
of the region well and emphasizes the fact that it is a regional actor. He notes, “We 
[Turkish foreign policy makers] sometimes use the term ‘insider mediator’ in our 
discourse. As an actor that is sometimes a party to the conflicts and has a direct interest in 
their outcome, Turkey tries to contribute to their resolution.”648  
Gezer further underlines that there are both advantages and disadvantages to being an 
insider mediator. He notes, “Turkey has an advantage in terms of long-term commitment. 
Instead of paying conjunctural or periodical attention to the resolution of conflicts, Turkey 
is able to engage long-term as an actor of the region.”649 He suggests that there is a global 
trend in terms of change in the nature of conflicts towards being more intrastate with more 
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multi-layered and complex dynamics attached. Identity plays a significant role in these 
kinds of conflicts through elements such as sect, religion and ethnicity.  
According to Gezer, an actor such as Turkey, that knows the region well and has historical, 
cultural and relational ties with it, is able to display long-term commitment to the 
resolution of problems.
650
 He notes, “We have the aim of becoming an actor that is able to 
speak with everyone and make sophisticated contribution [to the resolution of 
conflicts].”651 This comment is also indicative of Turkey’s enthusiasm to become more 
influential in the region by using mediation as a tool. In addition, both Aras and Gezer 
seem to be aware of the dilemma that Turkey is in, aware of the pitfalls and that Turkey is 
taking advantage of being able to present itself in a certain way. 
As the above discussion suggests, for Turkish policy makers, Turkey’s insider identity is 
more important than neutrality in mediation. Şahin maintains that, Turkey’s historical and 
geopolitical mission takes away its chance of being neutral. “We are communities [the 
communities in the region] that have lived together for centuries under the same state [as 
the Ottoman Empire], under the same flag in our near geography and in the broader Middle 
East,” he emphasizes.652 Mediation emerged as a tool of identity building for Turkey and 
being an insider plays a significant role in this process.  
Despite the positive value attached to Turkey’s insiderness as a mediator by Turkish policy 
makers, the Arab Spring revealed that there may sometimes be disadvantages to being an 
insider mediator since it raises questions with respect to neutrality and impartiality. For 
instance, during the course of the Arab Spring, Turkey has been blamed for taking the side 
of the Sunnis and pursuing sectarian politics. Its support for the Muslim Brotherhood in 
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Egypt, the opposition in Syria in addition to its alleged reluctance to fight the ISIS have 
been regarded as indications of its sectarian policies.
653
 It seems certain that Turkey’s 
credible image as a mediator deteriorated during the Arab Spring, partly because the 
tensions in its own policy were exposed, and partly because the rapidly worsening 
circumstances eroded any remaining support for mediation in Syria and Israel. Hence, 
Turkey needed to cast around for policies other than mediation in responding to the Arab 
Spring. 
Regarding the drawbacks of Turkey’s insider identity during the Arab Spring, Gezer 
contends that chances are much less for a mediator from outside the region to face such 
“unfair” accusations as being partial.654 In an attempt to advocate Turkey’s position Gezer 
posits,  
There is no tendency in Turkey’s foreign policy to defend a particular 
group and act in line with its interests. We have no such traditional 
foreign policy. We have no such genetic coding. We are trying to act as 
an island of stability amid such volatile environment. In such an 
environment, our area of manoeuvre is shrunk as an insider actor. We 
have to accept that.
655
 
 
In addition to its insiderness and the level of trust it was able to build with Syria, Turkey’s 
Western ties were also significant in triggering Syria’s request for its mediation. Gezer 
postulates that Turkey’s relations with the West have a positive impact on its mediator 
role. He notes,  
Turkey’s institutional relationship with the Transatlantic and European 
institutions is one of the important dimensions of its soft power. Turkey 
is party to all of Europe’s political and economic structures apart from the 
                                                     
653
 Cengiz Çandar, “İçeride ‘demokrasi açığı’ dışarıda ‘nüfuz kaybı’…” Radikal, November 2, 2014, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/cengiz_candar/icerde_demokrasi_acigi_disarida_nufuz_kaybi-1222680 
(accessed November 6, 2014).  
654
 Interview with Gezer. 
655
 Ibid. 
180 
 
EU. Similarly, it is a significant member of the NATO alliance. This 
creates an important impact on how Turkey is perceived. As a result, 
Turkey does not have to make a choice. One of the important tenets of 
the new foreign policy is this multi-dimensional foreign policy; the 
ability to look around with a perspective of 360 degrees.
656
 
 
Turkey’s close relations with the West, coupled with its non-Western identity, had a 
positive impact on its mediator role in the Syrian-Israeli talks before the Arab Spring. 
Although, it has deep Muslim, Asian and Middle Eastern characteristics and culture, 
Turkey also has serious engagements with the West. For instance, being “Muslim but 
secular”657 or being “a Muslim country and member of NATO”658 have been considered 
assets for Turkey as a mediator between Israel and the Arab world. As such, Turkey’s 
mediation was demanded by Syria as an actor that could help achieve its goal of 
reintegrating into the international system by using its Western links.  
For Israel, Turkey was both a Western ally and a Muslim actor that had good relations with 
Israel’s foes. Despite being a Muslim dominated country, Turkey’s strong ties with the 
Western world might have made it a more legitimate mediator for Israel compared to other 
possible mediators in the region such as Egypt. The fact that Turkey was able to talk to all 
actors in the region including Hamas and Hezbollah that the US considers as terrorist 
organizations also enhanced its legitimacy. As such, Turkey’s relational ties with the 
region comes to fore as a more important asset in international mediation than insiderness. 
The impartiality of the US both in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations as well as the broader 
Arab-Israeli peace talks have also been largely questioned due to its close relations with 
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Israel.
659
 According to Jones, “There is considerable evidence that American policy is 
deliberately skewed in particular directions in the politics of the Middle East and that 
rather than being a mediator in these conflicts the US is a key player with strong interests 
of its own.”660 
On the other hand, the example of US mediation also reveals that, impartiality per se may 
not always be the most important asset in international mediation. In this vein Quandt 
suggests that, 
It is of course true that the US is very closely aligned with the 
Israelis and usually has supported a kind of basic Israeli security 
concern and so forth. But the reason that successive Arab parties 
have wanted the US to be involved is not because we are seemed as 
so fair but because of this hope that the US, for its larger strategic 
interest, would limit its support to Israel to what we might call 
pre1967 Israel. On things like borders and Jerusalem [US formal 
position is] not so different from what might be called moderate 
Arab position. We never recognized the annexation of East 
Jerusalem. We never recognized Jerusalem as the official capital; 
our embassy is still in Tel Aviv. We never recognized the 
annexation of the Golan Heights. So, an Arab leader like Sadat 
could say “well of course the Americans are close to the Israelis 
but they never said the Sinai should not go back to Egypt and since 
that is our major goal maybe we can count on their support for 
that.”661 
 
Quandt also contends that as an asset, the leverage of the US over Israel is often considered 
more important than neutrality or objectivity in the Arab-Israeli peace talks. He notes, 
We [the US] always had this feeling that the special role we could 
play as mediator is not that we would be the most neutral or most 
objective but at the end of the day we could say to Israelis “if you 
do so and so we would reassure you with aid or technology 
transfers or intelligence cooperation or arms support. So that you 
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can compensate for giving up territory with some sense that your 
security is still intact.”662 
 
According to Kurtzer and Lasensky, the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict “have always 
leaned on Washington to help them bridge differences, walk the last mile, provide off-the-
table incentives to reach agreement, and to be an involved stakeholder in implementing 
accords.”663 
4.4.4 Style of Mediation 
This section aims to understand to what extent Turkey’s style of mediation may 
demonstrate a difference from other mediators by drawing on some of the indicators 
discussed in Chapter 2 such as being persistent or reluctant, inclusive or exclusive, 
bringing culture into mediation, and adopting a normative approach. 
In the Syrian-Israeli talks, Turkey was persistent and committed throughout the entire 
process unlike the US which, according to Quandt, assumed the Palestinian-Israeli track as 
more important and with bigger potential than the Syrian-Israeli track.
664
 As Aras also 
underlines, its commitment to the process was demonstrated through its high-level 
involvement in the process and its enthusiasm to continue the talks even after their 
suspension following the Gaza outbreak.
665
 As a demonstration of Turkey’s willingness to 
continue the talks Davutoğlu noted early in 2010 that, 
If the two countries agree to restart it [peace talks], we can do it. As 
Turkey, we are ready. The Syrian side already declared they want to 
continue from where we left (off). The Israeli side, they have different 
views. Some coalition members are against, some are in favor. We will 
see. If we see a strong political will, both in Israel and Syria, we will 
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continue to support (peace efforts). We will support every attempt, step in 
the direction of peace.
666
 
 
According to Quandt, an important aspect of Turkish mediation was that it was more to the 
point and precise.
667
 He notes, 
I have been told people say they [Turks] have done a very good job 
mediating. They have got into details that were never discussed before. 
Particularly the exact question of “what is meant by withdrawing to the 
1967 line?” that nobody quite knows where it was on the map. They 
knew where it was not but they did not quite know where it was. I think 
the moving toward a clear definition on the territorial, what it would 
mean to withdraw to the 1967 line and what else needs to be done... 
Those are the main contributions [of Turkey’s mediation].
668
 
 
This comment also sheds light on Quandt’s previous criticism of Christopher’s ignorance 
regarding the details of the agreement. According to Quandt’s observations, Turkey’s 
interest in the details of the agreement may be indicative of its willingness and 
commitment to the process. 
Quandt also suggests that Turkish style was much more “non-public” in the sense that it 
was easier to control the media during the peace talks. He postulates, 
I think the style of mediating was very non-public. One of the problems 
with the American style of mediation is that it tends to come into the 
public arena too much. Secretary of the state and the president get 
involved and all of a sudden we have to start explaining what the issues 
are. Sometimes an effective mediator has to mediate below the radar so 
that it is not being reported in the press. I think that is something that the 
Norwegians have done effectively with the Palestinians in Oslo. 
Americans are not very good at this kind of very low-key mediation.
669
 
 
In this view, Turkish mediation style is different in the sense that it is easier for Turkey to 
control its domestic media which may be an advantage in a mediation process in which 
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confidentiality is of critical value. However, the ability of the government to control the 
media is also indicative of the lack of press freedom in the country. 
Another difference is that Turkey followed an all-inclusive approach during the process. 
Although there was not any particular need to include a non-state actor in the Syrian-Israeli 
talks at the time, having side talks with Hamas or Hezbollah could have been necessary 
had the talks not been resumed and developed into the next stage. Turkey’s mediation style 
is in favour of the inclusion of all actors based on its willingness to present itself as having 
an all-inclusive style of diplomacy. For instance by referring to a conversation he had with 
Olmert regarding the Israeli-Palestinian talks, Erdoğan notes, “When I was talking with 
Prime Minister Olmert, I said regarding the Palestine-Israeli talks it would not be correct 
not to include Hamas in the negotiations. They entered the election in Palestine and won 
the majority of seats in the parliament.”670 He adds that Olmert did not agree to speak with 
Hamas.
671
  
Unlike Turkey, the US rejected to have any communication with stakeholders such as 
Hezbollah or Hamas on the basis that they are terrorist organizations. Furthermore, US 
anti-terrorism law and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act) of 2001 bring 
restrictions to such encounters. This has the potential to make it harder for the US to have 
an effective mediator role in the Arab-Israeli conflict which may require to keep the 
communication channels open with such parties as Hamas or Hezbollah, both of which it 
recognizes as terrorist organizations.
672
 
                                                     
670
 “Erdogan: Palestine an open-air prison,” Ynetnews.com. 
671
 Ibid. 
672
 Doug Noll, “Another International Mediation Fiasco in Libya,” The World Post, 6 June 2011,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-noll/another-international-med_b_872106.html (accessed August 14, 
2012). 
185 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, culture comes to fore as an important indicator to understand 
difference in mediation. As analysed in the above discussion on insiderness, Turkey’s 
cultural links with the region was important in paving the way for its mediator role. As also 
noted by Al-Nunu, the religious sensitivities of the Turkish leadership, and the moderate 
model of Islam Turkey was able to offer to the Muslim world, played a significant role in 
its being accepted as a mediator in regional conflicts. By referring to Turkey’s 
peacekeeping role in Afghanistan Subaşı argues in a similar vein that, “when a Turkish 
soldier goes to the Friday prayer in Afghanistan and prays with his uniform on that 
cultivates a relationship.”673 
As discussed earlier in the text, Turkey’s Muslim and secular identity was important in the 
emergence and approval of its mediator role in the region. However, Aras notes that, 
probably Turkey’s cultural ties with Syria or Israel did not have too much impact on the 
talks per se since they were rather technical with a clear agenda.
674
  
As discussed in Chapter 2, emerging powers have come to fore as “norm-defenders” in 
recent years. They also pursue advocacy on the international platform on certain issues. As 
also argued by Parlar, “In accordance with its rising ‘value-driven’ and ‘ideational’ posture 
in its region, Turkey then added a normative dimension to its evolving soft power, 
promoting democracy and humanitarian values in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region.”675 Turkey’s criticism of Israel following the suspension of the Syrian-
Israeli talks as a result of the Gaza crisis may be seen as an example of such advocacy. In 
addition, Erdoğan walked out from the panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 
                                                     
673
 Ibid. 
674
 Interview with Aras. 
675
 Dal, “Assessing Turkey's ‘Normative’ Power in the Middle East and North Africa Region,” 709. 
186 
 
2009 protesting the Israeli President Shimon Peres for defending Israel’s Gaza blockade.676 
During the panel Erdoğan said by pointing his finger at Peres, 
Mr. Peres, you are older than me. Your voice comes out in a very loud 
tone. And the loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience... 
When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill... And so Davos is 
over for me from now on.
677
 
 
Erdoğan skipped the Davos summits in the subsequent years. In June 2012, he organized 
the World Economic Forum in Istanbul as the host country. During his speech, Erdoğan 
criticized the situation in Gaza by noting, “People are being jailed in the world's largest 
open-air prison.”678 During the following years Erdoğan accused Israel “of a policy ‘based 
on lies,’"679 for attempting a “systematic genocide,”680 and declared it “a ‘threat’ to the 
Middle East.”681 According to Haşimi, 
It [Erdoğan’s anti-Israeli discourse] started after one of the parties 
[Israel] lied to the prime minister of the country [Turkey] that took all 
sorts of associated risks and conducted the mediation. Furthermore, that 
party adopted a contrary behaviour in the field. It was Turkey that lost its 
trust and even its willingness to mediate... The Prime Minister [Erdoğan] 
started talking after the issue had been over; after Israel “betrayed the 
process by not keeping its promise,” finalized and destroyed it [the peace 
talks] and created a negative atmosphere. He did not talk while the talks 
were still ongoing. You enter a different equation when you look at it this 
way. There is no point in constantly blaming the Prime Minister.
682
 
 
The normative discourse and advocacy in Turkish foreign policy has been prevalent on the 
Turkish government’s domestic policy as well. The AKP has used such discourse a 
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number of times, particularly before elections. For instance, it often depicts its followers as 
people that had been “oppressed,” “discriminated,” and whose “rights had been violated” 
by previous administrations.
683
 It also draws a parallel between its “oppressed” followers 
and the “oppressed Muslims” around the world. Similarly, some of Turkey’s missed 
opportunities have been attributed to the “unfairness” of the international community or 
external actors rather than its own shortcomings by policy makers. For instance, regarding 
the lack of Turkey’s mediation in Egypt Haşimi contends that,  
The order logic of events is constantly interpreted on behalf of Israel at 
the international equation. This is a wrong and unfair interpretation. The 
statements about Egypt are in a similar vein. For instance, they say, 
“Turkey could have mediated the Egyptian dispute but the opportunity 
has been missed due to the harsh statements by its prime minister.” Now, 
our foreign minister has explained, our prime minister has explained, our 
deputy undersecretary [of Prime Ministry] İbrahim Kalın has explained. 
They have given a number of examples from the talks. The Council of 
Wisemen [on Egypt] has come [to Turkey] and a roadmap of seven 
articles has been agreed upon to be conveyed to the Egyptian side. A 
council of 6-7 people including Amr Moussa came here representing the 
Arab League. It was said [by the Turkish representatives] that a process 
which would engage the parties into dialogue should be initiated to avoid 
its evolution towards a negative process. But none of the promises were 
kept.
684
 
 
The above discussion also suggests another insight with respect to Turkey’s mediation 
which is its lack of ability to influence the parties. Unlike the US, Turkey lacks sufficient 
leverage to make its voice heard over which inter alia is indicative of the limits of its soft 
power. 
Although the discourses of policy makers is normative, Turkey’s foreign policy has so far 
been more pragmatic than normative.
685
 Gezer pinpoints similarly that Turkey’s efforts 
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“are not just about altruism that aims to bring justice to the entire world. There is a 
dimension to it that is directly related to national interest.”686 He further highlights that,  
The emphasis we [foreign policy makers] put on values in an accelerating 
tone would overlap with Turkey’s interest in the long run. As an actor 
that defends values and follows a consistent policy within this 
framework, and as a constructive actor on the regional level, we believe 
that Turkey’s emphasises leave positive marks on the parties. Our prime 
minister and other policy makers have been putting an emphasis on 
justice since the past which is a consistent approach with the value-based 
foreign policy. The emphasis on values in a way helps you find your 
course in a turbulent sea amid a period of regional and systemic 
transformation. It enables you to put forth certain values and follow a 
consistent approach instead of changing position according to 
conjunctural circumstances. Mediation is not too different than this.
687
 
 
Haşimi postulates in a similar vein by noting that, 
Those who discuss and criticize Turkish foreign policy claim that Turkey 
pursues politics of ideology and does not think around the concept of 
interest. A state thinks around the concept of interest. Everyone thinks 
around this concept wherever there is politics. But the problem is how we 
define interest; what interest is. I do not think like the white Western 
man; like the rational man. He has an issue of military power derived 
from patriarchy. The issue of “We are the most powerful nation, we have 
the missiles,” and so on.688 
 
Haşimi’s quote is also indicative of how Turkey uses this normative discourse to construct 
its non-Western identity. It also emphasizes the importance of soft power against the hard 
military power and degrades rationality as a quality. However, this critical discourse may 
be serving as a facilitative device for Turkey to legitimize its policies domestically as well 
as regionally. Yet, the extent to which Turkey’s normative discourse and its claim to be 
offering something new and alternative to “Western” practices contributes to its mediation 
seems to be contestable.   
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4.4.5 Progress of Mediators 
As discussed in Chapter 2, progress of mediators refers to their ability to achieve their 
initial motives to mediate a given talk. There is no doubt that a full-fledged resolution of 
the conflict with an agreed upon agreement, as well as its implementation, was what 
Turkey hoped to achieve in mediating the conflict. However, the talks were suspended and 
Turkey failed to achieve this goal. Yet, owing to the talks, Turkey was able to earn a 
certain level of reputation and legitimacy as a mediator in the region. In fact, the Syrian-
Israeli talks, and the Iranian nuclear talks, became its most remembered mediation attempts 
in the region. Turkey made fame as a trustable and committed mediator.
689
 As such, it may 
be argued that, to a certain extent, Turkey was able to achieve its motive of “search for 
prestige” in the region. Furthermore, at the time, the talks also helped Turkey to further 
enhance its relations with Syria. As such, political and economic relations flourished as a 
result of the talks, which was another motive for Turkey to mediate the talks. 
However, the eventual failure of the talks had negative consequences on Turkey’s motive 
to ‘bring order, security, and stability’ to the region. In fact, despite other reasons, 
Turkey’s relations with Israel were strained partially as a result of the talks. Furthermore, 
had the talks reached a comprehensive resolution, this could have ended Syria’s 
international isolation, pushed its government towards reforms, and perhaps prevented the 
current crisis in the country, which has had dire regional consequences. Similarly, the 
failure of the talks also halted Turkey’s other motives such as ensuring energy security or 
diminishing Iran’s influence in the region. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that, owing to the talks, Turkey was able to help build a 
certain level of confidence between the two parties at the time. The resumption of the 
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negotiations after years of suspension may be seen as a progress. In addition, Turkey also 
brought direct talks into the agenda after seven years of suspension. According to Turkish 
officials, the Syrian-Israeli talks under Turkey’s mediation ended right before reaching a 
peace deal. The parties had reached consensus on several articles before the talks ended.
690
 
Erdoğan argues that, during their meeting, Olmert promised him that Gaza would not face 
a humanitarian crisis.
691
 Erdoğan was disappointed and upset that the crisis broke out right 
after Olmert's promise and the bilateral relations began to decline. Erdoğan notes that, 
"Olmert's last sentence (as he left meetings in Ankara) was, ‘As soon as I get back I will 
consult with my colleagues and get back to you.’ As I waited for his response, on 
December 27, bombs started falling on Gaza."
692
 Subsequently, Turkey’s mediator role 
was suspended indefinitely and despite Davutoğlu’s call for the resumption of this role 
during the brief negotiations in 2010, Israel preferred the US as the mediator. This is also 
indicative of the limits of Turkey’s power and what Turkish mediation has achieved.  
When compared to Turkey, the US seems to have achieved more progress as a mediator 
such as convincing the parties to commence direct talks. This was a considerable progress 
given the previous lack of any diplomatic relations. As Cobban highlights, the Madrid 
Conference “was the first time that an official from the Syrian Arab Republic had ever, in 
the forty-three years of Israel’s existence as a modern state, sat down openly with Israeli 
negotiators to discuss a final resolution of the conflict between them.”693 
In addition to achieving direct talks, US mediation also resulted in a disengagement 
agreement between Syria and Israel. As Asaf pinpoints, “Although limited, the two 
disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt in January 1974 and September 1975, 
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and the one between Israel and Syria in May 1974, resulted for the first time the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory.”694 However, although there have been 
some progress throughout the years, the fact that the US failed to thoroughly resolve the 
conflict, despite having mediated for a lot longer period of time than Turkey, raises 
questions regarding its mediation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks in order to 
understand to what extent it was able to mediate differently compared to the US. The 
chapter found that, Turkey’s acceptance of mediating the Syrian-Israeli talks was in line 
with its new regional policy which entailed a proactive approach towards the surrounding 
problems in order to help establish "a region of trade and an island of peace.”695  
As such, the evidence demonstrated in this chapter confirmed the finding in Chapter 3 
arguing that mediating the Syrian-Israeli talks was also part of a process of identity 
construction as a reliable, credible and capable actor, which then would help Turkey to 
boost its regional influence. This was also a result of the increasing role of soft-power in 
Turkish foreign policy in recent years. In addition, its mediator role emerged as a result of 
the relational links and the level of trust it was able to build with Syria which is indicative 
of the success of its regional policy at the time. 
Turkey was an emerging mediator that was new in the field with limited experience. In 
addition, it lacked sufficient institutionalization and capacity in mediation. Although policy 
makers are aware of this, they attribute the failure of Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-
Israeli talks to external factors such as lack of willingness of the parties towards resolution. 
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Turkey is also faced with the danger of the spill over of the surrounding conflicts as a 
result of its geographical proximity and close historical, social, political and economic ties 
with the region. This would also have a negative impact on the image Turkey has been 
trying to build as a secure and reliable energy transit route in the region. 
Turkey’s lack of sufficient hard power to twist arms or offer incentives came to fore as an 
important difference in this chapter when compared with the US. The study found that US 
ability to offer incentives, twist Israel’s arm and offer security reassurance provided it with 
a more stable mediator role over the course of the Arab-Israeli peace process and helped it 
achieve partial results. In this respect, contrary to the mainstream mediation literature that 
praises the importance of neutrality and impartiality, leverage came to fore as a more 
important element for mediation in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, Turkey 
had to be more persuasive and rely more on its discursive power. In this respect, Turkish 
“difference” is perhaps a way for Turkish policy makers to manage their own lack of 
power while maximising their influence in the region. 
The Syrian-Israeli case also validates that culture was important in the acceptance of 
Turkey’s mediator role both by the parties and in the region.  Turkey gained its legitimacy 
as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks from its dual identity which is both Western and 
non-Western. This dual identity played an important role by raising Turkey’s credibility in 
Syria as a possible actor that could help reintegrate it into the international system and in 
Israel as a trustable Western ally that is able to access all actors in the region including 
those such as Hezbollah or Hamas. In this respect, Turkey’s presented insiderness and its 
all-inclusive style of diplomacy came to fore as important assets as a mediator. The fact 
that Turkey had improved its relations with Syria at a time when the US still considered 
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the latter a “rogue state” also enhanced its legitimacy as a mediator which signalled an 
increased level of self-confidence on Turkey’s part. 
In terms of its progress, despite the suspension of the talks, Turkey was able to gain a 
certain amount of reputation and legitimacy as a mediator in the region as a result of the 
talks. However although its mediator role enabled Turkey to enhance its relations with 
Syria, its relations with Israel were significantly strained, partially as a result of the 
suspension of the talks which poses an example to understand how mediation cannot be 
analysed in a vacuum, in isolation from the political context. As such, it may be argued 
that, Turkey achieved partial results with its mediation. 
However, the fact that Israel preferred the US to Turkey during the brief 2010 peace talks 
with Syria is indicative of a missed opportunity with respect to Turkey’s mediation. It also 
gives clues about the limits of Turkey’s ability to convince the parties into a resolution. 
Therefore, when contrasted to the extensive diplomatic, military and economic resources 
available to the US, Turkey’s power as a mediator is limited. Furthermore, the extent of 
independence that it is willing to operate with, the contentious attitude it adopts, and the 
fact that it is an insider to the conflict that has vested interests in its outcome require a 
certain level of power which Turkey lacks. As such, the study found that Turkey cannot act 
too independently in its region against the US will. It needs the US support in its mediation 
since the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflicts have always wanted the guarantee of the latter 
in peace talks. 
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CHAPTER 5 – TURKEY’S MEDIATION IN SOMALIA 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Turkey’s mediator role in Somalia which has been ongoing since 
2012.
696
 This role was requested by the governments of Somalia and Somaliland, and as 
argued by Turkish diplomats, its large scale presence and commitment during and after the 
famine 2011 triggered such demand by positioning Turkey as a trustable actor in the 
country.
697
 Turkey’s then Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia during the 
deadly famine in 2011, as the first non-African leader to visit the country in 20 years. His 
visit triggered the flow of substantial Turkish aid into the country in a relatively short time, 
which played a significant role in the development of its mediator role in the country.
698
 As 
such, Turkey’s sudden robust interest in Somalia should be seen as part of its broader 
Africa policy which was reignited following the declaration of 2005 as “Year of Africa,” 
aiming to flourish political, economic and social relations with the continent. 
Understanding Turkey’s mediator role in Somalia is important since the Somali case 
comprises an example of an intrastate conflict. It also enables the thesis to examine, not 
just mediation between two states but also types of mediation conducted on regional and 
grassroots levels among different actors such as clans or opinion leaders, which offers 
different avenues to analyse Turkish mediation.  
Somalia is a very different example from the Syrian-Israeli case, and a very different 
environment, in which Turkey could mediate. The Somali case comprises a worthy area of 
study to examine how Turkey utilizes mediation as a tool of extending into new regions 
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that are not in its immediate neighbourhood. Mediation was one of the tools that Turkey 
used in order to achieve its policy of normalization in Somalia through the eradication of 
problems. This would then enable Turkey to increase its influence in the country as well as 
in Africa. Turkey would largely benefit from a stable Somalia and mediation enables it to 
present itself as a trustable and responsible actor. Somalia also sets a case for investigating 
the role of non-state actors such as humanitarian NGOs and businesses in Turkey’s peace 
initiatives. The Somali experience also offers an opportunity to examine the understanding 
of Turkish foreign policy makers which considers mediation in a broader sense or as a 
“package”699 that includes several supportive means such as humanitarian assistance and 
development aid. What role do these different means play in Turkey’s mediation? How 
and why Turkish policy makers refer to Turkish mediation as a “package”? 
In order to deepen the understanding on Turkey’s mediation, the chapter also draws some 
comparisons to British and Norwegian mediation in this country, asking whether Turkey 
could be said to have a different style of mediation to these countries with more established 
mediation records. While examining British mediation offers an opportunity to reflect on 
Turkey’s mediator role against a former great power, Norwegian mediation sets an 
example to small-state mediation that is also involved more on the level of grassroots. 
The chapter first analyses the background of the conflict. It then briefly analyses past 
attempts for mediation in Somalia and why these attempts failed. After a brief introduction 
of the mediation initiatives of Turkey, Britain and Norway, the chapter dwells deeper into 
Turkish mediation by drawing on the indicators discussed in Chapter 2. These include 
previous experiences of mediators, mediator’s motives, characteristics of mediators, their 
style of mediation, means supportive of mediation, and finally the progress of mediators. 
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5.2 Background on the Conflict in Somalia 
This section aims to give a brief background on the conflict in Somalia by examining its 
causes, actors, context and dynamics. Since the Somali case consists of a number of sub-
conflicts, it is difficult to identify common issues pertaining to all conflicts. As such, 
unlike in Chapter 4, there will not be a separate section on “Issues of the Conflict.” As a 
summary, Turkey’s mediation between Somalia and Somaliland has so far focused on 
promoting dialogue between the parties, distribution of international aid, and cooperation 
on security issues.
700
 These issues will be discussed in different intervals throughout the 
theses. 
A country labelled as “the most failed state,”701 Somalia is faced with a number of 
problems that have triggered various conflicts including the longest civil war of the post-
Cold War era. It had been ruled by nomadic and clan based, decentralised rulers until 
Britain colonized what is now Somaliland and Italy colonized the south-central part of the 
country in late 19
th
 century. In 1960 the country was decolonized and the British and 
Italian territories unified as Somali Republic until the military coup d'état of 1969 
orchestrated by General Mohamed Siad Barre.  
As with the rest of Africa, colonialism is a serious baggage for Somalia. One of the 
outcomes of colonialism was the sloppy drawing of borders in Africa. As a consequence, 
Somali people were split into four different countries including Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti 
and Somalia. According to Mengisteab, “the partition of ethnic groups into different 
countries often involves the disruption of social and cultural ties.”702 As Mengisteab 
further pinpoints, “partitioned ethnic identities tend to face relatively greater levels of 
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marginalization, ethnic struggles and civil wars.”703 During the Cold War, Somalia also 
became a zone of proxy wars between the USSR and the US such as the Ethio-Somali War 
of 1977-1978.
704
 
Somalia was dragged into civil war in 1988 as a result of uprisings by several clan-based 
armed groups who also founded the Somali National Movement against the military 
regime of Mohamed Siad Barre.
705
 The collapse of Barre’s regime in 1991 created a power 
vacuum that triggered conflict. In 1992 the UN intervened via the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia, a humanitarian mission, and the Unified Task Force, a peacekeeping 
taskforce. However, it had to withdraw from the country following the failure of the US-
led Operation Restore Hope.
706
 
5.2.1 Actors of the Conflict 
In ethnic conflicts it is often a difficult task to identify the actors and the identification 
itself may yield controversy and affect the outcome of the peace process since gaining 
recognition may often be one of the reasons for conflict. However, defining actors 
accurately is central to the efficient resolution of a given conflict. As also discussed in 
Chapter, it is also important in understanding how mediators may relate to these actors or 
how whether they include them in the peace process, which would then give clues 
regarding their mediation approaches. 
Despite several different actors that had been influential across the years, the main actors 
may be summarized as the various Somali central governments, the regional autonomous 
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administrations, such as Somaliland, established by the various clans, and the rebel militia 
groups, such as Al Shabaab. 
The central governments are the administrations that are internationally recognized as the 
legitimate representatives of the Somali people such as the current Federal Government of 
Somalia. These governments are unrecognized by some militia groups, clans or regional 
authorities, which is one of the causes of the conflict.  
The civil war resulted in the establishment of regional autonomous administrations by 
various clans such as the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalia founded in 1998 in 
the Northeastern part of the country, Galmudug in central Somalia, the Republic of 
Somaliland self-declared in the Northwestern part of the country, and smaller regions such 
as Ximan, Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a and Xeeb. While Somaliland707 is seeking international 
recognition as a unitary state, Puntland, Galmadug and others consider themselves as parts 
of the Federal State of Somalia.
708
 Considering itself as the successor state to the British 
Somaliland protectorate, Somaliland has been one of the parties of the peace talks 
conducted by Turkey, and Britain.  
Another group of actors are the rebel militia groups such as the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Somalia, the Islamic Courts Union, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab that fight 
the central governments to exert influence and control over a certain or the entire territory 
of Somalia. Since these groups are numerous in number, this study takes Al-Shabaab, or 
the Youth, as the main focus since it is the only one of these groups that participated in the 
talks that Turkey has mediated so far. 
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Founded in 2006, Al-Shabaab is currently assumed to control a third of Somalia, mainly 
the south-central part of the country.
709
 The official cause of Al-Shabaab is to defeat the 
central government, the African Union Mission, “seize power throughout Somalia, 
reincorporate Somali-inhabited areas of Kenya and Ethiopia, and create an Islamic 
caliphate.”710 It announced its merger with al-Qaida in 2012 and is considered a “terrorist 
organization” by a number of Western states including Britain and Norway. 
Al Shabaab has a decentralized structure led by its leader Ahmed Godane. As Jackson and 
Aynte argue, the group considers itself as a “government in waiting”711 and is a significant 
gatekeeper in the country especially for humanitarian aid agencies operating on the ground. 
It has an Office for the Supervision of the Affairs of Foreign Agencies that regulates the 
activities of the humanitarian aid agencies through its Humanitarian Coordination Office 
whose duty is “to negotiate access, collect ‘taxes’ and monitor aid agency activities.”712 
With regards its perception of foreign humanitarian NGOs, an official of Al-Shabaab 
notes, “whether they call themselves humanitarian or not, we know who they are: they are 
the civilian face of the infidel forces.”713 
5.2.2 The Context and Dynamics of the Conflict 
The context of the Somali conflict is determined by clan clashes, extreme poverty, frequent 
famines, and political struggles both on national and regional levels. There is also a serious 
problem in centre-periphery relations as a result of issues of legitimacy and 
disconnectedness. The volatile political climate in the country was coupled with the deadly 
famine as a result of the 2011 East Africa Drought, the worst drought of the last sixty 
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years. The drought only added to Somalia’s problems by creating health problems, a 
refugee crisis as well as economic and political problems affecting more than 40 per cent 
of the population.
714
 
It would be misleading to analyse the Somali conflict without understanding the regional 
context. The Eritrean – Ethiopian War of 1998-2000 and its repercussions have had 
negative consequences on Somalia. According to a report by NUPI, Somalia has turned 
into a venue of a proxy war between these states in addition to becoming “one of the 
battlefields of the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ and the accompanying struggle to 
contain radical Islam.”715  
Somalia has become a venue of proxy wars between Ethiopia, Egypt and the Gulf states as 
well. According to Menkhaus, while “Arab states seek a strong central Somali state to 
counterbalance and outflank Ethiopia; Ethiopia seeks a weak, decentralized client state, 
and is willing to settle for ongoing state collapse rather than risk a revived Arab-backed 
government in Mogadishu.”716 This rivalry further adds to the intractability of the conflict 
in Somalia. 
The nature of the Somali conflict indicates an issue of sovereignty, territory, natural 
resources and security. It is an intrastate conflict involving a range of actors and the quality 
of communication between the parties is poor. The conflict is fluctuating, protracted, 
dynamic and multidimensional. According to former Turkish Ambassador to Mogadishu, 
Kani Torun, in the Somali conflict, “there is a resource factor, there is a clan factor, there is 
an ideology issue, there is a foreign interest factor, there is a leadership factor or a lack of 
                                                     
714
 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, “DFID’s Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of 
Africa,” 2. See also, UNHCR, “Ethiopia Opens New Camp for Somali Refugees,” December 2011, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ed8d89a6.html (accessed January 13, 2014). 
715
 Axel Borchgrevink and Jon Harald Sande Lie, “Regional Conflicts and International Engagement on the 
Horn of Africa,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Report, 2009, 21. 
716
 Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, 9. 
201 
 
leadership factor, there is the absence of state institutions factor and there is the issue of 
shifting alliances.”717 These factors make it difficult to bring about normalization in 
Somalia. 
5.3 Mediation in Somalia 
There have been various mediation attempts in the Somali conflict on local, regional and 
national levels by various mediators such as Djibouti, the UN, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, 
Yemen, the IGAD and the Arab League.
718
 Most of these attempts failed to bring about 
long lasting peace. Hilde F. Johnson, former Minister of International Development of 
Norway and Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United 
Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, argues that “Individual leaders’ choices 
on whether to engage seriously in a peace process always involve their respective domestic 
political agendas.”719  
Domestic voices in Somalia, on the other hand, often blame outsiders for having their own 
agendas and interests in the country that ultimately hamper peace. Ethiopia, in this respect, 
is one of the most frequently blamed scapegoats.
720
 For instance, an anonymous Somali 
NGO representative argues that interference of external actors made the Somali conflict 
more complex leading to the failure of the mediation attempts. He also notes that the 
polarization within Somalia is another element that hampered the peace process.
721
 
According to Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein, Executive Director of Watchful Association 
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for Relief and Development, having a Muslim identity is one of the reasons why Somalia’s 
neighbours turn against it, as they are all non-Muslim.
722
 
Other critics blame the lack of sufficient international will and commitment to restoring 
peace in Somalia. For instance, while the UN is often blamed for arriving too late in the 
country, the US is blamed for lacking enough will for peacemaking in Somalia.
723
 In 
addition, while some critics blame lack of sufficient insight by the mediators into the 
realities of Somalia, others suggest inadequate security measures taken to secure the 
negotiations.
724
 As such, opinions on the failure of previous talks in Somalia vary 
considerably. 
The following section will give a brief account of mediation attempts by Britain, Turkey 
and Norway in Somalia in order to sharpen the understanding on Turkish mediation and 
draw inferences on the ways that it is able to mediate differently. 
5.3.1 British Mediation in Somalia 
 
Britain mediated between Somalia and Somaliland on June 20, 2012 in London following 
the First London Conference on Somalia. The talks were sponsored by the British 
government and the EU. The delegations from Somalia and Somaliland were appointed by 
the presidents of the two states Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Ahmed Mohamed 
Silanyo respectively. The Somali delegation was led by Somalia's Minister of Interior and 
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National Security Abdisamad Maalim Mohamud while the Somaliland delegation was led 
by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Abdullahi Omar.
725
 
Some of the issues discussed were the secession of Somaliland from Somalia; the 
acknowledgement of the massacre of Somalilanders allegedly staged by the Somali 
military regime between 1988 and 1991; the encouragement of dialogue between the 
parties; facilitation and distribution of international aid; and security cooperation on issues 
such as extremism, piracy, and the environment.
726
  
Subsequently, the parties published a joint declaration in Dubai on June 28, 2012 aiming 
“to formally endorse the process of the talks between the two sides.”727 Originally they 
were meant to involve six mediators including Britain, Turkey, Norway, South Africa, the 
EU and Switzerland. Although the process started under Britain’s mediation, according to 
Thomas Wheeler, Conflict and Security Adviser at Saferworld, there is a perception among 
some circles in Somaliland that Turkey hijacked the process.
728
 An anonymous Turkish 
diplomat rejects this assertion by arguing that it is not possible for Turkey to hijack the 
process since the parties themselves requested its mediation in the first place.
729
 
Alternatively, Ahmed argues that Britain ceased to be a mediator in the talks after 
Somaliland’s rejection to attend the Second London Conference on Somalia.730 
Subsequently, Britain pressured Somaliland either to attend the conference or agree to have 
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talks with the Somali Federal Government before the conference. Britain suggested the 
mediation of “Qatar, UAE or Turkey to avoid that new talks might taint London 
atmosphere days before the London Conference II.”731 Consequently, Somalia and 
Somaliland chose Turkey as a mediator for the peace talks and, in line with Britain’s 
suggestion; the final communiqué was drafted by Turkey, Britain, Somali Federal 
Government and Somaliland.
732
 
Britain’s involvement on the grassroots level is minimal. Saferworld, a British NGO, is the 
only British originated organization which carries out a project that targets the grassroots 
in collaboration with the EU and the Department for International Development (DFID). 
As part of the project, public consultation meetings are held among civil society actors. 
According to Mohamed Hussein Enow, Somalia/ Somaliland Field Coordinator at 
Saferworld, non-state actors are brought together from Somaliland, Puntland and South-
Central Somalia through three “non-state actor platforms” that includes Somalia South-
Central Non State Actors, Puntland Non State Actors Association and Somaliland Non 
State Actors Forum.
733
 
5.3.2 Turkish Mediation in Somalia 
 
As part of its peacemaking attempts in Somalia, Turkey hosted two international 
conferences aiming to bring together different actors from Somalia and end Somalia’s 
isolation on the international platform by raising awareness about the famine and the 
ongoing conflict in the country. Among these, the 2
nd
 Istanbul Conference on Somalia that 
was held on May 31 - June 1, 2012 was particularly important in that it brought together 
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representatives from various segments of the Somali society including 300 civil society 
representatives and 135 traditional elders from Somalia, Somaliland, Ximan, Xeeb, 
Puntland, Galmudug and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a.
734
 
Turkey has conducted a total of four rounds of talks between the Somali government and 
Somaliland. The first round of talks took place on April 12-14, 2013 when the President of 
Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the President of Somaliland, Ahmed Mahamoud 
Silanyo, were brought together in Ankara by then Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Turkish 
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.  
The Ankara meeting was the first meeting between Somalia and Somaliland at the 
presidential level initiated upon mutual request from the parties and resulted in the signing 
of the Ankara Communiqué.735 The meeting aimed “to reopen the dialogue after the 
change in the leadership of the Somali Federal Republic, and to establish a way forward 
for the dialogue.”736 It also aimed to galvanize international development aid to 
Somaliland, establish cooperation between the governments of Somalia and Somaliland on 
security issues to fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, toxic dumping, 
maritime crime and serious crime.
737
  
 
The second round of talks took place in Istanbul on July 7-9, 2013 resulting in the signing 
of Istanbul Declaration. While the Somali delegation was headed by then Minister of 
Interior Abdikarim Hussein Guled, the Somaliland delegation was headed by then Minister 
of Commerce Mohammad Abdullahi Omar. The third round of talks was held in Istanbul 
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on January 16-19, 2014 resulting in the signing of the II. Istanbul Declaration.
738
  The 
Somali delegation was headed by Guled while the Somaliland delegation was headed by 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Bihi Yonis. The fourth round of talks took place on 
March 1-3, 2015 in Istanbul.
739
 
 
Apart from these main talks, the civilian aviation representatives of the parties also met in 
Istanbul on April 4, 2014 to discuss technical issues on civil aviation.
740
 Parties also came 
together in Dubai on December 21, 2014 to express their willingness to proceed with the 
fourth round of talks.
741
 The seeds of these meetings were sown on July 7-9, 2013, when 
parties came together in Istanbul as a follow up of the Ankara meeting.
742
 Turkey also 
mediated between the Somali government and Al-Shabaab. The talks took place in the 
form of indirect talks under Turkey’s mediation and Norway’s support. During the process, 
Turkey and Norway collaborated in disengaging the leader of Hezbul Islam and his party 
from Al-Shabaab to foster his entry into the government.
743
  
5.3.3 Norwegian Mediation in Somalia 
 
Norwegian mediation in Somalia takes place mainly on the grassroots level. Norwegian 
organizations conduct workshops and trainings on mediation and conflict resolution to 
teachers, opinion leaders, traditional elders and the Somali diaspora. One such project 
carried out by Norway in cooperation with the University of Somalia aimed to build 
mediation and conflict resolution capacity around the city of Baidoa and “contribute to 
promoting peaceful and religious co-existence and prevent extremism in the 
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population.”744 Similarly, Norwegian Church Aid conducts projects to promote the roles of 
Somali authority figures, such as religious and traditional leaders, in terms of their roles in 
conflict resolution and mediation inter alia to educate and mobilize Somalis in combating 
piracy in Puntland.
745
 
Norway also organizes workshops within Norway to train influential Somali diaspora 
figures in conflict resolution and mediation. One such initiative was the visit paid by the 
Somali Institute for Peace Research, a Minnesota based non-profit Somali group, to Oslo 
to attend a one-week program with Norwegian peacemaking experts including former 
Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, who was the UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa in 2006-2007, members of the Oslo Center for Peace 
and Human Rights and the Nansen Center for Peace and Dialogue as well as the leading 
figures of the Somali community in Norway.
746
 
The Nansen Center brought together members of the Somali Diaspora in Norway from 
clashing clans in Somalia such as the Hawiye and Daord.
747
 The aim of these meetings is 
“creating a neutral space in which the different parties can meet, as well as providing 
useful training, for example in dialogue skills.”748 Norway’s Directorate of Integration and 
Diversity funded the meetings and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also 
involved in the organization process.
749
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Engaging the Somali diaspora is an important feature of Norwegian peacemaking in 
Somalia. A Norwegian policy paper notes, “Norwegian society will benefit from a policy 
that utilises the positive effects of migration, for example through increased participation 
in foreign policy and development cooperation.”750 Diaspora engagement brings in 
knowledge on the culture and language of the field, transnational networks, bridging 
function, long-term commitment, motivation, access to inaccessible zones and legitimacy 
of external engagement.
751
 For instance, unlike other Norwegian organizations, the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is able to operate in South/Central Somalia through its 
Norwegian staff with Somali origin.
752
 This would enable Norway both to have a better 
cultural and social outreach and also help in overcoming the prejudice against “the white 
man.” 
5.4 Turkey’s Difference as a Mediator in Somalia 
This section aims to deepen the understanding on the ways that Turkey was able to mediate 
differently than Britain and Norway in Somalia by drawing on different indicators brought 
out in Chapter 2.  
5.4.1 Previous Experience of the Mediator 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkey lacks experience, institutions, technical assistance and 
capacity with respect to mediation. According to Jamal Mohamed Barrow, former Somali 
Deputy Foreign Minister, “Westerners have a lot of details about the Somalis. So, the 
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Turkish should do the same. They must understand. They must learn about Somalis. They 
must get more information about the Somalis.”753  
In addition to its lack of sufficient experience in mediation, Somalia is also a new arena for 
Turkey. Despite historical links dating back to the Ottoman Empire, the bilateral relations 
have flourished only in the last couple of years. As a result, Turkey lacks sufficient 
knowledge about the local dynamics. For instance, regarding Turkey’s confusion with 
respect to the titles of the people invited to the 2
nd
 Istanbul Conference on Somalia, Barrow 
notes, “Some that were invited [to the conference] as elders were actually politicians; some 
invited civil society members were politicians. Why? Because you [Turkey] do not know 
who is who.”754 
According to anonymous Turkish diplomat 2, Turkey needs urgent capacity building in 
mediation in order for its mediator role to be sustainable.
755
 Despite the fact that it is rather 
new in Somalia, Turkey has become very active in the country in a relatively short period 
of time. Turkey had been in Somalia since 1980s however its embassy was closed 
following the outbreak of the civil war. On the non-state level Turkey has been operating 
in Somalia for about 15 years, IHH being the first Turkish NGO to arrive in the country.
756
 
Compared with Turkey, Britain has more experience as a mediator. It has mediated a 
number of conflicts throughout the history. Some of the early accounts are its mediation 
between Imperial Russia and Persian Empire during the Russo-Persian War which 
concluded with the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813,
757
 between Spain and its colonies in 1811-
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1813,
758
 during the American Civil War in 1862,
759
 in the Vilnius dispute between Poland 
and Lithuania in 1923,
760
 and in the Indo-Pakistani clash over the Rann of Kutch region in 
1965.
761
  
Similarly, although Norway’s mediation history is relatively newer, it has considerable 
experience in the field and takes the lead as a mediator among European small-states. 
According to a report by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has the largest annual 
budget for mediation among European small-states with around 90 million Euros 
(2009).
762
  
Furthermore, Norway invests considerably in expertise and institutionalization with respect 
to mediation. At the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, the institutionalization process is often 
complemented by close collaboration with relevant NGOs for capacity building, including 
trainings for official personnel as well as relevant stakeholders in conflict zones.
763
 
5.4.2 Mediator’s Motives 
As noted in Chapter 2, states often have interests when they embark on peacemaking 
missions. As discussed in earlier chapters, in line with the principles such as multi-
dimensionalism and proactivism of its new foreign policy, Turkey has become more active 
in distant regions. As such, Turkey’s Somali initiative should be viewed as part of its 
search for a role in new arenas such as Africa. Although parts of Africa used to belong to 
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the Ottoman Empire, these lands were lost during World War I. Turkey lacked interest in 
the continent until 1998 and a process of rapprochement began in 2005 which was declared 
as “Year of Africa.”764 Consequently the number of Turkish embassies in Africa has risen 
from 12 in 2005 to 39 in 2015.
765
  
Africa is an important venue for emerging powers with vast potential as a dynamic market 
with various natural resources and a dense population. Turkey’s priorities in Africa are to 
establish high-level political dialogue, develop economic relations through business 
channels, and to foster the involvement of non-governmental organizations.
766
 Strategies 
such as developing strong relations with the Horn of Africa and influential countries such 
as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania, Sudan and South Africa; having widespread diplomatic 
representations; establishing high-level dialogue with Africa’s international 
organizations,
767
 the most important being the African Union are important thereof.  
As Haşimi notes, taking on a leading role in mediation and peace processes means 
strengthening and extending your area of influence.
768
 Mediation is among Turkey’s 
important policy tools in Africa. Turkey has so far mediated in Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea, 
and in Mali.
769
 Mediation comes to the fore as a legitimate policy tool for Turkey and also 
offers a legitimate ground for its activities in a region from which it has been distant for 
several decades. To that end, the role of peacemaker offers Turkey a safe entry into a 
region where politics is often defined by volatility. It also offers Turkey regional and 
international visibility and leverage on the continent in addition to domestically 
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legitimizing its activities beyond its borders. Somalia sets an example for understanding 
Turkey’s engagement with regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. While at times 
this engagement manifests itself simply as political or economic relations, at other times it 
is embedded in Turkey’s peacemaking efforts.770 
Turkey’s role as a mediator in Somalia also coincided with its non-permanent membership 
in the UN Security Council, which furthered its initiative. Furthermore, African votes are 
important for Turkey in its international endeavours, such as the non-permanent Security 
Council seat in the UN
771
 or the Cyprus issue.
772
 As such, one of the aims and intended 
outcomes of Turkey’s Somali initiative may be to secure Somali votes on pertinent issues. 
Barrow suggests that a similar advantage can be achieved by Turkey by paying the 
contribution fees for Somalia to have a seat in international forums, which could secure 
Somali votes.
773
 
In addition to political interests, Turkey also has economic interests in Somalia as an 
unexploited market for its emerging businesses in search of new markets. Most of these 
businesses are active in the construction sector, and post-conflict countries offer ideal 
zones to secure new deals. Somalia is an emerging market for Turkey, with significant 
mineral resources, including iron, titanium and uranium. It is also estimated to have a 
considerable amount of untapped gas and oil reserves.
774
 Somalia also has a strategic 
location in the Horn of Africa that makes it a gateway to the rest of the continent. The 
power vacuum in the country creates an opportunity for foreign investors. Providing peace 
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and stability in the country is crucial in tackling the issue of on-going piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Arabian Sea.  
Turkey, Britain and Norway have similar official policies in Somalia. Britain’s Somali 
policy is based on four main pillars including supporting development; increasing 
international support; reducing conflict and increasing stability; and providing 
humanitarian assistance.
775
 Norway has similar policies such as rebuilding; good 
government; support to local capacity building; prevention of humanitarian catastrophes; 
and peace and reconciliation.
776
 Likewise, Turkey’s policies include eliminating Somalia’s 
international isolation; providing intensive and comprehensive humanitarian aid; 
rebuilding the infrastructure by realizing medium and long-term development projects; 
helping to restore security in the country by supporting Somali security forces and the 
African Union Mission in Somalia
777
 and supporting the process of political consensus and 
state building in the country.
778
 
Security is vital in post-conflict zones for a range of reasons such as ensuring the delivery 
of the aid, the security of the people in need of the aid and the security of the aid personnel. 
Turkey, Britain and Norway all consider restoring security a top priority in Somalia and a 
prerequisite for peace. Tackling extremism, fighting piracy and preventing illegal 
migration from Somalia are among both Britain and Norway’s security priorities in the 
country which have direct consequences on their domestic security as a result of 
immigration they receive from Somalia. 
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The characterization of collapsed states as challenges to international peace and security 
has portrayed them “as threats to international security in the broadest sense of the word – 
as breeding-grounds for disease, refugee flows, arms-trafficking, transnational crime, 
environmental destruction, regional instability and other problems.”779 This type of 
portrayal is often overemphasized by the international community as an excuse to 
legitimize its interventions into post-conflict zones. 
According to Wheeler, national security, its wider anti-terrorism strategy and promoting 
stability overseas are some of the most important motives of Britain in Somalia.
780
 Being 
the largest funder of AMISOM, Britain’s main “goal is to help Somalia move beyond a 
situation which requires humanitarian support and peace enforcement, and address threats 
to Britain from terrorism, piracy and migration.”781 According to a report by DFID, 
Somalia is a priority country for the UK National Security Council.
782
 In the words of 
British Prime Minister David Cameron,  
Somalia is a failed state that directly threatens British interests. Tourists and aid 
workers kidnapped. Young British minds poisoned by radicalism. Mass migration. 
Vital trade routes disrupted. Meanwhile Somalis themselves suffer extreme famine, 
made worse by violence and some of the worst poverty on earth. We shouldn’t tolerate 
this. Somali pirates aren’t invincible: they are violent and lawless men in small boats 
and it is time we properly stood up to them. That’s why British vessels can now carry 
arms. But there is a real and pressing need to pull together the international effort. 
That is why Britain will host a major conference in London next year, to focus 
attention on protecting merchant ships passing through the Gulf of Aden, tackling 
pirates, pressurising the extremists, supporting countries in the region and addressing 
the causes of conflict and instability in Somalia.
783
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Both Norway and Britain are important recruitment venues for Al-Shabaab.
784
 The Somali 
community in Britain is the largest in Europe with around 250.000 members in total.
785
 
According to Former Minister of British State for Africa, Asia and the United Nations 
Lord Mark Malloch Brown, “The main terrorist threat comes from Pakistan and Somalia – 
not Afghanistan.”786 Former British Ambassador to Somalia (1987-1989) Jeremy Varcoe 
also notes that fighting extremism is a significant motive for Britain in the country, “We 
are in Somalia partly for our own security. British government is conscious of the fact that 
Somalia is a breeding ground for extremism.”787 Varcoe further pinpoints that resolving the 
conflict in Somalia serves Britain’s immigration problem, “If we succeeded [to bring about 
peace] in Somalia, a number of them [Somali immigrants] would go back home.”788 
There are some cases when the Western media portrayed the Western originated recruits of 
militia groups such as Al-Shabaab as being brainwashed. In other cases they are portrayed 
as ignorant extremists who misinterpret the real teachings of Islam. The media overlooks 
the possibility that social inequalities, being stigmatized, labelled and pushed towards the 
margins of the society fuel anger and tension among immigrant youth who then look for 
groups to join and satisfy their need for belonging.
789
 There is also the possibility that 
some Western countries such as Britain overplay connections between radicalisation and a 
wider Muslim community or Islamic identity in order to build domestic support for their 
anti-terror/anti-extremist policies. 
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British policy in Somalia has been criticized by some for putting overemphasis on the issue 
of security. For instance, regarding the Second London Conference on Somalia, Beck 
Charlton, a journalist from Somaliland press blamed David Cameron for choosing “to use 
anti-terrorist rhetoric in the Somali context in order to draw parallels between the two 
countries and to justify British interest in Somalia’s long term vision.”790 He further 
claimed that Britain’s Somali initiative may be “part of a realpolitik agenda that seeks to 
exploit Somalia’s natural resources and investment opportunities by offering aid and 
humanitarian assistance.”791 
In a similar vein, Dowden criticized Britain for placing its own security before the people 
of Somalia. Referring to the London Conference in Somalia he notes,  
From the start it was clear that piracy and the subsequent cost to the City of London's 
marine insurance business, as well as the fear of terrorism, were the main drivers for 
David Cameron's concern. The interests of the Somali people were always going to be 
secondary. Since Britain had done nothing during the past 20 years of war and 
suffering, it seemed unlikely that concern for Somalis would be the top priority.
792
 
He also criticized the conference reports for indicating Al-Shabaab as the main cause of 
the conflict in Somalia and rather argued that “the roots of Somalia's state failure lie in its 
social structure not in Islamic extremism.”793 The Second London Conference on Somalia 
was also protested by groups such as Hands off Somalia and Fight Racism Fight 
Imperialism during the conference. The groups protested about “pillaging of Somalia 
through proxy wars and exacerbation of tribal differences, the criminalisation of Somalis in 
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Britain and the ever-growing heist to snatch natural resources from across the region.”794 
One of the highlights of the protest was the case of Mahdi Hashi, a British citizen of 
Somali origin who was arrested in Somalia by US troops allegedly for being an Al-
Shabaab element. Hashi is among the 16 people who have been stripped off their British 
citizenship since 2010 on the grounds of national security which has raised severe criticism 
in Britain.
795
 
As with Britain, one of the main reasons for Norway’s engagement with failed states, such 
as Somalia, is the security threat that may emerge from them. As former State Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs of Norway Vidar Helgesen notes,  
Security has become globalised. We, meaning we in the West, no longer have 
the luxury of pretending that we can carry on with our way of life and uphold 
our values regardless of what the rest of the world is doing. This was made 
abundantly clear to us all on 11 September 2001. The terrorist attacks on the 
epicentres of economic and military power were organised from mountain 
caves in one of the world’s poorest and most conflict-ridden countries. The 
lesson we should draw is that trying to resolve conflicts and addressing security 
threats in far-away places is in our own interest as well as being a humanitarian 
imperative.
796
 
The population of the Somali community in Norway is approximately 30,000.
797
According 
to Norwegian Foreign Ministry, “It is in Norway’s interest that problems in a distant 
country do not become global.”798 For instance, “The piracy off Somalia, with the threat it 
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poses to Norwegian shipping, is an example of a situation where Norway has an obvious 
and direct interest in the stability and development of another country.”799 
Given its small-state position and lack of hard power, it may be argued that Norway has 
developed a survival strategy based on a discourse of peace and mediation has become a 
tool of ensuring its own security.
800
 This discourse also highlights the notions of “self-
interest” and “altruism” as other main motivations behind Norwegian peace.801 In addition, 
“security” may also be listed as an important motivation behind these efforts.802  
Piracy as a transnational organized crime is another issue at stake in terms of Britain’s and 
Norway’s involvement in Somalia. In 2010 Norway chaired the Contact Group on Piracy 
off the Coast of Somalia, a group established by the UN Security Council “to coordinate 
the international efforts to suppress piracy in these waters.”803 Norway also cooperates 
with the UN in terms of the prosecution of the arrested pirates. Norway supports the Piracy 
Prisoner Transfer Programme conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
and the United Nations Office for Project Services. The project aims to build prisons in 
Somalia and transfer Somali pirates prosecuted abroad to these prisons.
804
 
As with any country involved in global marine trade, piracy poses a threat for Turkey as 
well which is why it has contributed to the anti-piracy operations in Somalia by utilizing its 
marine forces via the US-led Combined Task Force 151.
805
 In addition to its anti-piracy 
activities, Turkey has also delivered $2 million to the African Union Mission in Somalia in 
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2013. It has signed two bilateral treaties on security with the Somali government, including 
a military cooperation pact.
806
 
A former Somali diplomat and ambassador Mohamed Sharif Mohamud blames the 
international community for supporting colonization of Somalia by saying that they are 
"planning to end the mandate of the transitional government and replace it by a committee 
of 15 states, this is direct colonisation."
807
 One of the reasons for increased Western 
interest in Somalia may be to balance out the growing interests of Turkey, Iran and other 
Muslim countries in the country. It should be noted that countries such as Canada have 
already been conducting oil research activities in Somalia through companies such as 
Africa Oil.
808
 
Another motive for Britain’s presence in Somalia is its partnerships with Ethiopia and 
Kenya which is also related to its broader policy in the Horn of Africa.
809
 Another 
important motive is the push from the British civil society particularly by the large Somali 
immigrant community and NGOs on the government to take on larger responsibilities in 
the country with respect to its humanitarian diplomacy. As Varcoe notes, elements of guilt 
of Britain as a former colonizer may also be playing a part in its humanitarian initiatives in 
Somalia.
810
 Considering the vast pledges made by the UK, coupled with the employment 
of Nicholas Kay, a British diplomat, as the new UN Special Representative for Somalia, 
one may expect Britain to deepen its involvement in Somalia. 
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5.4.3 Characteristics of Mediators 
One of Turkey’s differences as a mediator in Somalia is its power capabilities with respect 
to Britain and Norway. While Britain is a former great power with considerable ongoing 
influence in Somalia, Norway is a European small-state and Turkey may be labelled as an 
emerging mediator. For instance, in terms of institutional status, while Britain is member 
of the UN Security Council, Turkey and Norway are not. Turkey’s membership in a 
number of international and African organizations is supportive of its mediator role in the 
Somali conflict. For instance, Turkey has been a strategic partner to the African Union 
since 2008. It is also diplomatically accredited to the ECOWAS and the East African 
Community, and is a member of the International Partners Forum of the IGAD and the 
African Development Bank.
811
 
While Norway, as a small-state, utilized more of its soft-power in Somalia, Turkey and 
Britain combined elements of soft and hard power. Britain’s former great power status may 
also be indicative as to why it gave up on its mediator role in Somalia. As noted in Chapter 
2, it is sometimes easier for great powers to give up on their mediator roles and replace 
them by different policy tools present in their toolboxes.  
In terms of legitimacy, it may be argued that Turkey has considerable legitimacy as a 
mediator in Somalia. Britain’s close links with Somaliland, which is a former British 
colony, also raises scepticism. For instance, according to an anonymous diplomat from 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, one of the reasons why Britain ceased to mediate the talks 
between Somalia and Somaliland was because the former had suspicions over its 
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impartiality. As such, there is a lack of trust on the side of Somali government towards 
Britain.
812
 
There is a bitter memory attached to colonial history in Africa. Varcoe notes, “We may 
have power but we are distrusted [in Somalia]. A country like Turkey would appeal to 
Somali politicians and people as a growing Muslim country.”813 The Ottoman Empire, on 
the other hand, did not have a high level of engagement with Somalia. It responded to the 
calls of Somalis for help during the Portuguese and Ethiopian invasion attempts to help 
what was then the Adel Sultanate. In 1548 part of what is now Somaliland (Zeila and 
Berbera) was captured by the Ottoman Empire and was under its nominal rule for 300 
years. Abdirazak Siyad Abdi, Somali Ambassador to the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation, argues that the Ottoman Empire left a positive mark in Somalia compared to 
European colonizers which enhances Turkey’s legitimacy as a mediator.814 He notes, 
The Europeans were different because firstly, Turks had the same 
religion while the others were Christian. Somalis considered the 
Ottomans as the big brother that has come to watch and look after us. 
Also, the colonizers used to appoint white man to stay there and rule. 
However, the Turks used to appoint the most influential clan leader to 
represent the Sultan. So, all the names that are left behind are Somali 
names while the others forced people to change the names of their 
children to call them “John” or “Maria.” The Turks never changed a 
name.  They said, “We worship the same God and we are here to protect 
you.” Lastly, the Turkish left many buildings behind them whereas the 
British, for example, never left any legacy behind.
815
 
Similarly, religious ties and Turkey’s non-Western identity serve as a legitimate ground for 
Turkey’s mediator role in the country. For instance, Wheeler highlights that “Somalis do 
not trust Christians. Turkey’s not being Western is an asset for Turkey. Somalis remember 
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the Ottoman links.”816 An anonymous senior Turkish diplomat underlines in a similar vein 
that the Ottoman Empire has a very positive history in Somalia as a result of its positive 
marks such as the defence of the Somalis against the Portuguese and the construction of 
Somalia’s water infrastructure and its mosques.817 An anonymous Somali NGO 
representative notes that Turkey’s being Muslim has a positive influence but its influence 
in Somalia is based mainly on the tangible work executed on the ground.
818
 
Abdi notes that, “The Somalis believe in Turks because they can never forget the 
intervention that happened at the right time. Erdoğan visited with his cabinet and all other 
leaders came after him. They are doing lots of projects such as building roads and airports. 
There is no other initiative that goes parallel to that of Turkey’s. We believe that Turks are 
helping us because we are brothers, we are Muslims.”819 
Varcoe also highlights that being Muslim and having much more understanding of the 
Islamic culture is an asset for Turkey. On the other hand, he adds that, “Turkey has much 
less knowledge about the African culture whereas because of historical ties Britain does 
have knowledge.”820 In this view, although understanding Islamic culture is an asset for 
Turkey, understanding the diverse and the unique traits of African culture is also important 
in Somalia. 
Regarding the different ways in which Turkey can mediate in Somalia, İşbilir postulates 
that, Turkey is not perceived as a “white man” in Somalia because of its Muslim identity. 
He notes that, “the impact of the Caliphate still continues particularly in places like 
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Somalia.”821 However, he also underlines that Turkey does not have the capacity to fully 
respond to and satisfy such expectations. He notes,  
When the perceptions are so high, expectations turn out to be high as 
well. A great excitement, enthusiasm and romantic discourses follow but 
mutual interactions do not fulfil the expectations. The reason is that 
Turkey’s capacity, its human capital is not compatible. The human 
capital is trying to be acquired but we [Turkey] need another eight to ten 
years.
822
 
One of the obstacles that Turkey could face in Somalia is the reaction it receives from the 
region. The peoples of Africa are inclined to resolve their own problems by achieving 
increased self-reliance.
823
 Although Turkey’s relatively non-Western image in Africa, 
based on its non-colonial past, as well as its historical, religious and cultural ties with the 
continent increases its legitimacy, it is still a non-African state.
824
 This situation may create 
a perception that Turkey is attempting to cultivate an international image by using Africa’s 
vulnerabilities.  
5.4.4 Style of Mediation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, style of mediation is another indicator that may shed light on 
understanding difference between mediators. Turkey has been persistent and determinant 
in its mediation approach in Somalia. While Britain quit mediation following the first 
round of talks it had conducted, Turkey has completed four rounds of talks. Erdoğan’s 
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second visit to Mogadishu on January 25, 2015 as the President was intended to be a 
demonstration of Turkey’s commitment to peace in Somalia.825  
Turkey’s mediation style in the Somali conflict has so far been facilitative mediation which 
relied on a more persuasive style as opposed to a coercive one. As argued by an 
anonymous Turkish diplomat from Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkey provided 
administrative and logistical support rather than content wise. One of the reasons for such 
an approach was that the talks have not yet been ripe for a more full-fledged mediation 
attempt. However, the last time when parties came together in Istanbul, they asked Turkey 
to be prepared to provide political and content wise contribution in the next round of talks 
which are to be held in 2015.
826
 
As outlined earlier, Turkey utilizes means such as development aid and humanitarian 
assistance to support its mediation attempts. This style is also similar to that of Britain and 
Norway. As such, all three countries follow a “multi-track”827 approach to peace that opens 
room for a range of actors such as the state, civil society, businesses, and the like. 
Development aid and humanitarian assistance play important roles in their peacemaking 
attempts.  
According to Torun, the multifaceted and complex nature of the Somali conflict requires a 
novel approach to mediation and the Turkish model “could be summed up as deploying aid 
and development rather than smooth-talking diplomats.”828 In this view, as also underlined 
by Mustafa Şahin, Head of Center for Development Research, Turkish Ministry of 
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Development, aid and development prepare the ground for mediation and help Turkey 
realize the promises it makes on the negotiation table.
829
 According to Apakan, Turkey has 
a broader vision of mediation which includes preventive diplomacy, conflict management, 
peacebuilding, economic development, institution building and empowerment of people.
830
 
Although Turkey offers many incentives in the form of aid, it does not impose a particular 
outcome on the parties. According to Abdi,  
Turkey’s mediation approach differs. Turkey said, “Whatever you guys 
decide, whether united or disunited, that is your internal decision. For us, 
we see you both as our brothers and we want to be a channel of interest 
for you; we want to give you an accommodation, an umbrella, a platform 
for you to resolve your problems and talk. Turkey is trying to resolve a 
sensitive issue. They say, “Delay the issue of secession and talk about 
economic mutual interest, talk about what you share.”831  
 
Another distinctive element in Turkey’s style of mediation is the emphasis on the 
importance of human touch based on building empathy and deploying sincerity as core to 
the mediation process. Turkey’s mediation style in Somalia is based on “wining hearts and 
minds of people.”  The fact that Turkey draws the attention of the parties on more tangible 
and, in a way, resolvable issues during the talks without meddling into issues of identity by 
not passing judgement, is appraised by the parties. 
Sharing cultural space, celebrating religious holidays together, opening social spaces and 
sharing them with the people are other important inputs in Turkey’s style.832 Turkish Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia also provided him with an image of a 
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conscience advocate of the poor and the subordinated. In Erdoğan’s words the Somali 
crisis,  
...tests the notion of civilization and our modern values... Nobody with 
common sense and conscience can remain indifferent to such a drama... 
The tears that are now running from Somalia's golden sands into the 
Indian Ocean must stop. They should be replaced by hopeful voices of a 
country where people do not lose their lives because of starvation and 
where they express their eagerness to develop and restore peace and 
stability.
833
 
For instance, Abdi expresses how “touched” he was with a statement made by Davutoğlu 
in the Somali parliament,  
Davutoğlu said during his speech: “You are 90 million [in population]. 
You are 10 million Somalis, 80 million Turks; we are 90 million 
together.” Our population is one. Everybody in Somalia, young or old, 
talks about Turkey all the time. In the biggest ceremonies, for example in 
the day of independence, people don’t wave just the Somali flag. They 
wave the Somali and the Turkish flag together. The Somali intellectuals 
and communities living abroad have paid visits to the nearest Turkish 
embassies, met the Turkish ambassador and given him red roses and 
flowers. They say “Thank you Türkiye [Turkey]!” They established the 
“Turkish-Somali-American Friendship Association.” 
Turkey’s style is also risk-taking. For instance, Turkish Embassy is located in the heart of 
Mogadishu which is a significant difference compared to Norway and Britain. Norway 
does not have an embassy in Somalia while the British Embassy is located at the 
Mogadishu Airport. In addition, on June 1, 2014, Turkey opened a consulate in Hergesa, 
capital of Somaliland. It is one of the three countries, alongside Yemen and Ethiopia, 
which has a consulate in Hergesa.
834
 
According to Abdi, the level of risk that Turkey takes and the commitment it has impress 
the Somalis. He notes,  
Saudi Arabia gave $ 50 million to Somalia through the UNDP. 30 per 
cent of that money goes to administration costs because the directors are 
based in Kenya, Nairobi staying in nice five star hotels. When they 
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come, they come by air. Their salaries are unimaginable. Because they 
say that Somalia is a very dangerous area. So they have to have full 
coverage insurance. They stay at expensive hotels and take bonuses. The 
Turks, on the other hand, build institutions; they build primary schools. 
Some Turkish engineers bring their families and they enrol their children 
to small Turkish schools in Mogadishu. They do not charge us for 
insurance. They say, “We trust Allah. You kill me; I am shaheed 
[martyr].” When you bring your family that shows you are committed. 
The level of commitment is very high. When someone brings their 
children, that means they want to share the pain with you. They put their 
own families at risk. No one else is willing to do that. That’s why with 
Turkey we have to turn a blind eye to the small negative things.   
As noted in Chapter 2, inclusiveness may be used as another indicator to understand 
difference among Turkey, Britain and Norway. In terms of inclusiveness, one may notice 
that Turkey, Norway and Britain all tried to follow an inclusive approach in terms of 
peacemaking in Somalia. By highlighting the importance for Britain of following an 
inclusive approach in Somalia Cameron noted during the London Conference on Somalia,  
We have leading figures from governments in every continent of the 
world, leading organisations from the African Union and European 
Union to the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation and the United 
Nations. And most importantly of all, Somali delegations – representing 
almost every region of Somalia not under terrorist control… I am 
delighted that we have with us together for the first time today, the 
Presidents of almost all those regions. It is vital that this whole process is 
as inclusive as possible with a Constituent Assembly chosen by the 
Somali people leading to a more representative government.
835
 
Inviting a diverse set of actors including a range of states, international and regional 
organizations and the leaders of various regional administrations from Somalia is a 
manifestation of Britain’s inclusive approach in Somalia. However, as evident in 
Cameron’s speech Britain invited “almost every region of Somalia not under terrorist 
control” excluding Al-Shabaab and some others from the process. Both Britain and 
Norway recognize al-Shabaab as a “terrorist organization” whereas Turkey still has not 
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made such official statement. Drawing a parallel between Britain’s own peace process in 
Northern Ireland and Somalia Dowden notes,  
Cameron does not appear to have learned from Britain's own experience 
in Northern Ireland and the decolonisation process of the 1960s. In both 
cases Westminster tried to build coalitions of moderates and exclude the 
extremists and "men of violence". But in the end in Northern Ireland 
peace came when the extremists were brought into the process, just as 
Britain 40 years earlier had been forced to release the jailed 'terrorists' 
throughout its empire and hand power to them. Not inviting elements of 
Shabaab to London [Conference on Somalia] (and threatening to 
continue bombing them) has ensured that the war will continue. 
Excluding the Eritreans, major players in Somalia was also a mistake.   
Dowden further criticizes the Western countries for providing too many privileges for 
Somali politicians by noting, 
The agenda of the Somali politicians at Lancaster House on Thursday 
[during London Conference on Somalia] was clear: to get the British and 
Americans to fight their war for them or pay others to do it and bomb 
their enemies. That will enable them to hold office - even though they 
have little power - and keep stealing the aid. 
By referring to the exclusion of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from the peace processes 
in Somalia Varcoe postulates that,  
The West rejected the ICU in Somalia. It [the rule of the ICU] was the 
only time there was some kind of order in the country. If we had not 
opposed them, we might have had less radicalization. The reason why we 
refrained for so long was that we lacked cultural knowledge. 
According to Wheeler, one of the differences of Britain in Somalia from Turkey is that it 
operates more through multilateral channels than Turkey does such as the UN and the 
EU.
836
 Building international partnerships is a significant feature of both Britain and 
Norway whereas Turkey operates more independently in Somalia apart from briefly 
collaborating with some actors on certain issues such as the collaboration it had with 
Norway during the talks between Al-Shabaab and the TFG and providing platforms for 
encouraging international support for Somalia. In this respect, Hilde F. Johnson, former 
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Minister of International Development of Norway and Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South 
Sudan, underlines that there is a lot of potential for cooperation between Turkey and 
Norway as mediators who can play complementary roles as mediators.
837
 
5.4.5 Means Supportive of Mediation 
As noted in Chapter 2, particularly in intrastate conflicts, it is often necessary to support 
mediation by other means such as development aid, humanitarian assistance, medical relief 
or peacebuilding in a broader sense. In the case of Turkey’s mediation in Somalia, aid was 
significant in terms of building trust. As also underlined by an anonymous Turkish 
diplomat, when the parties saw what Turkey had done on the ground they sought for its 
mediation.
838
 This view is also supported by the Ambassador of Somalia to Turkey 
Mohamed Mursal Sheikh Abdurahman.
839
 As such, aid plays an important role in building 
trust, credibility, displaying commitment and constituting legitimacy as a mediator. As 
Schloms puts forth, these tools also enable peacemakers to implement the decisions taken 
on the table, play important roles in the phases of rehabilitation, reconstruction and 
development and strengthen the capacities for peace.
840
  
As also argued by Turkish policy makers, Turkey’s mediation in Somalia is not confined to 
diplomatic talks.
841
 It rather carries out a variety of activities on the ground ranging from 
providing development aid to humanitarian assistance, capacity building and statebuilding 
shaped around its policies in the country which hold similarities with the policies of Britain 
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and Norway. This section will examine what role these policies play in Turkey’s 
mediation, in times by comparing and contrasting them with those of Britain and Norway 
in order to better understand to what extent Turkey’s mediation differs in Somalia. 
5.4.5.1 Development Aid as a Peace Dividend 
Development aid is an important component of peacemaking activities of all three actors. 
While the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is the main body that 
coordinates Turkey’s official development assistance (ODA),842 British aid is coordinated 
by the DFID and the Norwegian aid is coordinated by the NORAD. In line with the new 
Turkish foreign policy, TIKA has diversified its operations not only among post-Soviet 
regions (mainly the Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans) but also in Africa, the 
Middle East and Asia.
843
 It has become an important policy instrument for Turkey in recent 
years.
844
 As noted on the website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
Official development assistance (ODA) has increasingly become an 
integral part of Turkey’s proactive foreign policy... As part of its policy 
of utilizing a wide range of soft power instruments such as assuming a 
mediator role in regional conflicts, Turkey also boosted its ODA to 
various countries affected by conflicts and other sources of instability 
such as natural disasters.
845
 
As evident in the above statement, ODA is an important instrument for Turkish mediation. 
Aras underlines similarly that,  
When Turkey proposes mediation to parties in conflict, it proposes 
them a package. It gives out the message, “We come there as 
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diplomats and mediate. If you accept peace, in return we resolve your 
problems such as development or emergency assistance.”846  
In this sense, Turkey uses aid as a means to promote peace and keep the promises it makes 
on the table.
847
 In addition, empowering the parties by offering development aid also 
increases Turkey’s legitimacy in conflict zones. Turkey’s hands-on approach, which 
entails opening offices in Somalia and Somaliland and deploying Turkish staff on the 
ground, was also significant in building credibility as a mediator. For instance, unlike 
Turkish institutions, DFID does not have any personnel based in Somalia and operates 
from the British Office for Somalia in Nairobi and from the Somalia Unit in London.
848
 
On the other hand, having a hands-on approach may sometimes be a disadvantage. Oruç 
suggests that being active in field is not always beneficial particularly considering the 
security challenges. He argues that one of the reasons for the attack on the Turkish 
Embassy in Mogadishu was its poorly picked location exposing it to potential attacks.
849
 
He notes, 
You have to safeguard your king while playing chess. Sometimes you 
even have to give up on your queen to protect your king. If you go and 
place your king in the least safeguarded spot of the city just to say “I am 
in Somalia” those who want to interfere with your work can easily topple 
it.
850
 
 
According to a report by IPC, Saferworld and Oxfam, Turkey’s aid is tangible and it 
reaches the beneficiaries whereas aid from traditional donors is delivered through a very 
bureaucratic channel and in the end only about 10 per cent reaches the final beneficiaries. 
An anonymous Somali NGO representative notes that,  
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Countries such as Britain or Norway have lots of words but not as much 
tangible work. Turkey has done much tangible work especially in the 
field of education, water and infrastructure. For instance, the Mogadishu 
Airport and the ports have been built by Turkish companies. There was a 
lot of competition among the British, the Norwegian and the Turkish 
companies over these constructions but the Somali parliament preferred 
the Turkish based on the tangible work executed on the ground.
851
 
While this approach has its own benefits, such as acting in a timely manner and avoiding 
leakages on its way as a result of illegal acts, it has also been criticized by some Somali 
officials for bypassing the government.
852
 Somali Deputy Foreign Minister Barrow 
considers that foreign agents should cooperate more with the government when delivering 
aid. Barrow notes, “for example, there is an NGO working in the water sector. As the 
government, I know where the problem is. Because, sometimes scarcity of water can cause 
conflict. But if the NGO digs a well somewhere there is no conflict, it doesn’t contribute to 
the solution. What the government can do is that it guides you to the place where there is 
no water.”853 
Oruç, on the other hand criticizes this approach and notes that one of the mistakes that 
Turkish officials made in Somalia was working too close with the central government and 
getting stuck with the central bureaucracy and thus losing flexibility. He notes,  
Turkey could be very successful in Somalia if it could follow the 
roadmap that was initially drafted by our prime minister; but it could not 
because, it got stuck with the status-quo in Mogadishu. It did not do 
anything to overcome it. There is a secluded structure there completely 
under the control of USA and Britain. The central government controls 
the area with a radius of 6-7 kilometres and does not allow anyone 
operate outside this area.
854
 
Similar to Turkey, a closer look at European small-state mediators reveals that they follow 
a multi-track approach to peace and consider development aid as complementary to peace 
initiatives. The peace-brokering roles, humanitarian and development aid initiatives of 
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these countries are often intertwined.
855
 As a European small-state, Norway as well 
considers development aid as an integral part of its peace initiatives.
856
 Peace-brokering 
roles, humanitarian and development aid initiatives of these states are often intertwined.
857
 
The peace initiatives of Norway are closely linked to its development initiatives; a case 
often summarized in the motto, “sustainable development promotes peace and sustainable 
peace promotes development.”858 In addition, while in the past peace was treated as a tool 
of Norway’s development aid; from 1995 onwards it has become a distinctive “goal” and 
“part” of Norwegian South policy.859 As noted by Skånland, a multi-track approach is an 
important element of the Norwegian model of peacemaking,
860
 and this is also the case in 
Somalia. For instance in 2012, Norway delivered around $77, 7 million (472 million NOK) 
to Somalia of which $37 million was delivered through multilateral organizations such as 
the UN, $32 million through Norwegian non-governmental organizations, $8, 3 million 
through international and local NGOs, and the rest through Norwegian public and private 
sector.
861
 
Some of the organizations through which Norway delivers aid to Somalia are the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Norwegian Red Cross and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NRC, the UN Central 
Emergency Response Fund, the UNHCR, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the UN, Concern Worldwide, Norwegian Church Aid, Save 
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the Children, the NRC’s disaster preparedness force, Norwegian People’s Aid, World Food 
Program and World Health Organisation (WHO).
862
 
Referring to the multi-track nature of Turkey’s Somali initiative, Haşimi pinpoints that 
“Turkey is very active in the field with its NGOs, businessmen, all of its institutions and 
municipalities.”863 NGOs and charities are among important agents that have influenced 
the course of Turkish foreign policy in recent years.
864
 Turkey’s humanitarian NGOs 
pursue a number of activities in the field. Although their work sometimes overlaps with 
that of the government, Turkish NGOs operate fairly independently from the state. Their 
work mainly entails providing services such as emergency assistance and medical relief, 
building infrastructure and investing in social and human capital.
865
 A number of Turkish 
NGOs are currently active in the field in Somalia such as the Humanitarian Aid Relief 
Foundation, Doctors Worldwide, KimseYok Mu?, the Cansuyu Foundation, the Nile 
Foundation, the Helping Hands Foundation, the Deniz Feneri Foundation, the Hasene 
Foundation, the Foundation for World Orphans (DÜNYEV), the Beşir Foundation, the 
International Anatolian Health Federation, the Physicians for Hope Foundation (ÜHDER), 
the Deniz Feneri Foundation, Une Seule Humanité (BISEG), the Dost Eli Foundation, the 
Dosteller Aid and Solidarity Foundation, Sadakataşı Foundation and the KutupYıldızı 
Foundation. 
Turkish businesses are also active in Somalia particularly in developing the infrastructure 
of the country. The businesses that have been trading in the country have been small and 
medium sized enterprises. Agriculture, livestock and fisheries are the main trade resources. 
                                                     
862
 NORAD, “Somalia.” 
863
 Interview with Haşimi. 
864
 Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, “Turkey's Opening to Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 48, 
no.4, 2010: 525–546. 
865
 Aras and Akpınar, “The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey’s Peacebuilding,” 230-247. 
235 
 
While Turkish exports to Somalia were around $2.3 million in 2007, they reached $40 
million in 2011.
866
 The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists 
(TUSKON) is the most active Turkish business agency in Somalia. On April 7, 2012, the 
first business forum for Somalia in 20 years was held by the Bahçelievler Businessmen’s 
Association (an offshoot of the TUSKON) in Mogadishu with the participation of 
businessmen from various sectors which was concluded with the establishment of the 
Somali-Turkish Business Association. Somalia’s other foreign trade partners are the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
member states, India, Italy and the United Kingdom.
867
 
While both Britain and Norway are “g07”868 countries, Turkey is not although the share of 
ODA in its foreign policy has grown visibly increasing by 30 times since 2003. In 2011 
and 2012, Turkey’s development aid was the fastest growing in the world. Considered an 
“emerging donor” by the World Food Program, Turkey will also host the 1st World 
Humanitarian Aid Summit in 2016.
869
 Turkey currently delivers development aid to 81 
countries worldwide.
870
 Britain’s overall ODA reached £11.3 billion in 2013, 0.7 per cent 
of its gross national income
871
 while Norway allocates one of the highest percentage of 
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gross domestic product in the world to development aid by more than 1 per cent.
872
 
Turkey’s ODA is around 0.21 per cent of its total gross national income.873 
In 2012 Norway’s bilateral assistance to Somalia was around 472 million NOK. While the 
total amount spent for emergency assistance was 322 million NOK, 101 million NOK was 
spent for good governance, 37 million NOK spent for education, 10 million NOK for 
health and social services, and 2 million NOK was spent for economic development and 
trade.
874
 In that sense, emergency assistance and good governance received the main bulk 
of Norwegian aid in Somalia. In 2013, Norway increased its aid to Somalia to 500 million 
NOK.
875
 
While Turkey’s total development aid is lower than both Britain and Norway, the aid it has 
delivered to Somalia so far is higher than both actors. In 2011 – 2012, Somalia received 
the lowest of Britain’s aid to the Horn of Africa by £44 million (around $72 million) 
compared to £290 million for Ethiopia and £93 million for Kenya. DFID’s total budget for 
Somalia for 2013-2014 is around £60 million of which 39.65% goes to projects on 
government, 29.82% to projects on disaster, 16.14% on health, 3.51% on education, 2.11% 
on industry and 8.77% to projects on other sectors.
876
 In 2012 Norway delivered around 
360 million NOK (around $60 million) of total aid to Somalia increasing it to 500 million 
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NOK in 2013.
877
 Turkey’s total aid to Somalia, on the other hand, exceeded $365 million 
in 2012.
878
 
The main focus of Britain’s policy of supporting development in Somalia is “to provide 
humanitarian assistance, beat poverty and prevent conflict.”879 The UK implements this 
policy through the DFID by focusing “on governance and peace-building, wealth and job 
creation, health care, particularly for women and children, and humanitarian assistance.”880 
Turkey as well has similar policies in Somalia.
881
 Education has been the flagship of 
Turkey’s peacebuilding policy in Somalia. Educational aid is important for Turkey in 
contributing to Somalia’s capacity building as well as constructing affinity in long term 
among those students that study with Turkish scholarships. According to Abdi, “Turkey 
should provide jobs in Somalia for the Somali youth who are educated in Turkey. This 
would also ensure loyalty towards Turkey. And al-Shabaab would lose recruitment.”882 
Turkey has provided free education and training to more than 4,200 people in Somalia in 
various fields. Its educational aid is delivered through official
883
 and non-state channels 
that provide scholarships and training alongside opening schools, institutions and 
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vocational centres in Somalia.
884
 Norway supports education in Somalia as well. For 
instance, the NRC has two educational programs in Somalia including the Alternative 
Basic Education ABE) program and the Youth Education Pack program aiming to 
reintegrate Somali youth into the school system or offering vocational training for older 
students.
885
 
Construction constitutes a significant element of Turkey’s development policy both 
domestically and externally. It has been a growing line of work for Turkey’s new elite in 
recent years.
886
 Rebuilding infrastructure, transportation, construction, and refurbishment 
of various buildings, including government offices, schools, hospitals and orphanages, are 
notable in Turkey’s efforts in Somalia. Abdi notes that, “There are roads now in Somalia 
being built by Turkish companies. Before that, the city was muddy in the rain and had very 
ugly roads full of holes. Now you can see in the city how many kilometres of roads the 
Istanbul Municipality alone has built in our capital city. None of the other countries ever 
did that to Somalia.”887 
Britain operates in Somalia mainly through the DFID in close cooperation with 
organizations such as the UN, the EU and the World Bank alongside a number of non-state 
organizations such as the ICRC, CSOs and the UNICEF, UNHCR, World Food Program, 
Care International and Oxfam. From October 2011 to March 2013 the DFID delivered 
around £108 million to Somalia of which 34 per cent went through UN OCHA Common 
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Humanitarian Fund, 54 per cent through other UN agencies and ICRC and 12 per cent 
through a range of international civil society organizations. In this respect, the DFID 
follows a multilateral approach to its engagement with Somalia. World Health 
Organization is another agency the DFID cooperates with in Somalia. Save the Children, 
Christian Aid, Merlin, Action Against Hunger, OXFAM, Concern and UNICEF are among 
the civil society organizations the DFID works with in Somalia. Progressio, Saferworld, 
Maginternational and Islamic Relief are other UK based NGOs that operate in Somalia.
888
 
According to Wheeler, although British NGOs are independent, sometimes they are 
significantly funded by the British government.
889
 Norwegian NGOs are also often funded 
through tender bids initiated by the government. Turkish NGOs, on the other hand are 
completely funded through public donations. In 2011, the UK also initiated the 
establishment of a pooled fund for Somalia called the Somalia Cash Consortium during the 
crisis to foster cooperation among different countries and agencies in delivering cash and 
vouchers to the families in need.
890
 The Consortium consists of four NGOs including 
Action Contre la Faim, Adeso, Danish Refugee Council and Save the Children and is 
funded by ECHO, Danida, IOM, SDC, SIDA and UNICEF alongside the DFID
891
which is 
the largest contributor to the fund.
892
 
5.4.5.2 Providing Humanitarian Assistance 
Providing humanitarian assistance is another common feature among all three actors. In 
line with its policy in Somalia, Britain’s target is to reach out to over one million people 
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through humanitarian assistance by “improving the overall emergency responsiveness in 
saving lives, alleviating human suffering, and maintaining the dignity of people affected by 
civil strife and natural disasters such as drought.”893 DFID reaches out to three identified 
regions including Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia which receives 75 per 
cent of the total humanitarian assistance. It focuses on “designing a multi-year 
humanitarian programme with a focus on improving resilience to humanitarian crises, as 
well as responding to urgent needs”894in cooperation with the UN Common Humanitarian 
Fund as well as a range of international NGOs.
895
 
Turkey’s humanitarian assistance in Somalia is mainly coordinated through the Prime 
Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) which provides 
emergency assistance and delivers humanitarian aid, particularly during the initial phase of 
crisis.
896
 The provision of emergency assistance is particularly important since it increases 
the public visibility of actors during the initial stage of the crisis when the media attention 
is at its peak. It also paves the way for further involvement by legitimising the 
intervention.
897
 
Medical relief is another important aspect of Turkey’s humanitarian assistance in Somalia 
which by far has been by far one of the biggest recipients in the last few years. Health has 
been a significant instrument of Turkey’s soft power. Building hospitals, providing 
                                                     
893
 Gov.uk, “Providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,” 24 March 
2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/providing-humanitarian-assistance-in-somalia (accessed July 24, 
2014). 
894
 DFID, “Operational Plan 2011-2015,” DFID Somalia, June 2013, 4. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209263/Somalia.pdf (accessed 
July 24, 2014). 
895
 Ibid. 
896
 AFAD is “an umbrella organization, collaborating with the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Forests and Hydraulic Works and other relevant ministries as 
well as non-governmental organizations, depending on the nature and magnitude of the disaster or 
emergency.” See, Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey, “About Us,” 
https://www.afad.gov.tr/EN/IcerikDetay.aspx?ID=1 (accessed July 16, 2014). 
897
 Aras and Akpınar, “The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey’s Peacebuilding,” 230-247. 
241 
 
medical relief in camps, prisons and orphanages, carrying out circumcision surgeries, 
providing training for medical personnel and scholarships to study medicine in Turkey are 
part of Turkey’s medical relief. The importance Turkey puts on health is also evident in the 
appointment of a medical doctor Dr. Cemalettin Kani Torun (also a former board member 
of Doctors Worldwide) as Turkish ambassador to Somalia.  
To that end, TIKA, the Ministry of Health, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and 
Turkish Red Crescent as a semi-official actor are some official agents delivering medical 
relief to Somalia alongside several humanitarian NGOs, among which the Turkish Red 
Crescent, the Doctors Worldwide, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, and the KimseYok 
Mu are the most active. 
898
 
Conducting cataract surgery is a significant part of Turkey’s medical relief in Somalia as 
well as in the rest of Africa. Cataract surgeries are particularly significant since they enable 
rapid and extensive outreach. The results of these surgeries are also concrete, positive and 
long-term. Noteworthy campaigns include: Kimse Yok Mu’s Cataract Project;899 IHH’s 
Africa Cataract Campaign carried out in partnership with the Islamic Development Bank in 
South Sudan and Sierra Leone; TİKA in Ethiopia and Sudan, Al Birr at-Tawasul 
Foundation in Sudan; the World Health Organization in Somalia.
900
 
Norway also delivers medical relief to Somalia, although in a smaller scale when 
compared to Turkey. The Norwegian Red Cross is one of the organizations active in the 
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country since 1991 mainly in partnership with the Somali Red Crescent and the 
International Red Cross.
901
 It also supported the organizational development of the Somali 
Red Crescent.
902
 Britain also cooperates with the Somali Red Crescent and the 
International Red Cross in Somalia.
903
 
One of the active Norwegian NGOs in Somalia is the NRC which focuses mainly on 
emergency response and preventing the recurrence of conflict by providing relief on 
“shelter and infrastructure construction; water, hygiene and sanitation; emergency 
education including youth education; protection; food security and livelihoods” operating 
mainly in Puntland, South Central Somalia and Somaliland.
904
 
Norwegian Church Aid is another NGO that has been operating in the country since 1993 
focusing mainly on “right to water and health, as well as the right to peace and security.”905 
It works mainly in Gedo region, Mogadishu and Puntland. Norwegian Church Aid is also a 
founding member of ACT Somali Forum, a platform that consists of a range of 
organizations active in Somalia such as Diakonie of Germany, Christian Aid, the Lutheran 
World Federation and Finn Church Aid.
906
 
5.4.5.3 Eliminating Somalia’s Isolation by Encouraging International Support 
Turkey has taken significant steps in terms of ending Somalia’s international isolation by 
encouraging international support. Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during the famine in 2011 
rapidly brought Somalia into headlines. The fact that despite high security risks he visited 
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the country along with his family and a delegation of 200 businessmen, politicians, civil 
society representatives, and even celebrities created a huge impact.
907
 
According to Abdi, “Erdoğan in Mogadishu has turned the eyes of international attention 
to Somalia. He came in the right time, with the right intention, as we believe, and he did 
not come alone. He came with his family and members of his cabinet. Somalis were very 
happy.”908 Abdi also notes, “The Somalis believe in the Turks because they can never 
forget the intervention that happened at the right time. Erdoğan visited with his cabinet, 
and all other leaders came after him.”909 
Erdoğan’s visit took place at a time when other leaders refrained from visiting the country 
with the excuse of poor security measures. The visit also coincided with the month of 
Ramadan, during which millions of Muslims around the world were fasting and were able 
to empathize with their counterparts in Somalia. According to Enow, Turkish 
government’s move in Somalia “met the momentum. Turkey was quick in action which 
promoted its credibility.”910 
Another significant initiative by Turkey in terms of eliminating Somalia’s international 
isolation was starting international flights between Istanbul and Mogadishu on March 6, 
2012.
911
 Regarding the impact of this initiative Abdi notes,  
When the [international] elites want to come to Somalia they ask, ‘How 
can we come? You don’t have national air carrier.’ Then we tell them, 
‘Turkish Airlines has weekly flights to Mogadishu.’ That answers 
everything. They say, ‘Oh that means that it is safe.’ Turkey opened an 
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international window for us. For all those who want to come from 
Europe or America, Turkish Airlines made their trip possible. The trip 
used to be very difficult before. People had to go to the neighbouring 
countries and travel from there.
912
 
The reopening of the Turkish Embassy in Somalia after 20 years was another initiative that 
ended Somalia’s isolation. Holding international conferences to encourage international 
support for Somalia is another method used both by Turkey and Britain. Turkey has held 
two international conferences on Somalia. The first Istanbul Conference on Somalia was 
held on May 21-23, 2010, within the framework of the Djibouti Agreement. The 
conference set up a roadmap for peacebuilding and development in Somalia.
913
 Bilateral 
agreements were signed between Turkey and Somalia in fields of military, education, and 
technical and scientific cooperation.
914
 According to Davutoğlu, the conference was 
concluded with a strong message for Somalia built on three major dimensions. The first 
dimension highlighted the future of Somalia, focusing on peace, political reform, security 
and economic development in the country. The second dimension was about regional 
ownership, and called on Somalia’s neighbours to give their full support for peace in the 
country. The third dimension concerned international ownership, and called on the 
international community to support peace in Somalia.
915
 
According to Apakan, as a result of Turkey’s mobilization of the international community 
for Somalia, there has been a shift of balance in the Horn of Africa. He adds that the 
Somali Conference was significant because it encouraged local ownership of the 
problem.
916
 The Istanbul Conference on Somalia was considered a significant achievement 
for Turkish-Somali rapprochement. A year after the conference, on May 9-13, 2011, the 
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Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, of which Somalia is a member, 
was hosted by Turkey in Istanbul.
917
 The Istanbul Conferences and the LDC Conference 
triggered further interest in Africa followed by the deadly famine. Owing both to the heavy 
level of drought in the country as well as misgovernment, the situation in Somalia quickly 
hit global headlines, accompanied by lack of comprehensive international solution for the 
tragedy. The rising Turkish interest in Somalia generated the flow of over $365 million in 
aid into the country, nearly double the amount that Turkey had pledged during the 
conference to deliver annually to all of the LDCs. Accordingly in 2011 Somali became the 
fourth country, following Pakistan, Syria and Afghanistan, where Turkey's development 
aid has been highly concentrated.
918
 As mentioned before, Turkey also hosted the 2
nd
 
Istanbul Conference on Somalia and organized the OIC Conference on Somalia, where 
countries pledged $350 million, plus another $500 million for Somalia. In March 2011 the 
OIC opened its Humanitarian Coordination Office in Mogadishu.
919
 
Promoting international support for Somalia is a priority for Britain as well. The British 
Embassy Mogadishu, which has been operating from its compound on Mogadishu Airport 
since April 25, 2013, is the main agent of this policy in collaboration with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development, and the Ministry of 
Defence.
920
Britain has also hosted two international conferences for Somalia including the 
First and the Second London Conferences on Somalia. The former was held on February 
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23, 2012 with the participation of fifty-five delegations from around the world.
921
 The 
Somali Diaspora in the UK raised some criticism on the conference on the basis that their 
concerns had not been addressed; the agenda had been “preordained” and “the focus 
should have been on investment, jobs, gender, and the humanitarian crisis rather than 
international security and piracy.”922 Coordinator of the Somali Relief and Development 
Forum Rahma Ahmed claimed that, "When the British government decided to step forward 
it should have asked what Somalis wanted. What they did instead was to identify a few 
areas. It failed to respect the process and priorities set by Somalis."
923
 Some Somalis such 
as the founder and head of the Somali Diaspora UK and a Somali activist Amina 
Souleiman criticized the conference for not sufficiently addressing the issue of women.
924
 
This criticism though was addressed during the Second London Conference on Somalia 
which included the issue of gender equality on the conference agenda. 
The Second London Conference on Somalia was jointly hosted by the UK and the Federal 
Government of Somalia on May 7, 2013 “to provide international support for the Somali 
government’s immediate priorities as they rebuild their country.”925 The conference 
focused on supporting the realisation of social and economic rights through development 
programmes, working to address inequalities especially with respect to gender inequalities, 
and improving inclusion and accountability.
926
It aimed to support FGS on areas of 
security, justice and public financial management. Another focus of the conference was 
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eliminating sexual violence in Somalia. The international community committed to provide 
expertise and funding of over $300 million during the conference.
927
 
Another conference that was organized by Britain for Somalia was the AMISOM Diaspora 
Meeting that was held in London on May 9-10, 2013. The conference aimed to, “engage 
the views of the Somali Diaspora on the situation in Somalia; mobilise Somali Diaspora 
support for the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM, the peace process including 
the implementation of the government’s six-pillar priorities with a view to enhancing the 
stabilisation of Somalia; and mobilise the necessary skills from the Somali Diaspora and 
facilitate their return home in order to provide skilled manpower for the rebuilding of the 
Somali state.”928 In addition to the Somali Diaspora, the conference also included civil 
society and media organizations from Somalia, members of the Federal Government of 
Somalia and a range of international partners.
929
 
As part of its policy on increasing international support for Somalia, the UK government 
supports the Federal Government of Somalia to develop a New Deal compact aiming to 
define and encourage partnership between the FGS and international community. It also 
supports the National Development Plan of Somaliland in addition to the creation of the 
Somaliland Development Fund together with Denmark. A similar cooperation is 
established with Puntland in the production of the National Development Plan.
930
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5.4.5.4 Religious Aid in Somalia 
One of Turkey’s differences in Somalia is delivering religious aid. The religious activities 
of the Turkish state and NGOs may be summarized as distributing copies of the Quran, 
distributing meat during Eid al-Adha [the Feast of Sacrifice], as well as conducting free 
circumcision surgeries, refurbishing mosques and opening Quran courses.
931
 
According to Subaşı, one of the aims of Turkey’s religious aid is to prevent religion from 
becoming a source of conflict. He notes that different interpretations of religion trigger 
conflict. Subaşı posits that, “there is a sui generis radicalism in Somalia that triggers the 
clash between the Salafis, the Sunnis and the liberals.”932 He further notes that Turkey 
offers a moderate model of Islam that tries to resolve the conflict by offering scholarships 
and providing employment for the youth.
933
 This assertion also suggests that Turkey 
interprets religious extremism amongst youth not as an issue of religion but as an issue of 
poverty and lack of opportunity. 
Similarly, the religious edge in Turkey’s mediation also accentuates the sentiments. For 
example, distribution of aid by the Turkish state and NGOs during religious holidays 
increases significantly which wins the hearts and minds of the people in Somalia as well as 
other Muslim countries. Abdi notes, “I think the Turkish Prime Minister told his people 
during his speech, ‘Instead of slaughtering one sheep for your family this holiday, how 
about you donate it this year to the people who are dying [in Somalia]?’” This and other 
similar sentimental talks by Turkish officials find their way through the hearts of people in 
need. 
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Having religious similarities with Somalia is also an asset for Turkey in terms of 
constituting legitimacy based on its Muslim identity. Although this may become an 
advantage on many levels, on some levels it may trigger problems as well. According to 
Abdi, Turkey’s religious activities in Somalia raise concerns among secular Somalis. He 
notes,  
Some secular Somalis are not happy with the Turkish role [in Somalia]. 
Because they think that the Turkish state is pro-Islamic. They do not 
want Somalia to get support from a strong partner. Because they think 
that Turkey will strengthen the role of the Islamic existence and the 
Islamic values in Somalia. Somalia is more Islamicized than Turkey but 
because it is a very weak country and because Turkey came with 
technology, with finance, with expertise, this would give the Islamics in 
Somalia a door, a room to manoeuvre and also international relations. 
Seculars do not want that. They try to disconnect them by making 
propaganda in Somalia by saying “Why is Turkey coming to Somalia? 
What do they want from us? What is the agenda behind Turkish 
involvement? There must be a hidden agenda.” But when they are asked 
for a proof, they do not give us proof. They are only suspicious. They 
say, “We are a sovereign state. We do not belong to the Ottoman Empire 
anymore. So why are they trying to recapture us?
934
 
Delivering religious aid from multiple channels, each of which with potentially different 
interpretations of Islam, may create incoherency and confusion that could lead to criticism 
of Turkey and decrease its credibility in the long term.
935
 Although the Turkish 
government often promotes secularism in the Islamic world, civil society may carry out a 
different agenda or at least their activities may be interpreted in a different way on the 
ground. Abdi notes,   
The Turkish NGOs who came first showed Islamic affection and passion 
to the Somali people such as IHH and many others from the Gülen 
movement. They said, “We [Turks and Somalis] are Muslim. We can 
marry each other.” And actually, some Turkish guys got married in 
Mogadishu. Usually the Somalis do not marry other nationalities. They 
are a bit racist in that sense but they opened their hearts to the Turks. The 
seculars say, “Turkey is a growing economy. They must have an 
economic agenda even if they are sincere. Don’t think that they have 
come because we are Muslims. They have come because we have many 
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resources and their economy needs our raw material that we have over 
here. They will give one hundred and take one million.” The other people 
who are against that debate says, “When I am dying or my children are 
dying the one who feeds me saves my life.” So there are these two 
debates. But generally, Turkey’s role is acceptable and it is welcomed.936 
5.4.6 Progress of Mediators 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, with respect to the progress of mediators, the study examines 
to what extent mediators were able to achieve their initial goals. Progress, in this sense, is 
not solely about short to mid-term objectives such as signing an agreement but also about 
mid to long-term ones such as improving “the quality of communication, a change in the 
population’s attitude, the building of common projects.”937  
Turkey, Britain and Norway have all had progress in their Somali peace initiatives on 
different levels. For instance, Britain was able to conduct the first direct talks between 
Somalia and Somaliland in more than twenty years which was an important progress. 
Norway’s contribution is also noteworthy in terms of generating peace talks on the 
grassroots by bringing together various clan leaders, religious leaders, youth and other 
significant figures of the Somali society. Turkey took over the mediator’s hat from Britain 
and achieved to bring together the Somali government with Somaliland as well as Al-
Shabaab for a round of talks, the latter with support from Norway.  
Turkey’s initiative resulted in the signing of the Ankara Communiqué, the first peace 
agreement between Somalia and Somaliland.
938
 As noted earlier, it was also the first time 
the parties came together at the presidential level. Referring to Turkey’s progress Haşimi 
notes,  
At a time when its mediator role was considered ended, Turkey mediated 
between Somalia and Somaliland – the two actors that everyone had 
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thought would have never come together. There is a moving, effective 
and successful process. But in the end, its success is to be determined by 
the equation there [in Somalia]. At the moment, we know that we are 
able to speak with both parties.
939
 
One of Turkey’s significant achievements was bringing Somalia onto the international 
agenda and triggering the flow of massive aid into the country which raised hopes and 
normalized life to a certain extent in Somalia.
940
 Turkey’s projects aim to have long-term 
impact in the country. Regarding the sustainability of Turkish projects, Hussein notes that, 
“Turkish projects are sustainable but the European projects focus on emergency aid and are 
not really sustainable. Turks are building ports, airports, hospitals, schools which are all 
sustainable.”941 Abdi notes in a similar vein, 
In the port city of Bebera, the Turkish had built a pipe that provides the 
ships with drinking water. It was built a long time ago and still operates. 
Before that, they [sailors] used to bring drinking water from their own 
country thinking they could not drink the water in Somalia but the 
Turkish solved that problem. Also, the fruits that are famous in Somalia 
never had market for it but Turkey now buys fruits such as lemons and 
oranges that are abundant in Somalia. Turkey buys a big quantity and 
brings her currency to us. The other countries do not buy Somali 
products. Turkey asks us, “Why don’t you have fishing companies. We 
need fish. You have the longest shore in Africa.” So Turkey is 
encouraging the Somalis to invest in their shores.
942
 
Ensuring sustainability is a common concern among many Turkish NGOs as well. 
Investing in the education and training to build local capacity is often emphasized as a 
prerequisite for sustainability. For instance, Karaman argues that training medical 
personnel in conflict zones can contribute to the sustainability of medical aid.
943
 Deniz 
Feneri also underscores the importance of sustainability, for instance by providing 
vocational training to local people in a range of areas, from goat farming to fishery.
944
 In 
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order to ensure sustainability and contribute to capacity building, Turkey requires that the 
recipients of scholarships return to Somalia once their studies are completed. According to 
Doctors Worldwide, sustainability is important in the Turkish model.
945
 
With respect to Turkey’s overall foreign policy goals in mediating the Somali conflict, one 
may argue that it has so far achieved several of them. Turkey achieved to earn considerable 
amount of prestige and recognition, both in Africa and internationally as a result of its 
Somali initiative. As also noted by an anonymous senior Turkish diplomat, Turkey’s 
Somali initiative coincides with its rising role as an emerging power, “Somalia brought 
Turkey to the fore in the international arena. The African public evaluates Turkey based on 
its Somali initiative. From Botswana to Mozambique, everyone praises Turkey now. We 
have taken solid steps,” he notes.946  
Despite the fact that its Somali engagement helped Turkey construct an identity as a 
credible and trustable actor in Africa, only time will show whether one may speak of a 
sustainable Turkish role in the country. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to understand Turkey’s mediation in Somalia in order to examine to 
what extent it may differ from Western mediators such as Britain and Norway. Similar to 
the Syrian-Israeli case, mediation was part of Turkey’s broader foreign policy interests in 
the Somali case as well. Mediation, and the peaceful image, helped Turkey increase its 
visibility and legitimacy both in Somalia and in Africa. Africa is a dynamic market with its 
natural resources and dense population. Mediation offers a legitimate ground for Turkey to 
achieve its political and economic goals.  
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Similar to the Syrian-Israeli case, in the Somali case as well, Turkey is an emerging 
mediator which lacks sufficient experience. However, the chapter found that the level of 
commitment Turkey demonstrated and the trust it was able to build since 2011 has come to 
fore as more important criteria for the parties to consult its mediation. Therefore, the study 
found that experience per se may not always be sufficient or necessary for a state to have 
legitimacy as mediator. However, the chapter also found that Turkey does need further 
institutionalization and capacity building to ensure the sustainability of its mediator role. 
Similar to the Syrian-Israeli case, in Somalia as well, Turkey has followed a persuasive 
approach, rather than a coercive one, and its mediation has been rather facilitative. 
However, the fact that during the last round of talks Somalia and Somaliland requested 
Turkey to prepare itself to become more involved in the next round of talks is indicative of 
the level of trust Turkey has been able to build probably as a result of the commitment it 
has demonstrated as well as the level of influence it has exerted. 
Turkey is considered a legitimate actor in Somalia. The positive memories attached to the 
Ottoman past in the country and its Muslim identity provided Turkey with significant 
legitimacy at the entry stage. As such, the Somali case confirms the argument put forth in 
Chapter 2 that culture plays an important role in mediation. Compared to the Syrian-Israeli 
case, culture played a larger role in Somalia. However, the study also found that, while 
cultural ties were important in opening up channels and gaining entry into Somalia, 
delivering sustainable, visible and solid projects was more important in preserving 
Turkey’s legitimacy and credibility.  
The Somali case also demonstrates that means supportive of mediation, such as 
development aid and humanitarian assistance were also important in Turkey’s mediation. 
Turkey utilizes these tools for the realization of its goal of normalization in Somalia. 
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Turkey would benefit from a stable and secure Somalia as a new market for its economic 
goals, and as a gateway to the rest of Africa which is a continent that Turkey aims to 
increase its engagement with. 
The Turkish model also promotes the involvement of non-state actors in peace processes, 
which also helped Turkey foster its credibility as a mediator in Somalia. Turkey also 
followed an inclusive mediation approach in Somalia by bringing together various actors 
including the state, regional administrations, clans, traditional elders, and even Al-
Shabaab.  
For Turkey, security in Somalia is limited to securing its activities on the ground whereas 
for Britain and Norway, the consequences of the conflict in Somalia such as extremism, 
piracy, and migration are considered a threat to their own national security. While Britain 
and Norway are criticized for using security concerns as a cover to legitimize their 
presence in Somalia, Turkey indicates religious links and the direness of the situation as 
reasons for its engagement. 
Although Somalia is still far from reaching comprehensive peace, it may be argued that, 
Turkey has achieved a number of foreign policy goals with its engagement in Somalia. 
However, its engagement is still new and the complexity of the conflict and the volatility 
in the country may hamper the positive image it has been able to portray so far. Its long-
term success as a mediator will largely depend on demonstrating commitment on the 
institutional level and its ability to execute sustainable projects on the ground. 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION 
This thesis investigated to what extent Turkey’s mediation differs from Western modes of 
mediation. In order to answer this question the thesis tried to understand how difference in 
international mediation could be identified, what role mediation plays in the broader 
Turkish foreign policy, why and how Turkey mediates, the main determinants of Turkey’s 
role as a mediator, and whether this is a sustainable role or a temporary one based on 
certain internal or/and external factors.  
To be able to identify Turkey’s difference in mediation, the study drew on the mediation 
literature and applied certain indicators such as previous experience of mediators, their 
motives, characteristics, style, and progress on the cases of the Syrian-Israeli talks and the 
Somali conflict. These indicators helped me make judgements about Turkey’s difference 
vis-à-vis the more traditional Western mediators such as the US in the Syrian-Israeli talks, 
and Britain and Norway in Somalia. For instance, some of the motives of states brought 
out in the literature were search for prestige, exerting influence, preventing spill-over of 
the conflict or legitimizing foreign policy. These indicators were then tested in the two 
cases to understand to what extent Turkish mediation may differ. Similarly, power 
capability of mediators was another indicator which provided significant insight for 
identifying Turkey’s difference in its mediation approach. 
The study sought to examine Turkey’s mediation against the background of change that 
has taken place in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade or so, which, as argued here, 
paved the way for the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role. Drawing on a constructivist 
approach, the thesis has shown that Turkey’s search for a new identity under the 
imperatives of domestic balances as well as the changing regional and international 
landscape paved the way for the emergence of a new vision for its foreign policy. This 
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understanding is also supportive of the agent-structure debate in constructivism which 
argues that the two are mutually constructive. As such, Turkey’s mediator role emerged 
inter alia as a result of the responses of Turkish policy makers to the changing regional 
and international structure in line with developments such as the end of the Cold War, the 
September 11 events and the US-led invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, Turkey’s approach to 
the problems pertaining in its region was determined by the ideas and interests of policy 
makers who envisioned Turkey a role as a regional leader.  
In this respect, the identities and interests of Turkish foreign policy makers, particularly 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, have been influential in the formation of this vision based on the idea of 
becoming more active and influential in post-Ottoman lands by reigniting Turkey’s 
historical-geographical links therein. His vision of mediation, in a way, underlines the new 
sense of Turkish identity as the elements he emphasises well suit the idea of positioning 
Turkey as a sensitive, responsive and culturally attuned regional power.
947
 As such, 
mediation was a role conception for Turkey and part of its expanding foreign policy. It was 
also a tool of achieving its “zero-problems with neighbors” policy while also enhancing its 
regional status and international prestige. 
Turkey’s mediation, and the idea of Turkish policy makers of being able to approach 
mediation differently, is to a large extent part of a deliberate identity construction on 
Turkey’s part. Given the changing international circumstances and the regional difficulties, 
mediation provides an opportunity for Turkey to enhance its influence and position itself 
based on a mixed identity as Western, enabling it to be more influential, and non-Western, 
enabling it to utilize its shared historic ties and being able to act in a new way. In this 
regard, the thesis confirmed its initial argument that when the mediator is a state, its 
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motives to mediate a given conflict are in parallel with its foreign policy interests such as 
enhancing prestige, exerting influence or identity construction through the portrayal of a 
peaceful image.  
Turkey’s mediator role was not only self-attributed but, as evident in the Syrian-Israeli and 
the Somali cases, also developed in response to the demand coming from conflicting 
parties. This demand is indicative of the relational links and the level of trust that Turkey 
was able to build with the parties, which was one of the objectives of the new Turkish 
foreign policy. In the Syrian-Israeli talks, Turkey capitalized on its dual identity as 
Western and non-Western. Turkey was a mediator that could help to reintegrate Syria into 
the international system as well as have access to all actors in the region including Israel’s 
foes such as Hamas and Hezbollah. As such, its dual identity also offers an effective way 
of exerting influence while securing itself in a volatile region. In the Somali case, the 
demand came as a result of the trust Turkey was able to build and the commitment it 
demonstrated on the ground with instruments such as humanitarian assistance and the 
development aid. As such, in intrastate conflicts, Turkey’s mediation comes as “a 
package”948 that includes aid and assistance as peace dividends. This model also promotes 
the involvement of non-state actors such as NGOs and businesses. 
Mediation is also a tool of increasing Turkey’s visibility and legitimacy in its quest to 
become more active and influential in its immediate neighbourhood and in distant 
geographies. While Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks enhanced its visibility 
and legitimacy in the Middle East, its involvement in Somalia became a show case which 
enabled it to portray an image as a credible, committed and legitimate actor in Africa 
which is a new market for Turkey as an emerging power.   
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This thesis has shown that domestic concerns also played an important role for Turkey to 
take on a mediator role. In the Syrian-Israeli case, its mediation role enabled Turkey to 
bring home a “success story” which in turn would divert attention from the contested 2007 
parliamentary elections, legitimize its foreign policy of becoming more active in a region 
such as the Middle East which the previous administrations had avoided, and enhance its 
image as the defender of the Palestinian cause. Similarly, its mediation enabled it to 
legitimize its policy in Somalia and Africa. As such, one of Turkey’s differences was that 
while Britain and Norway securitized their involvement in Somalia by drawing attention to 
extremism, piracy, and migration as threats to its national security, Turkey drew attention 
to the direness of the situation and underlined its religious links with the Somali people. 
However, despite the difference in their portrayal of their motives, one of the similarities 
among them is that the foreign policy goals such as becoming more involved in Somalia lie 
at the root of their interests.  
Turkey preferred to apply a persuasive and facilitative mediation style in both cases. Its 
lack of sufficient hard power prevented it from being coercive and press parties towards a 
resolution, unlike for instance, the US in the Syrian-Israeli talks which was able to pressure 
the parties by using carrots and sticks. Being the only actor that is able to twist Israel’s arm 
or offer incentives such as ensuring security or delivering substantial amounts of aid 
provided the US with a more stable mediator role in the Arab-Israeli talks across the years.  
The Turkish experience also demonstrates that since emerging mediators lack sufficient 
power and leverage compared to more traditional mediators such as the US or Britain, they 
need to be more resourceful and invest more on capacity building, institutionalization, and 
expertise. Similarly, preserving their impartiality is also significant in sustaining their 
image as accountable mediators. As such, emerging mediators need to adopt an impartial 
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image since taking sides and pressing an outcome requires certain power capabilities. As a 
result emerging mediators need to be more persuasive in their approach. For instance, the 
fact that Turkey, Qatar and Iran all took sides during the Arab Spring affected their 
credibility as mediators, which is indicative of the importance of preserving neutrality as a 
mediator.
949
 
In the Somali case, however, Turkey’s courage to enter the country despite all the security 
concerns and its commitment on the ground provided it with a stable mediator role. The 
fact that the parties demanded the expansion of its contribution into a more involved 
mediator role demonstrates the level of trust it was able to build as a mediator. 
One of the important differences of Turkish mediation has been the promotion of Turkey’s 
insiderness and all-inclusiveness. The fact that policy makers frequently highlight 
Turkey’s insider characteristics as an asset for its mediation is also indicative of a 
deliberate identity construction which enables Turkey to be more involved in regional 
issues. The all-inclusive approach also enables Turkey to enhance its relational links with 
various actors as part of its new foreign policy.  
Turkey’s experience in the Syrian-Israeli talks suggests that emerging mediators tend to be 
more enthusiastic in resolving problems pertaining in their regions and their mediator roles 
are generally welcomed as insiders to the problems. The fact that they are more vulnerable 
to a possible spill-over effect of the conflicts in their region and have more insight about 
their dynamics and context brings them forth as preferable mediators in their region.  
This thesis also suggested that culture plays an important role in Turkey’s mediation. 
Turkey capitalizes on its cultural ties as a mediator, particularly on its Muslim identity. In 
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both the Syrian-Israeli and the Somali case, Turkey’s cultural links played an important 
role. However, the study has shown that while culture was important in gaining entry into 
the talks, Turkey’s demonstration of its commitment and determination played a larger role 
during the talks. For instance, the solid projects that Turkey was able to execute on the 
ground played a more important role in Somalia. 
Turkey’s Somali experience illustrates that trust and commitment are two important 
elements in building a credible image as a mediator. It also exemplifies that capacity 
generation through the utilization of both state and non-state actors is significant in 
achieving concrete results particularly in intrastate conflicts. Inclusiveness and the 
involvement of the grassroots are also important elements in building rapport and a 
credible image. In this respect, unlike some other emerging powers such as India or China 
that prefer to concentrate on a bilateral approach in their Africa policy, Turkish 
government is supportive of the involvement of Turkish humanitarian NGOs. This 
approach, which promotes grassroots engagement, is likely to achieve more sustainable 
results particularly in countries, such as Somalia, which lack stable state institutions as a 
result of lengthy civil war. In these circumstances official and civilian capacity 
coordination comes to fore as an important element to consider. 
Despite the positive picture drawn by them, Turkish policy makers seem to be aware of the 
potential contradictions and points of controversy regarding Turkey’s mediation. One of 
the obstacles facing the sustainability of Turkey’s mediator role is the lack of sufficient 
institutionalization and capacity regarding its mediation. Although, there has been 
noteworthy effort to increase the capacity of Turkish Foreign Ministry in recent years,
950
 
these efforts failed to find their way into mediation. The ministry still lacks a department 
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dedicated to mediation as well as experts in the field. In addition, Istanbul Conference on 
Mediation which was being co-organized with Finland annually since 2012 under the 
framework of the Friends of Mediation was not organized this year.  
As such, the level of institutionalization does not live up to the high expectations set for 
Turkey by Turkish policy makers. The degree of confidence, praise and at times 
defensiveness adopted by Turkish actors suggest an exaggerated role for Turkey as a 
regional leader. However, the extensive vision of the current foreign policy, the bold 
rhetoric it is based on coupled with the lack of sufficient institutional infrastructure 
indicate a mismatch of means and ends which is likely to affect the sustainability of 
Turkey’s mediator role. In this respect, the Turkish experience suggests that it is important 
for new players to set realistic goals in their quest for becoming influential actors in global 
politics. 
In a similar vein, mediator states also need to show coherence in their rhetoric and practice 
particularly vis-à-vis the balance between their domestic and foreign policies. As also 
indicated in the study, a common aspect among some emerging powers is their rise as 
norm entrepreneurs on the global stage. Countries like Turkey, Brazil and India criticize 
the existing conduct of international relations and institutions such the UN Security 
Council, the NATO and the EU. They often advocate human rights, democracy and 
equality on international platforms and criticize the West for having double standards.  
While part of their criticism addresses the existing problems on realistic grounds, part of it 
is suggestive of an intention to acquire a bigger share of the cake. On the other hand, they 
have a rather poor domestic record with respect to the norms they advocate in their foreign 
policies. Unlike, for instance, Scandinavian countries, which display a similarity to 
emerging powers in their normative stance, emerging powers fail to employ these norms 
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sufficiently in their domestic politics. It is, however, necessary that they achieve balance 
between their rhetoric and practice to be able to project a credible and reliable image as 
mediators. 
Another obstacle lying ahead is the confrontational attitude that Turkey adopted vis-à-vis 
certain actors in recent years. For instance, Erdoğan’s harsh criticism of Israel regarding its 
attack on Gaza as well as its overall attitude in the Palestinian conflict, were the main 
reason why Israel rejected the renewal of Turkey’s mediator role in the Syrian-Israeli talks. 
The Syrian-Israeli case signals that leverage and the ability to influence the parties may be 
more important characteristics for mediators. In this regard, the “symbolic power”951 
derived from its heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate that Turkey relies on 
may not always be sufficient to influence the parties in a mediation process as well as 
implement the decisions taken on the table. In this respect, the Syrian-Israeli case is also 
indicative of the limits of Turkey’s ability to influence the parties into a resolution. It also 
shows that Turkey needs US support in its mediator role in the region. 
This attitude was also apparent during the Arab Spring in which Turkey has been accused 
of pursuing sectarian politics and taking sides. As such, Turkey’s insiderness, which is put 
forth as a significant tenet by policy makers with respect to its mediation, has turned into a 
disadvantage for Turkey. Until the Arab Spring, the main objective of Turkey’s foreign 
policy was to expand from being a regional power to an international one. To be able to 
achieve that aim, Turkey tried to utilize mediation as an instrument of instituting order by 
ensuring stability and security in the region. The Arab Spring came as a surprise and 
created a setback for Turkey’s regional policy. It has also indicated the limits of Turkey’s 
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capabilities.
952
 For instance, Turkey failed to predict the fall of the Ghaddafi regime and 
the endurance of the Assad regime. The failure of Turkey’s Syrian policy during the Arab 
Spring offers a new context to analyse its previous performance as well as the future of its 
mediator role. It also offers an opportunity for future research to inspect the sustainability 
of this role.  
Turkey had a number of mediation attempts during this period in which it achieved mixed 
results. For instance, while its mediation echoed positive response in Bahrain, it achieved 
partial results in Libya and Iraq. Furthermore, it was not able to achieve any results in 
Syria or Yemen. Furthermore, the Libyan and the Syrian experiences demonstrated that 
Turkey cannot go too far against its Western allies and has limited independence as a 
regional player. Regardless of Turkey’s ambitions to evolve into an international player, 
this seems rather difficult for an actor that is unable to control even its backyard. As such, 
it may be argued that, during the Arab Spring, mediation has turned from being a tool of 
instituting order and expanding Turkey’s area of influence to one of preserving it.953  
Mediation has become part of Turkey’s identity building as an insider actor and it has to 
have a long-term vision in order to secure that role. Turkey’s mediator role has been too 
dependent on its new foreign policy which may challenge its sustainability. The change of 
leadership at the Turkish Foreign Ministry as a result of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s appointment 
as the Prime Minister may be seen as one of the reasons why Turkey seems to have lost its 
enthusiasm in mediation. In addition, the fact that the government has been through certain 
domestic challenges as a result of the corruption scandal it has been facing, its inability to 
resolve the Kurdish issue, and its democratic deficiencies have the potential to challenge 
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its foreign policy. All these elements may risk Turkey’s image as a mediator in the days to 
come. 
Turkey’s experience as an emerging mediator on the periphery illuminates that there is 
now more room for other players to become influential in the international system. The 
approaches of these players may have both similarities and differences from more 
traditional players. Tentatively, the Turkish experience could set an example for 
understanding the roles of other emerging powers particularly as agents of peace. 
Despite certain setbacks, Turkey needs to embrace mediation as an important policy tool in 
such a volatile region. As the recent report by the UNHCR also reveals, Turkey is currently 
home to the largest number of refugees in the world which is a direct result of the conflicts 
in the region.
954
 The dire consequences of the Arab Spring signal the value that mediation 
deserves as a non-violent tool of conflict resolution. The future of Turkey’s mediator role 
is dependent upon the willingness of policy makers and also the improvement of the 
current condition of Turkish mediation by investing in institutionalization, capacity 
building and expertise. So long as the necessary measures are taken, mediation would be 
an integral part of Turkish foreign policy. 
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